This is probably the most instructive quote from the Statement:
The experience in Japan, where I have lived for nearly twenty years, is particularly instructive. It is a little known fact that wages in Japan are actually higher than in the United States -- about 20 to 30 percent higher measured at recent market exchange rates. Yet even as Japan has rapidly increased its imports from China, it has shown no evidence of being hollowed out. Quite the reverse. Japan's industrial strength has, on balance, actually been considerably enhanced by trade with China in recent years. Certainly Japan's trade surpluses have continued to burgeon. Japan's current account surplus last year, at $181 billion, was not only the largest of any nation in world history but it was more than three times Japan's current account surplus in 1989, the last year of the Tokyo financial boom.
It is interesting to note that China supplied full 20.7 percent of all Japan's imports in 2004, compared to a mere 13.4 percent of America's. Measured in yen, Japan's imports from China increased by 263 percent in the ten years to 2004.
Just as in the case of the United States, outsourcing from China has played a major role in the rise in Japan's imports in recent years. There the similarity ends. Unlike the United States, Japan believes in managing its trade. Although Japanese officials recognize, of course, that consumers can benefit considerably from trade, they also recognize that people need jobs and incomes before they can consume. Thus where imports would pose a significant threat to jobs, the Japanese government generally acts to minimize the damage. It does so typically by issuing guidance to key players in, for instance, the Japanese distribution system to minimize their purchases of the relevant imports.
Where outsourcing is concerned, a second key concern for Japanese policymakers is to keep tight control of the nation's key production technologies, thereby maximizing Japan's productivity edge. It is taken for granted in Japan that production technologies are as much the nation's property as they are the property of the corporations that developed them. Thus individual corporations are not permitted unilaterally to transfer advanced technologies to foreign operations. The sense that the technologies are national property is enhanced by the fact that they are typically developed jointly by Japanese corporations in industry-wide research cartels. It is assumed by all concerned that the latest technologies will be applied in the first instance in factories at home, thereby giving Japanese workers a vital edge in global competition. Any decision to move the technologies abroad will be the result of a government-guided industry consensus. Thus although corporate Japan has transferred significant production technologies to China in recent years, it has never given away the crown jewels.
A Commission that I was completely unaware of and was surprised to see that it was actually created during Bushco's term of office.
Overview
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Establishment:
The Commission was created in October 2000 by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, Pub. L. No. 106-398, 114 STAT.1654A-334 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S. C.§ 7002 (2001)), as amended, and the "Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, " Pub. L. No. 108-7 dated February 20, 2003.
Purpose:
To monitor, investigate, and submit to congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for the legislative and administrative action.
Public Law 108-7 directs the Commission to focus its work and study on the following nine areas: proliferation practices, economic reforms and U.S. economic transfers, energy, U.S. capital markets, corporate reporting, regional economic and security impacts, U.S.-China bilateral programs, WTO compliance, and media control by the Chinese government.
Composition:
The Commission is composed of 12 members, three of whom are selected by each of the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate, and the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House. The Commissioners serve two-year terms.
Commissioners:
C. Richard D'Amato, Chairman; Roger W. Robinson, Vice Chairman; Carolyn Bartholomew, George Becker, Stephen Bryen, June Teufel Dreyer, Robert Ellsworth, Patrick A. Mulloy, William A. Reinsch, Michael R. Wessel, Larry M. Wortzel