Intelligence Problems In Iraq Are Detailed

[RamboLiberal]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14278-2003Oct24.html

The U.S. military intelligence gathering operation in Iraq is being undercut by a series of problems in using technology, training intelligence specialists and managing them in the field, according to an internal Army evaluation.

A report published this week by the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., uses unusually blunt language to identify the intelligence problems and to recommend solutions. In discussing the training of intelligence specialists, for example, it states that commanders reported that younger officers and soldiers were unprepared for their assignments, "did not understand the targeting process" and possessed "very little to no analytical skills."

In a related assessment, the report also states that reserve troops specializing in civil affairs and psychological operations sent earlier this year to Afghanistan received "marginally effective" training before their deployment. "The poor quality of mission preparation was inexcusable given that the operation was over a year and a half old," it concludes.

The Army critique of U.S. intelligence efforts in Iraq is especially noteworthy, because the Bush administration and senior military commanders have maintained for months that more U.S. troops are not needed in Iraq, and that what is needed, instead, is better intelligence. The report discloses, for example, that the intelligence teams already operating in Iraq have been far less productive than the Army expected them to be. The 69 "tactical human intelligence teams" operating in the country at the time of the study, at the beginning of the summer, should have been producing "at least" 120 reports a day, but instead were delivering an average total of 30, it states. It attributes that apparent underperformance to "the lack of guidance and focus" from the intelligence office overseeing the teams' work.

[TacticalPeek]

1. Responsibility for FUBAR is detailed:

snip

The third personnel move may be most significant of all. Last month, Rumsfeld sent one of his closest aides, Stephen Cambone, to the new position of under secretary of defense for intelligence, created to have a single office overseeing the organization, planning and execution of military intelligence missions.

Cambone's new position also oversees assets that used to belong elsewhere, most notably a secret intelligence organization that specializes in large-scale "deep penetration" missions in foreign countries, especially tapping communications and laying the groundwork for overt military operations. This organization, code-named "Gray Fox," now effectively reports to the office of the secretary of defense.

Asked about the transfer of control of Gray Fox, Cambone said, "We won't talk about those things."

snip

WaPo

With this record, I wouldn't talk 'these things' either.