http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGA0O9GI7SD.htmlIn the AP article "Confusion Hampered CIA Efforts to Stop Bin Laden Before 9/11" by Ken Guggenheim, Mar 24, 2004, as the AP quotes from the commission report released today and yesterday, we learn that
1.on the Bush/CIA/Tenet cover-up side that CIA officers at all levels of the agency questioned the effectiveness of the most active strategy that policy-makers were employing to defeat the terrorist enemy,
but that no one could tell the commission why the CIA did not suggest a change to that strategy, or indeed why the strategy remained largely unchanged throughout the period leading up to 9/11.
2. Since Bush was given a talk by the CIA's deputy director of operations, Jim Pavitt, shortly after he was elected that bin Laden was one of the gravest threats to the country, and since the August 2001 CIA secretive assessment on whether terrorists might attack the United States given to Bush included no "specific, credible information about any threatened attacks in the United States," according to a second report released by the commission Wednesday,
I Guess we are to include that those talks included either non-specific, credible information, or specific non-credible information on the attack that was coming.
3. And while the Bush crowd, on their way to Iraq, questioned the intelligence from our intelligence agencies that said they had began to see strong indications in June and July 2001 that a terrorist attack was likely, Tenet in his daily briefings to Bush and staff had a sense that officials at the White House had grasped the sense of urgency he was communicating to them.
4. And while the poor CIA is told Clinton that they are authorized to kill bin Laden, Tenet claims he understood that to mean capture bin Laden, or kill during a capture attempt - but of course while the CIA now complains about what they thought the orders were, Clinton's former national security adviser, Samuel Berger said the CIA never complained about the restrictions to the White House, per the report.
5. And indeed those restrictions against unnecessary collateral damage meant that local mercenary forces who considered attacking bin Laden convoys about six times before Sept. 11, were told to abort when bin Laden took a different route, or they reported security was too tight, or they reported women and children were believed to be in the convoy they thought might contain bin Laden.
6. And those missed opportunity for Clinton missile attacks on bin Laden after we received intelligence on his whereabouts didn't proceed because the intelligence came from a single, uncorroborated source and there was a risk of innocents being killed. Seems after the Pakistani ISI screwed Clinton in the first missile strike by telling bin Laden to get out of town, we really did not develop local intel on our own.
Why are Bush and Tenet still employed?