At the Doura power station, a large oil-fired plant that supplies much of Baghdad's electricity, a single engineer is working with an acetylene torch to repair a much patched heat exchanger.
The site is strewn with rusted pipes, broken gauges and refuse. Only two of its four turbines are in working order. An aged Fiat gas turbine wheezes along on low-pressure natural gas. Doura's two broken turbines are supposed to provide 320MW, equivalent to a 10th of Iraq's entire current production. But the Siemens engineers whose company built the plant have made a survey and gone home; their future work schedule is not clear. The US army unit is an Airborne artillery company, not Corps of Engineers specialists.
"You don't see the civilians out here," an army officer grimaces, referring to the Coalition Provisional Authority. "The Iraqis just agree with everything you ask, and then nothing happens."
The fitful effort to restore electricity supplies epitomises the so far ineffectual reconstruction effort in Iraq. Shortages--not just of energy but of goods and services of all kinds--remain acute. The lack of security and the country's dilapidated condition remain the two biggest problems. But increasingly contractors and CPA dissidents openly allege that the US's direction of Iraq's recovery is beset by bureaucratic inertia and mismanagement. "The Americans have a lot of problems," says Dattar Kassam, director-general of Baghdad's refinery. "They are overwhelmed and understaffed. Just when I get to know one of them, he gets himself sent back.
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