~snip~
When the Torricelli Act took effect, contracts valued at over
$100 million with Argentine subsidiaries of Continental Grain, in
New York, and Cargill, in Minnesota, for products such as wheat,
soy, beans, peas and lentils had to be canceled. The U.S. market is
obviously one of the most competitive in terms of production of
various types of foods.According to several studies,the average cost
of importing grains coming from U.S. suppliers, including trans-
portation charges,is $130 (US) per metric ton,substantially cheap-
er than importing the grain from Europe,which would cost around
$270.
6
This means, for example, that in 1997 the added cost for
Cuba of importing beans was $24 million (US) dollars, and for
importing wheat flour it is $7.8 million each year.
Likewise, restrictions imposed on shipping by sea raised trans-
portation costs of food by 30 percent with respect to international
rates and lengthened delivery cycles of goods to the people. Thus,
for example,a New Zealand company that manufactures powdered
milk declined to supply 1,500 metric tons in the face of refusal on
the part of their shipping company to deliver the cargo to Cuban
ports.Overall,it is estimated that in 1998,the added cost of import-
ing essential foods,given the lack of access to U.S.markets,reached
$30 million,
7
which represented approximately 2 percent of exports
that year and substantially reduced the global import budget. This
figure is equivalent to 15,000 tons of powdered milk that Cuban
children never received.
The impact on availability of food was not limited exclusively to
direct importation of foodstuffs but also exerted considerable effect
on the already weakened agro-industrial sector.The productivity of
the agricultural and farming sector was severely hampered by the
prohibition on selling items such as pesticides, fertilizers, animal
feed, and fuel.
Two well-known cases were those of Bayer AG of Germany and
Sanachem of South Africa.Bayer canceled sales of the pesticide Sen-
cor because the company transferred production of the active ingre-
dient to a plant in Kansas City.Bayer requested permission from the
United States to continue exporting to Cuba, but permission was
denied.In 1997,Dow Chemical bought the shares of the Sentrachem
group of South Africa, owner of Sanachem, with which Cuba had
enjoyed stable trading relations since 1992.In 1997 a Cuban import
firm had purchased pesticides valued at $82 million from Sanachem,
yet after that acquisition the U.S. Treasury Department put an end
to business dealings between the two companies, refusing even to
grant a license to cover the shipment of products that were in
transit.The human costs due to impact on the health sector are even
more obvious and dramatic if we consider that U.S.companies pro-
duce more than 50 percent of important new drugs on the interna-
tional market and that 90 percent of patents on new biotechnology
products are granted to U.S.firms.Many of these products are vital
to saving human lives and have no equivalents made in Cuba.After
Torricelli, fourteen subsidiaries based in Germany, Sweden, Japan,
France,Argentina,Italy,Australia,the Netherlands,Canada,Belgium
and Switzerland that produce medicines and medical equipment
stopped selling to Cuba.
Cuba is forbidden to buy, from U.S. companies or subsidiaries,
products such as third-generation antibiotics, medicines and drugs
used in postoperative pediatric cardiology and to treat infantile
leukemia,modern cancer therapies,and medications for the relief of
side effects, for the treatment of AIDS, and others. Cuba is also
denied the ability to purchase equipment and replacement parts for
donated equipment, as is the case of Kobe dialysis equipment, used
with persons requiring transplants.
More:
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:7de-Ulga7VAJ:muse.jhu.edu/demo/logos/v003/3.4hidalgo.pdf+Cuba+embargo+effect+European+Canadian+trade+impact&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=19&gl=us&client=firefox-a