...not to mention their fuel consumption, For example, a CH-47D Chinook helicopter consumes 130000 gallons of fuel in its
effort to refuel the force with 200000 gallons.
<snip>
The Helicopter's Grim Future in Modern Combat
December 3, 2003
by Ralph Omholt
Despite our rapid defeat of the Iraqi army last spring, one clear lesson that has emerged from both the combat and occupation phases of the war is that the entire concept of helicopter operations in battle is undermined by their extreme vulnerability to ground fire.
Unlike our experience in the jungles and wooded mountains of Vietnam, the helicopter is a prime and easy target in desert and urban warfare environments such as we have seen in Somalia, and are still seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The combat record of the helicopter in Vietnam was different from subsequent battlefields. That was true by virtue of the limitations of the Viet Cong-NVA firing accuracy, the limitations of their weaponry - including quantity - and the visual limitations of the jungle or forests which served to protect the helicopters flying overhead. It was also true that the UH-1 Huey was a simple and tough helicopter, easily repaired. The application of the helicopter was uniquely successful in a unique environment. And, their relatively low cost ensured that quantity was rarely a factor.
The harsh reality is that today the helicopter is a terrible choice of troop transport or firepower against any competent or well-equipped force - of any size. Whether in Mogadishu 10 years ago or Iraq today, the helicopter equation has changed for the worse. Typically, the adversary's ground arms are more available. And whether by luck or skill, the effectiveness of enemy ordnance is far greater than that experienced in Vietnam.
While the details remain unclear eight months after the fact, the only major battle in the Iraq war centered on U.S. attack helicopters ended in mission failure. The raid involved 40 AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters that attacked Iraqi Republican Guard units south of Baghdad on March 24. One was shot down (the two crewmen taken prisoner) and 30 returned to base having sustained severe damage. The Washington Post subsequently reported:
"In attacking a formation of about 40 Apache Longbows on Monday, the Iraqis staged a classic helicopter ambush first perfected by the North Vietnamese in the 1960s. As the lethal, tank-killing aircraft approached on a mission to destroy the Medina Division's dispersed armor, troops dispersed throughout a palm-lined residential area and opened fire with antiaircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades and a wall of fire from rifles and other small arms. ... "The Iraqi fire was so intense that the Apaches had to break off their mission and return to base."
<more>
<link>
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Defensewatch_120303_Helicopter,00.html <snip #2>
Fueling the Force in the Army After Next—Revolution or Evolution?
by Captain Marc Lawton and Captain Tacildayus Andrews
Today's Army is heavily dependent on oil and its byproducts as the primary fuel for the force. Yet oil reserves are limited. Current predictions indicate that the decline of oil reserves will coincide with the timeline for implementing Army After Next (AAN) technologies. AAN plans for the year 2025 and beyond call for a more fuel-efficient Army—in particular, making fossil fuel powered vehicles up to 75 percent more efficient. Unfortunately, little or no effort is being directed toward developing and using alternative energy sources. This is a shortsighted plan that leaves the Army vulnerable to another 1970's-like oil crisis. Now is the time to pursue a revolution in technology rather than merely accepting the currently proposed evolution in technology. Logic and national security concerns mandate a complete break from fossil fuel dependence. One such revolutionary change is the use of hydrogen—a resource that no country or organization can monopolize—as a fuel.
<more>
<link>
http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug99/MS406.htm