http://www.prudentbear.com/archive_comm_article.asp?category=Guest+Commentary&content_idx=39603In the concluding “Credit Bubble Bulletin” for the year, Doug Noland characterized 2004 as the “Year It Didn’t Matter” and hypothesized that 2005 may be the year it does. “It” being a catchall for all the negatives and vicissitudes of the past year which seemed to have no visible effect on a U.S. economy which grew at around 4%, long rates and spreads which actually contracted, ebullient equity markets spurted and residential real estate continued to climb. Some of these ignored difficulties include 125 bps of rate increases by the Fed, continuing internal deficit and expanding external deficit, sliding dollar and all time record credit expansion.
Perusing the first WSJ of the year, the issue that corrals all visible economists for forecast, the year looks to be more of the same. The consensus sees 3.6% growth, a long bond inching up to 4.7%, inflation decreasing to 2.5% and the dollar pretty much unchanged from yearend. Separately, the savants of markets see high single-digit to low double-digit equity returns, corporate profits up 10%, and slightly less rapid sales and appreciation in housing.
In the afore-mentioned Bulletin, Doug chronicled the latest innovation from the “Financial Engineers”, the CDO SQUARED’S. This most fascinating vehicle seemingly (we say seemingly because we admit we still don’t fully comprehend the invention) are leveraged (we don’t know how much) pools of “Synthetic” CDO’s which are composed of pools of credit default swaps. If you are not confused by now, you are ahead of the writer. (CDO’s started out as Collateralized Debt Obligations or in vernacular, puddles of debt consisting of underlying loans as collateral.)
Presumably the buyer of one of these things receives a neat, computer generated, analysis of risk, credit quality, etc. with all the usual disclaimers. With 50 years experience in credit analysis we declare that we would find it hopeless to even attempt to do such a risk analysis, but computers and financial engineers obviously can. When thinking of Will “It” ever matter? abominations such as this seem to suggest that maybe the financial world is getting close. I sometimes read a quirky individual known as “The Mogambo Guru” and he summed up the situation recently with a valid quote from the “old” Henry Ford! “It is well that the people of the nation do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning.” These systems’ evolution would probably provoke an even more evocative comment from “Old Henry” now.
Covering two topics in one paragraph, we will refer again to Credit default swaps, the supposed underlying fodder in synthetic CDO’s as described above. These instruments, according to a Fitch Study we saw quoted, more than doubled in the last year. Since product inception in the early 1990’s, growth has been rapid, but not this exponential. The new notional totals are north of $3 trillion and are increasingly being competitively issued by hedge funds at lower premiums than the originators, the money center banks and prime brokers are willing to accept. These are “over the counter,” unregulated footnote accounted for instruments deeply buried, where they can be tracked in 10Q’s and K’s (Of course, for the portion issued by hedge funds, their opacity is total). A supposition we read (in Grant’s Interest Rate Observer) which seems reasonable is that the likelihood that issuers, again, particularly hedge funds known to be enamored of trading in volatility, will have hedged some of this risk in the actual debt markets. With an increment of more than $1.5 trillion in 2004, such hedging would add an “artificial” or added demand factor of, for example $300 billion in the BB or less debt markets if 20% had been hedged. This may be a partial answer to the puzzling situation of lower grade debt spreads actually having contracted considerably against treasuries in 2004 counter-intuitively. 2004 will go down as the oddity of a year where the Fed raised 125 bps and longer debt, treasury, investment grade AND junk/emerging markets rates stayed low and, other than treasuries, contracted against that benchmark. The benchmark treasury immobility over the year from 4.20 to 4.20 is fairly easy to understand. It started with the Japanese buying some $300 billion in the 1st quarter and continued through the 3rd quarter with the “Oil producers” buying $80 billion after several years absence from the market. (Have to bet that they were thrilled to do so or, in the absence of the Japanese, did they get a little hint from Snow et al?) For those who look at the Fed Z1, it can be ascertained that the “Caribbean” continued to be a big net buyer of U.S. debt. Not that those little islands have hundreds of billions but that is where the “offshore companies” wind up being reported. This is confirmation that the “telegraphed” Fed “measured” policy of rising rates has enabled the carry trade players to continue to play. Add together all of the foregoing and there is possibly an inkling of an answer to some very puzzling 2004 debt market action. From a risk standpoint, none of the above has ameliorated the multi-year acceleration of risk in an ever-increasingly leveraged, convoluted and opaque debt explosion. Add up the $700 trillion of foreign debt demand and the hypothetical $200-400 billion of credit default hedging artificial demand and the supply to meet demand is there even with a national savings rate of +/- ZERO.
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