According to this report from the NACLA, this law is politially driven by the ruling ARENA party (background below) to garner support for the upcoming March 2004 presidential elections. Get this, it's a temporary measure that ends with the final days of the current ARENA administration.
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...Opposition parties criticize the use of dangerous and repressive measures to combat a social problem that demands a more comprehensive approach. Some legislators have compared it to declaring a "war on young people," and speculate that, without complementary measures to treat the root causes of gang violence, the plan will generate even more violence.
The law, approved as a temporary measure, will be in effect for six months, a period coinciding with the final days of the Flores administration. The crackdown is widely recognized as a strategy of the ruling ARENA party to garner support for the upcoming March 2004 presidential elections.
El Salvador is not alone in allowing heavily armed soldiers to police poor neighborhoods. Similar operations are being used in Honduras and Guatemala, as police representatives from across Central America work together on a coordinated campaign to use military force to combat the threat of gang violence.
In less than three months, the Mano Dura Plan has resulted in more than 3,000 arrests, the majority of which appear to be arbitrary roundups of youth with characteristics of gang affiliation. Of those arrested, approximately 80% have been released due to lack of evidence.
http://www.nacla.org/art_display.php?art=2290
Background on the ARENA party:
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ARENA Party of El Salvador
ARENA: Nationalist Republican Aliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista)
ARENA was formed in September 1981 by rightist military officers and landowners as well as leaders of the death squads. The volatile and charismatic Roberto D'Aubuisson quickly became the party's leader. D'Aubuisson combined fierce anti-communism, fiery nationalism, and a willingness to fight his opponents using any means at hand, including murder. He succeeded in building support for his hardline policies among the traditional supporters of the oligarchy, and extended the right's influence to some elements of the rural poor. Although D'Aubuisson enjoyed great support among ARENA party members, his prominence within its leadership insured that the United States would work against ARENA coming to power.
In 1985, D'Aubuisson stepped down as party president in an apparent effort to moderate the party's image. His replacement, Alfredo Cristiani, was a wealthy coffee grower who had been considered D'Aubuisson's protégé. D'Aubuisson was named ARENA's "president for life" and he continued to weild much influence within the party until his death.
During the 1980s, ARENA was characterized by a hard-line approach to dealing with the guerrilla insurgency. Time and again, ARENA rejected meaningful negotiations with the FMLN. Its intransigence helped secure ARENA's place as the preeminent rightist party. ARENA also drew support because of its nationalistic criticism of U.S. interference in Salvadoran politics. Although never rejecting U.S. aid, ARENA argued that political and human rights conditions imposed by the U.S. violated Salvadoran sovereignty and were helping to prolong the war by blocking the scorched earth strategy urged by ARENA.
With the declining popularity of the Christian Democrats and the improved image of ARENA cultivated by Cristiani, the U.S., which had once seen an ARENA presidential victory as a catastrophe, came to accept the new ARENA government which took power in 1989. Although the Cristiani administration initially indicated some openness to a negotiated end to the war, a spate of human rights abuses by the military and rightists, along with provocations from the FMLN, from September to November of 1989 signaled that the war was far from over.
http://www.icomm.ca/carecen/page71.html