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(Apologizing in advance since you kicked off a geeky lecture based on stuff that's been rattling through my head for a few days. ;) )
I heard a description of the various congresses and settlements and so on in history after the great European wars - Westphalia after the Thirty Years' War, Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars, and so on.
Most of them, with the exception of Versailles after WWI, were generally recognized amicably enough (all things considered) by all the parties, including the defeated ones, because they usually didn't radically change things or force anyone to stay down or whatnot, but simply described things: the agreements weren't "it shall be this way" as much as they were "this is the way it is, right now, at the conclusion of this conflict." So you have a system set up in a peace treaty that describes the state of the world as of the peace treaty, and people were generally fine with it - the major powers knew where they stood in regards to each other, the winning ones were obviously winners, the defeated parties knew there wasn't much they could do about it but were also in on the process, and so on. So the ink dries, and people are comfortable because the balance of power is properly laid out and usually holds for the next thirty to sixty years.
WWI and Versailles broke that pattern, and understandably enough given how incomprehensibly savage the war was. People didn't have much experience with truly total war then and were exhausted, frightened and outraged by it, so they went overboard and planted the seeds for the sequel. When that came along it was obviously ended much more decisively, with Germany technically ceasing to exist altogether and Japan being thoroughly crushed, but the allies' victory was strong enough that time that they could State The Way Things Are Now much more comfortably.
The UNSC system is one big reflection of that - when they set up the organization, they needed all the major powers on board because they knew what happened when they weren't last time. The veto was an attempt to, for lack of a more diplomatic term, bribe the great powers into signing onto the system, and it worked. It had all the remaining great powers on board - Germany and Japan having been effectively destroyed, of course - so the end result is that the layout of the Security Council is, like most of the previous big peace agreements, at least in part a description saying "this is the way it is, right now, at the conclusion of this conflict." The P-5 are the victorious powers from the Second World War, and given the situation at the time it made perfect sense politically that they be the ones with a disproportionate say in global affairs.
Of course, from there we go back to my first big paragraph, where I said the solution, once laid out, holds for thirty to sixty years. So a few years ago, more or less right on schedule, people started chafing at the bit about the list of veto-wielders, both for abuses of said vetoes and for the fact that, increasingly, it no longer accurately represents the power structure among the major players in the world. Given that things are a Kumbaya circle now compared to this stage in the process at any of the previous ones, I'm not exactly worried about a major war being needed to reshuffle the deck, but it's going to be jarring to quite a few people no matter how it ends up going (expanding the veto wielders, changing their membership, eliminating it altogether, etc).
Personally I'm a fan of getting rid of the veto, or at least changing how it can be used, though I don't know how one could reform it without potentially threatening the whole system which I still think would do more harm than good at this point. Adding additional vetoes might deadlock some things as well, at least on the security side of things (since they can't veto the Assembly or whatnot), but it also might not, and having some of the up-and-coming major powers in the "South" finally represented might result in some goodwill from a lot of other places.
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