on the subject after his first tour of duty in Iraq. It wasn't called out specifically, but using his formula, that's what is now calculated as needed to pacify a city the size of Baghdad. I haven't read the paper, only what was reported on it in the MSM. I believe that he was questioned on the discrepancy in his confirmation hearings... I didn't see his response. As to my remark about 2 years ago... that's just my opinion. Of course, Patraeus wasn't the first general to come up with such estimates, the Army chief of staff, Gen. Shinseki, had a similar or larger number in mind and said so to Congress before the invasion which effectively ended his career in the U.S. Army... read
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Shinsekimany other now retired (forced from office) generals have now come forward and stated that Shinseki was correct and that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz (now both removed from the DoD) were completely wrong.
Right after the fall of Baghdad, had we taken the following steps, things might be much different than today...
1. Do not disband the Iraqi Army... ask the top Baathist generals to retire (at full pay, mind you)... but keep the troops and let them keep their light weapons (rifles and sidearms).
2. Immediately secure the Iraqi ammo dumps with American soldiers (needed more than we invaded with for this).
3. Allowed the Iraqi army to secure their own cultural and business establishments (with almost invisible American supervision).
4. Started an immediate war recovery effort by hiring thousands of Iraqi people to rebuild their own country.
5. Before the anything else, bring all the tribal leaders and religious leaders (Sunni, Shia, Kurd) together and agree on a framework for sharing oil revenues. Lift all sanctions and get the oil industry back on it's feet. Then talk about democracy and voting and so on.
6. Set a date certain that the US forces would leave. Do NOT occupy Saddam's palaces and start building permanent installations and green zones and such (people have a way of thinking that if you are building a huge embassy and permanent army bases and so on, that you might be thinking of not leaving.
I think that had we done this, rather than the war profiteering and Neocon laboratory for international empire building, we might be in much better shape there (actually, we might well be gone from there and now dealing with other international situations, and from a position of strength rather than weakness because of failure).