Potential Bush-CIA crisis
TODAY'S COLUMNIST
By John B. Roberts II
September 1, 2005
George Tenet is not going to let himself become the fall guy for the September 11 intelligence failures, according to a former intelligence officer and a source friendly to Mr. Tenet.
A scathing report by Inspector General John Helgerson criticized the former CIA director and a score of other agency personnel for their failure to develop a strategy against al Qaeda. The report, delivered to Congress this week, recommends punitive sanctions for Mr. Tenet, former Deputy Director of Operations James L. Pavitt and former counter-terrorist center head J. Cofer Black. Mr. Tenet's response to the report is a 20-page, tightly knitted rebuttal of responsibility prepared with the aid of a lawyer, according to the friendly source.
Mr. Tenet's decision to defend himself against the charges in the report poses a potential crisis for the White House. According to a former clandestine services officer, the former CIA director turned down a publisher's $4.5 million book offer because he didn't want to embarrass the White House by rehashing the failure to prevent September 11 and the flawed intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Tenet, according to a knowledgeable source, had a "wink and a nod" understanding with the White House that he wouldn't be scapegoated for intelligence failings. The deal, one source says, was sealed with the award of the Presidential Freedom Medal.
Now that deal may be off. Mr. Tenet's rebuttal to the report is detailed and explicit. In defending his integrity as CIA director, Mr. Tenet treads perilously close to affirming the account of Richard Clarke, the former NSC terrorism official whose public disclosure of the Bush administration's delay in adopting a strategy against al Qaeda stirred controversy last summer.
The IG report is the result of a 17-month investigation by a team of 11 CIA officials. The Senate and House intelligence oversight committees requested the report, which follows in a CIA tradition of analyses of past mistakes in order to prevent recurrences. After double-agent Aldrich Ames was unmasked, the CIA inspector general produced a detailed account of the agency's failure to protect its Soviet spies. That report, which was made public, prompted sweeping changes in CIA counterintelligence practices.
In contrast, the IG report and Mr. Tenet's 20-page rebuttal are classified. This is a departure from past CIA practice. There is much about the IG report that is unusual. It was completed, according to multiple intelligence sources, by July 2004. Acting CIA Director John McLaughlin passed this hot potato to his successor, Porter Goss. As chairman of the House intelligence committee, Mr. Goss had lead the joint congressional inquiry into September 11 and called for the inspector general's report.
In an abundance of fairness, Mr. Goss gave agency personnel whose performance was criticized by the IG time to review files and respond in their own defense. This one-year delay in its issuance, coupled with the decision to classify the report, give ammunition to partisan critics.
This isn't about avoiding sanctions. Insiders agree that career-ending letters of reprimand are about the most severe punishment CIA officials will face. Messrs. Tenet, Pavitt and Black have all left the agency. What is at stake for them is personal honor and their legacy in failing to prevent September 11.
In criticizing Mr. Tenet for lack of a strategy to fight al Qaeda, the IG report goes to the heart of the September 11 failure. Mr. Tenet's defense inevitably leads to the sensitive issue of the CIA briefings of the president and other senior officials in the summer of 2001
http://washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20050831-091719-1217r.htm