http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-03-23-iraq-rebuild_x.htm3/23/2006 11:09 PM
BAGHDAD — The head of the U.S.-led program to rebuild Iraq said Thursday that the Iraqi government can no longer count on U.S. funds and must rely on its own revenues and other foreign aid, particularly from Gulf nations.
"The Iraqi government needs to build up its capability to do its own capital budget investment," Daniel Speckhard, director of the U.S. Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, told reporters.
The burden of funding reconstruction poses an extraordinary challenge for a country that needs tens of billions of dollars for repairing its infrastructure at the same time it's struggling to pay its bills. Iraq's main revenue source — oil — is hampered by insurgent attacks on production facilities and pipelines, forcing the country to spend $6 billion a year on oil imports.
Iraq's deputy finance minister, Kamal Field al-Basri, said it was "reasonable" for the United States to sharply cut back its reconstruction efforts after spending about $21 billion. "We should be very much dependent on ourselves," al-Basri said in an interview.
Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East expert at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, called
the U.S. reconstruction effort "a dismal failure. It hasn't met any of its goals. It's left a legacy of half-built projects, built to U.S. standards, which Iraq doesn't have the capability to maintain."...more...
US: Halliburton's Performance Worsens under Second Iraqi Oil ContractThese documents show that between July 2004 and July 2005, Halliburton 's performance under RIO 2 repeatedly received scathing critiques:
• Intentional Overcharging: The PCO board evaluating Halliburton 's request for award fees found that Halliburton repeatedly overcharged the taxpayer, apparently intentionally. In one case, "ost estimates had hidden rate factors to increase cost of project without informing the Government." In another instance, Halliburton "tried to inflate cost estimate by $26M." In yet a third example, Halliburton claimed costs for laying concrete pads and footings that the Iraqi Oil Ministry had "already put in place."
• Exorbitant Costs: The PCO reported that Halliburton was "accruing exorbitant indirect costs at a rapid rate" and that Halliburton 's "lack of cost containment and funds management is the single biggest detriment to this program." The oversight contractor found a "lack of cost control … in Houston, Kuwait, and Iraq." In a partial review of the RIO 2 contract, DCAA auditors challenged $45 million in costs as unreasonable or unsupported.
• Inadequate Cost Reporting: The PCO found that Halliburton "universally failed to provide adequate cost information," had "profound systemic problems," provided "substandard" cost reports that did "not meet minimum standards," and submitted reports that had been "vetted of any information that would allow tracking of details." The oversight contractor complained about "unacceptable unchecked cost reports."
• Schedule Delays: Halliburton 's work under RIO 2 was continually plagued by delays. According to the PCO, Halliburton had a "50% late completion" rate for RIO 2 projects. Evaluations by the award fee board noted "untimely work" and "schedule slippage."
• Refusal to Cooperate: PCO evaluations described Halliburton as "obstructive" with oversight officials. Despite the billions in taxpayer funds Halliburton has been paid, the company's "leadership demonstrated minimal cooperative attitude resolving problems."