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Published on Friday, May 18, 2001 in the New York Times 'Private Contractors' Role of U.S. Companies in Colombia Is Questioned by Juan Forero BOGOTÁ, Colombia, May 17 — Their presence grew as Colombia's drug war intensified in the 1990's, with the United States hiring American pilots, radar operators, former Army Special Forces trainers and other former military personnel to carry out important missions.
Under private contracts known to only a few members of the United States Congress, these specialists — all working for American companies — have flown spray planes and helicopters, trained and advised Colombian military personnel, repaired high-tech machinery and helped pave remote airfield runways. Supporters of private contractors say that, overall, the companies have completed important work while relieving key American military specialists who would otherwise have had to uproot from strategically significant regions.
But now questions are being raised in the American Congress and even by Colombian officials about the logic of relying on private companies for operations that are not open to public scrutiny.
Americans working in Colombia are constantly exposed to danger, critics note, with three American pilots killed since 1997 when their spray planes crashed. Also of concern to policy makers in Washington and military officials here is whether the United States should be spending tens of millions of dollars annually on contractors when Colombian officials say Colombians could be trained to complete the same operations for much less money.
Indeed, the largest of the companies operating in Colombia, DynCorp of Reston, Va., a $1.4 billion company that has handled many tasks here in the last 10 years, was awarded a five- year, $170 million contract in 1998, according to government reports. American Congressional aides familiar with DynCorp say the company's pilots can earn more than $100,000 a year conducting operations that Colombian pilots could do for less than $40,000 a year.
"When we get a contractor here, we always think we could probably get a Colombian to do this, and a lot cheaper," said a high-ranking official in President Andrés Pastrana's administration who is familiar with contractors. "We can do it with a Colombian company, and it would cost 60 percent less." (snip/...) http://commondreams.org/headlines01/0518-02.htm~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From C.I.P. online: Counternarcotics or counterinsurgency?
The lack of conditions or transperency over contractors' military activities gives rise to concerns about their congruence with U.S. policy. U.S. officials like Ambassador Anne Patterson reassure that "the political stomach for going into the counter-insurgency business is zero. It is not going to happen." {Article text from Colombian Defense Ministry} Nonetheless, some observers worry that contractors on counternarcotics missions may be getting too close to Colombia's larger conflict. Trying to avoid a direct involvement in Colombia's decades-old war, the Pentagon has forbidden the estimated 200 U.S. military trainers here from entering combat areas or joining police or military operations that could result in clashes with guerrillas or paramilitaries. But no such restrictions apply to the American civilians working for DynCorp or another Virginia firm, Military Professional Resources Inc., known as MPRI, both under contract to help Colombian security forces. {Miami Herald, Feb. 22, 2001 - link to article text at Yahoo Groups}
"There have been U.S. media reports that some {DynCorp and MPRI} missions extend beyond drug-fighting and into the Colombian military's war against some 23,000 leftist rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as FARC, and National Liberation Army, known as ELN." {Miami Herald, Feb. 26, 2001 - link to article text at corpwatch.org} http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/contractors.htm~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Bush started bumping up the numbers of American military in Colombia, in 2002. I'll bet there's far more than this article indicated by now: Plan Colombia
~snip~ In March 2002 The Bush administration drafted a plan to expand the US military role in Colombia from counterdrug training to anti-terrorism. The policy shift could require as many as 100 additional American troops to be sent to Colombia. On March 21, the Administration asked the Congress for new authorities. The terrorist and narcotics problems in Colombia are intertwined. President Bush recognized this link when he stated on April 18, after his meeting with President Pastrana, "We've put FARC, AUC on our terrorist list. We've called them for what they are. These are killers, who use killing and intimidation to foster political means... By fighting narco-trafficking, we're fighting the funding sources for these political terrorists. And sometimes they're interchangeable. It is essential for Colombia to succeed in this war against terror in order for her people to realize the vast potential of a great, democratic country ... I am confident that with the right leadership and the right help from America, ... Colombia can succeed. And it is in everybody's interests that she does succeed." The president added that he discussed with President Pastrana "how to change the focus of our strategy from counternarcotics to include counterterrorism."
In July 2002 the US Congress rolled back restrictions that had limited American aid to antidrug programs. The more broad-based U.S. assistance program for Colombia would enable Colombia to use U.S.-provided helicopters and the counter-drug brigade from Plan Colombia to fight terrorism some of the time, as needed. The White House proposal would maintain the 800-person cap on U.S. military personnel and contractors providing training and other services in Colombia. This will not exceed the 400-person cap on U.S. military personnel providing training in Colombia, nor the 400-person cap on U.S. civilian contractors. The new legal authorities sought by the White House allowed U.S. assistance to Colombia to be used to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats" to Colombia's national security.
In October 2002, eighteen months after an American missionary plane was mistakenly shot down, the United States resumed a campaign to help Colombia track and force down drug flights. The program was suspended in April 2001 in Colombia and Peru after a Peruvian warplane shot down the missionary flight over the Amazon, killing an American and her infant daughter. Colombian warplanes will intercept drug flights based on intelligence from the United States.
In a significant shift in American policy, in October 2002, United States Special Forces arrived in Colombia to lay the groundwork for training in counterinsurgency. Under a two year $94 million initiative, beginning January 2003 ten American helicopters will bolster the Colombian counterinsurgency efforts, and some 4,000 troops will receive American training. The troops will defend a 500-mile long pipeline, which snakes through eastern Colombia, transporting 100,000 barrels of oil a day for Occidental Petroleum of Los Angeles. The pipeline has long been vulnerable to bombings by Colombia's guerrilla groups. Pipeline bombings by the guerrillas cost the government nearly $500 million in 2001. The two main rebel groups, which view Occidental as a symbol of American imperialism, have bombed the pipeline nearly a thousand times since the 1980's. The Colombian military increased security, deploying five of the six battalions in the 6,000-man 18th Brigade to pipeline protection, up from just two battalions in 2001. The number of bombings fell to 30 in the first nine months of 2002, down from 170 in 2001.
The United States helped the government of Colombia to resume drug interdiction flights, which were suspended in April 2001 after a missionary plane was mistakenly shot down in Peru. The mishap resulted in the deaths of US missionary Veronica Bowers and her infant daughter, prompting authorities to insist on more stringent safety procedures before the anti-drug flight program could be re-launched. With a stronger emphasis on safety protocols, the Airbridge Denial program resumed in Colombia in late August 2003. To ensure that safety standards are maintained, the program's certification process will take place each year. In April 2003 the United States signed a bilateral agreement with the government of Colombia that spelled out procedures that will be followed in this program.
As of September 2003 there were more than 2,000 US personnel from 32 US agencies at the US embassy in Bogotá. This US embassy has surpassed the US embassy in Cairo as the largest US embassy in the world. As of July 2003 there were 358 US troops in Colombia, three times the 117 US troops in Colombia in November 2001. Five US citizens employed as contractors were killed in Colombia during 2003, and a total of 21 US government-titled aircraft had been downed since 1998. (snip)
In March 2004 the Bush administration asked Congress to increase by 75 percent the number of US troops and contractors in Colombia, citing the need to bolster its fight against drug traffickers and rebel fighters. The Bush administration wanted Congress to raise the cap on US soldiers and advisers to 800 from 400, and to increase the limit on civilian contractors to 600 from 400. These increases were approved in October 2004. (snip/...) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/colombia.htm
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