Bay of Pigs Forty Tears after (National Security Archive):In its final online release of material related to the conference, the National Security Archive has also posted audio recordings of two telephone conversations between President Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, on March 2, 1963, in which they discuss concerns that a Senate investigating committee might reveal that the president had authorized jets from the U.S. aircraft carrier Essex to provide one hour of air cover for the brigade's B-26 bombers on the morning of April 19. The unmarked jets failed to rendezvous with the bombers, however, because the CIA and the Pentagon were unaware of a time zone difference between Nicaragua and Cuba. Two B-26s were shot down and four Americans lost.
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/Bits in there relevant to this fandango they are celebrating in Miami.
INVASION at Bay of PigsIn a desperate last-ditch effort to support the invasion, a limited air strike was approved on April 19, but it would not be enough, and four American pilots lost their lives that day. At 2:30 p.m., brigade commander “Pepe” Perez San Roman ordered radio operator Julio Monzon Santos to transmit a final message from brigade 2506. “We have nothing left to fight with, “ San Roman said, his voice breaking, “how can you people do this to us, our people, our country? Over and out.”
Without supplies or air cover, the invading forces fell. To them, the lack of air cover was a direct betrayal. In the end, 200 rebel soldiers were killed, and 1,197 others were captured.
“There’s no question that the brigade members were competent, valiant, and committed in their efforts to salvage a rapidly deteriorating situation in a remote area,” writes Bissell. “Most of them had no previous professional military training, yet they mounted an amphibious landing and conducted air operations in a manner that was a tribute to their bravery and dedication. They did not receive their due.”
“The reality,” writes Schlesinger, “was that Fidel Castro turned out to be a far more formidable foe and in command of a far better organized regime than anyone had supposed. His patrols spotted the invasion at almost the first possible moment. His planes reacted with speed and vigor. His police eliminated any chance of sabotage or rebellion behind the lines. His soldiers stayed loyal and fought hard. He himself never panicked; and, if faults were chargeable to him, they were his overestimate of the strength of the invasion and undue caution in pressing the ground attack against the beachhead. His performance was impressive.” http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/baypigs/pigs5.htmSounds a little like the ignorant hubris we are now seeing in Iraq.
A Deniability DebacleOn April 15 at the United Nations, U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson rose to defend his country from charges by the Cubans that the planes attacking the island received U.S. support. He derided the allegations as being "without foundation," and said that the planes "to the best of our knowledge were Castro's own air force planes and, according to the pilots, they took off from Castro's own air force fields." In addition, Stevenson displayed a photo of one of the planes and pointed out its Cuban markings.
As David Phillips, the CIA's propaganda chief, monitored the events at the U.N., he was shocked by Stevenson's statements. As he later wrote: "As I watched Stevenson defend the deceitful scheme a chill moved through my body. What had we done? Adlai Stevenson had been taken in by the hoax! Had no one bothered to tell our Ambassador at the United Nations of the deception involved in the air strike?" In fact, Stevenson had not been briefed on the plans, and was later enraged to find that he had repeated the CIA cover story before the international community.
Within a day, it became apparent that the planes could not have been from the Cuban air force, and as the exile brigade landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, U.S. denials of involvement with the operation lay in ruins.
After the invasion, Kennedy appointed a small, secret commission to evaluate the causes of failure at the Bay of Pigs. Among their conclusions was a statement on the challenges of conducting a secret war: "A paramilitary operation of the magnitude of Zapata
could not be prepared and conducted in such a way that all U.S. support of it and connection with it could be plausibly denied."
http://www.parascope.com/articles/1296/debacle.htmThis all makes scintilating reading for people that think our spooks
are up to the job of "protecting" us.