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Edited on Mon Oct-20-03 10:22 AM by Aidoneus
If "moderate" is just defined as an interchangeable euphemism for "collaborator", as it so often is, and "radical" for "independent"--then the model is irreconciliably flawed right out of the blocks.
Ayatallah al-Udma Sayyid Sistani personally downplays the potential for conflict with Sayyid Sadr; Sistani shifts the blame for the tension on the occupation itself. The both of them oppose the occupation and are generally for Islamic laws applied as the most fair tool of judgement--whatever is said about Sistani in the press that is meant to flatter him and set him aside from the Sadrs or Hakims in the same respect are inaccurate.
The difference between them is mostly a generation gap (that, and the Persian-born Sistani is of the exalted position of Grand Ayatallah, as Sadr's martyred father was, and Muqtada Sadr himself as the lesser accomplished position of Hojjatolleslam but aspiring towards the position of Ayatallah), a demographic gap that dates back a decade to the competition between Sistani and Sadr's father after the death of the previous highest Najafi authority in the early 90s. Sayyid Sistani may be the most respected leader in the Najafi hawaza among the elder generation, notoriously passive, but Sadr has the wider draw of his father's among the younger generation and working poor sections of society exactly because he is an activist leader and not passive. Striking at Sadr would overnight give him exponentially more admiration than he'd otherwise get on his own strengths.
No self-respecting faction in Iraq would support the invaders suppressing any among them, though some may favour it in a burst of opportunistic self-promotion. Along those lines, it is speculated that some of the older Shia factions like Hakim's SAIRI and the 3 branches of al-Daawa signed on to the quisling council just because they couldn't match the same activist popular support that the Sadrists can and instead hedged their bets with receiving power on a platter from the invaders rather than from popular consent. At any rate, they're all resting on the safe bet that should there be any real democratic tally taken, the lion's share of power is delivered to the various Shia factions anyway. That is exactly the reason no such democratic election has yet to or will take place any time soon (when's that other puppet Karzai's election, anyway?), as well as on the side the fact that the first two demands of any real independent Iraqi popular body will demand the 2 things the invaders don't plan to give up--immediate removal of all foreign armies from Iraq, and full Iraqi control of economic wealth and services. Instead, Bremer wants to get all services and oil sold off to multinational corps before going forward with an election probably as dubious as the rigged mechamism that Russia went through with their puppet Kadryov.
What would I suggest be done about them? It may be too late to prevent something like the Israeli invaders/occupation forces faced in Lebanon (with the parallel of the students of Sadr's father and Fadlallah being the first bursts of what would later become a widely popular resistance), but I would suggest putting all power to a real Iraqi government, elected through popular participation and not a selected handful of consentual quislins, arranage funds for humanitarian aid and reconstruction (not peacekeepers or any such charade) to be channeled through the UN and Iraqi-accepted NGOs to repay for the catastrophic damage deliberately brought about in Iraq, and removing all foreign troops immediately before making things irreconciliably fractured. I know that's not going to happen, for the colonization project as yet has cost far too much to duck out without a return on the investment for the criminals behind this. So as a practical step towards perhaps defusing things, first of all ceasing all harassment of independent Iraqis, for that will just make heroes of them and push them further into the camp of open resistance.
Sadr recently made a remarkable offer for a concession--that he would drop his opposition to the quisling Iraqi Governing Council if the colonial-proconsul Bremer's veto over it was dropped. As a practical course, I would suggest taking whatever olive branch that is offered up in the situation, be grateful that any such concession is even offered, and not inflame an unfolding catastrophe any more than it has already.
But it may be a bit late for that, and what I personally would suggest is really resting upon the assumption of an open window that is perhaps already shut. If that is the case then it is already on the model of Lebanon, and all that really can be done is to bleed needlessly and lash out blindly, only to be thrown out at some later date, like the British were before for example. :shrug:
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