August 4, 2005
Special Report
Narcotics and Economics Drive U.S. Policy in Latin America
Washington
By The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists*
At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on March 5, 1998, Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, then head of the U.S. Southern Command, laid out the rationale for a large-scale U.S. military aid program unfolding for Colombia.
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One country—Colombia—was at the center of all potential and peril, and it became the focus of an unprecedented U.S. military and economic aid package to the region. The country is in the grips of a five-decade-old guerrilla war, with powerful left-wing armies—who effectively control about 40 percent of Colombia—countered by a growing right-wing paramilitary movement that uses ghoulish death-squad tactics against its presumed enemies. Colombia continues to be the leading producer of narcotics destined for the U.S. market. In 1999, according to the United Nations, Colombia supplied an estimated 66 percent of the world’s cocaine supply—a staggering 300 metric tons annually. Both the leftist guerrilla groups and the paramilitaries are engorging their armies on the profits of that drug trade.
Colombia also leads the world in violence, with 77.5 murders per 100,000 people each year—more than 13 times the U.S. rate. A third of the world’s terrorist attacks occur in Colombia and more than half the kidnappings. Leftist rebel groups—including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known by its Spanish acronym FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN—are well-funded, sophisticated insurgencies. In 1998, then-Colombian Defense Minister Gilberto Echeverri estimated that the rebels pulled in $1 billion in revenue that year from kidnapping, extortion and participation in the country’s lucrative drug trade. The paramilitaries, with an estimated 8,000 men and women under arms, are intimately tied to drug-smuggling cartels. Their trademark is wanton disrespect for human life, and they are responsible for two-thirds of the estimated 4,000 annual political murders in Colombia.
Ever since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, U.S. presidents have asserted their prerogatives in the Americas. From gunboat diplomacy to propping up shaky dictatorships in the Cold War to fighting the war on drugs, the United States has been deeply involved in the affairs of Latin America. To varying degrees, economic motivations have always influenced U.S. policy makers and underlain their approach to the region. Rarely, however, have human rights been of foremost concern in Washington’s involvement in Latin America. Indeed, U.S. military aid to the region has often been implicated in human rights abuses. Clinton even issued a mea culpa in 1999 after a Guatemalan truth commission found that U.S. military and intelligence aid had helped the Guatemalan military commit "acts of genocide" against the Mayans during that country’s 36-year civil war. Yet when Clinton’s own administration—and Congress—confronted the turmoil in Colombia, it took the traditional approach to Latin America. And, though corporate interests, military strategic needs, and law enforcement concerns were all duly taken into account in formulating a policy toward Colombia, respect for human rights could—quite literally—be waived by the president in favor of other priorities.
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