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But it is worth taking a step back and taking a fuller look at General Clark's record. The larger story is this: General Clark believed the stakes were so high for NATO that the alliance needed to be prepared to confront Mr. Milosevic militarily.
When the fighting erupted, General Clark managed to keep the alliance intact. Along with Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, he believed that NATO could not ensure victory by relying on airstrikes alone and needed to have the option of using ground troops — a view that that put General Clark at odds with a risk-averse Pentagon, but one that was supported by many strategic experts.
NATO's military campaign was not perfect by any means. But the general's judgment on those critical issues seems pretty solid when viewed in perspective: a humanitarian wrong was righted and NATO won its first and only war.
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It was important for NATO to take a stand in the Balkans and foolish for the alliance to go to war with one hand tied behind its back. Conventional air power had never previously won a war single-handedly and there was no guarantee that it would succeed in Kosovo in a reasonable time frame. General Clark's insistence on preparing a ground option was sound military doctrine.
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Britain was the United States' staunchest ally, and so the Clinton administration decided to defer to the British position. Still, General Clark's recommendation was not rash; it was a judgment call that had been discussed in detail in Washington and that was initially supported at senior levels of the American government.
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But the record also indicates that the general had very difficult questions to contend with and that his judgment on some of the crucial issues was sound.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/03/politics/03CND-GORD.html?hpDTH