http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8272787/site/newsweek/~snip~
A cache of secret British government memos, obtained by British journalist Michael Smith and recently spread around the Internet, depict the quiet diplomatic struggle between the two governments leading up to the war. In them, senior Blair aides expressed early concerns that Bush's blueprint for the Iraq invasion was hastily conceived, overly optimistic and legally shaky. British officials won't comment on the content of the memos. But they haven't disputed their authenticity, and some may be glad they leaked: for the most part, the memos show that the Brits were presciently worried about what could go wrong in the war and its aftermath.
One of the papers, the "Downing Street Memo," has caused the biggest stir. The memo is the minutes of a July 23, 2002, meeting between Blair and top advisers. In it, Richard Dearlove, head of the British foreign-intelligence service M.I.6, reported on a trip to Washington. "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route... There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath..." Antiwar activists have seized on the memo as a smoking gun, saying it proves Bush cooked intel—and that he had already decided to attack Iraq at the same time he was insisting he would use force only as a last resort.
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But by summer 2002, some in Blair's inner circle had concluded Bush was beyond British influence. A July 21 paper recounts that, during a spring meeting with Bush at the president's Crawford ranch, Blair had told the president he would "support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain conditions were met." Blair wanted Bush to make a serious effort to "construct a coalition" and "exhaust" the efforts of U.N. weapons inspectors. The Brits no longer believed Bush would meet those conditions, however: "... we face the real danger that the US will commit themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to support," the paper says.
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Even so, Blair stuck close to Bush. The Brits held out hope that they would play a larger role in rebuilding Iraq. Instead, they found themselves marginalized, with top posts in Baghdad going to Bush loyalists instead of British hands with years of field experience. Some British officials privately believe they are still regarded as junior partners—nice to have around, as long as they keep their mouths shut.