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Edited on Thu Nov-17-11 06:01 PM by happyslug
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=468&page=293 The short outline of the case missed the most important paragraph of the MAJORITY: We need not differ with the view of the Court of Appeals that overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration is expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First Amendment. We assume for present purposes, but do not decide, that such is the case, cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), but this assumption only begins the inquiry. Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 -46 (1983); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, <468 U.S. 288, 294> Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 -648 (1981); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).Notice even the Majority agreed that "camping" could be protected First Amendment right if done to communicate a message. The issue was the ban by the Park Service "reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions". Then the court ruled the ban was "Reasonable: Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Park Service regulation is sustainable under the four-factor standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for validating a regulation of expressive conduct, which, in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions. No one contends that aside <468 U.S. 288, 299> from its impact on speech a rule against camping or overnight sleeping in public parks is beyond the constitutional power of the Government to enforce. And for the reasons we have discussed above, there is a substantial Government interest in conserving park property, an interest that is plainly served by, and requires for its implementation, measures such as the proscription of sleeping that are designed to limit the wear and tear on park properties. That interest is unrelated to suppression of expression.
We are unmoved by the Court of Appeals' view that the challenged regulation is unnecessary, and hence invalid, because there are less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have satisfied the Government interest in preserving park lands. There is no gainsaying that preventing overnight sleeping will avoid a measure of actual or threatened damage to Lafayette Park and the Mall. The Court of Appeals' suggestions that the Park Service minimize the possible injury by reducing the size, duration, or frequency of demonstrations would still curtail the total allowable expression in which demonstrators could engage, whether by sleeping or otherwise, and these suggestions represent no more than a disagreement with the Park Service over how much protection the core parks require or how an acceptable level of preservation is to be attained. We do not believe, however, that either United States v. O'Brien or the time, place, or manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation's parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained. In fact the dissent agreed with the first paragraph I cited above: "Restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Ante, at 293 (citations omitted). I conclude, however, that the regulations at issue in this case, as applied to respondents, fail to satisfy this standard.Thus the issue is NOT sleeping or camping BUT if the regulations to prevent such activity is "Reasonable". Given that this has been happening over the last few months, a much tougher thing to prove then denying CONTINUED "camping and sleeping". Just a comment on the decision of the US Supreme Court has to be read narrowly given BOTH sides agreed as to the actual legal test, the FACTUAL findings that support that legal Finding will be the issue, as it was in "CLARK v. COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), 468 U.S. 288
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