Interesting 5/26/1994 articles showing Bolton as anti-democracy

[zbdent]

John Bolton fighting for Democracy - NOT!

5/26/1994 - Akron Beacon Journal. No link, so I typed it as it appeared on the page.

Should the United States invade Haiti with military force?

No. Even failed policy cannot justify its use.

John R. Bolton was assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs during the Bush administration. This commentary, published in the Washington Post, was written in response to the one by Stephen Solarz and Richard Haass.

By John R. Bolton

Washington: Former Rep. Stephen Solarz and my former Bush administration colleague Richard Haass urged the United States to lead a multilateral force in an invasion of Haiti.

These writers are clearly correct in saying that U.S. Policy toward Haiti has failed. But they are clearly wrong in saying the only way to deal with the problem is an American-led invasion.

To begin with, it is not at all clear exactly what this administration's Haitian policy is, given all the twists and turns it has taken between candidate Bill Clinton's first statements on the treatment of refugees in 1992 and his most recent pronouncements on tightening sanctions. But to the extent that the policy can be summarized as returning President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power, it is wrong.

All agree Aristide was elected freely and fairly in September 1991. But he is hardly a "democrat" worthy of American protection. No one, for example, has seriously denied Aristide's endorsement of "necklacing." Certainly he was, at best, careless in his dealings with the Haitian constitution, urging his supporters to steal from homes of the wealthy.

It is not enough for a leader to be elected by a majority vote, even a large one. There are values - respect for individual rights, constitutional procedures and the rule of law - that inform American standards and (in differing forms) those of all the other industrial democracies. Aristide has never demonstrated a commitment to these values.

Haass and Solarz nowhere articulate what exactly are America's key interests in Haiti. I believe the central interest is preventing a flood of Haitian boat people from landing on the shores of Florida. This point has absolutely nothing to do with the race or nationality of the potential boat people, and those who claim otherwise are engaged in name-calling disguised as rational argument.

Burdensome budgetary consequences

Social service budgets at the state and federal levels are already strained. The Bush policy, largely maintained by Clinton until his recent shift, for the most part has taken account of this reality, and has been successful.

A viable and stable democracy in Haiti is unquestionably a desirable goal. So is a viable and stable democracy in China, Cuba or North Korea. But I doubt even war-hawk Democrats would advocate American-led invasions of these countries. Perhaps Haiti would be easier to subdue, but that is hardly the basis on which global foreign policy should be made. Moreover, the the happenstance of U.N. or OAS sanction (if either could be obtained) would in no way make an invasion of Haiti more feasible, sustainable or palatable.

The authors contend that "an exit strategy is entirely feasible." They assert that the United States would be the principal invader but the occupation could be turned over to other nations, which presumably lack the fortitude to engage in the initial invasion. They concede that "a few years" might be needed "while adequate security conditions were created" and that - even then - there would be "no guarantee" the operation would result in "an enduring democracy in Haiti."

These are candid views, and they deserve respect, but they sound suspiciously like the Clinton administration's failed efforts at "nation-building" in Somalia. Have we learned nothing from Clinton's transmogrification of the Bush policy in that tragic land? "Nation-building" simply will not occur unless all parties in a disputed territory are willing to engage, and they are obviously not willing to do so in Haiti today.

One lesson of Somalia (where, perhaps, the Bush administration can be faulted) is that before the United States undertakes even a humanitarian intervention, the "follow-on" forces need to be identified and committed well in advance of the initial American deployment.

The risk of a chain of unequal links

Thus a critical issue - never addressed when the Clinton administration changed the Bush Somalia policy from humanitarian relief to "nation-building" - is how that handoff to the replacement force would occur. What if the "follow-on" forces argue that conditions on the ground in Haiti are not what they anticipated when they signed on with the multinational force? What are we going to do to "force" the other governments to deploy?

Finally, Haass and Solarz write that an invasion of Haiti "would result in some casualties." This is a stunningly casual and offhand reference to potential American dead and wounded.

The real issue can be posed bluntly: How many American casualties is it worth to replace General Cedras with President Aristide?

The answer is: none.

This is not meant to overlook the desperate conditions Haiti and its impoverished people face. It is, however, meant to urge policy-makers to come to grips with both the facts and how the facts will be seen in this country - the famous "CNN curve" - in any U.S.-led invasion of Haiti.

What should be done, then, if not an invasion? First, the sanctions have not helped Aristide, and they have not deterred Cedras and the military. What they have done is hurt the people of the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. They should be lifted.

Second, U.S. Coast Guard and Navy vessels should continue to interdict the boats (which are frequently dangerous and unseaworthy) carying refugees (most of them economic) from Haiti, and return them.

American diplomatic efforts, perhaps assited by a fact-finding commission, as Sen. Bob Dole, R-Kansas, has suggested, should continue to be applied to seeking a political solution in Haiti, but with no pre-established bottom line such as the return to power of Aristide.

Ultimately, the people of Haiti have to be responsible for themselves. We once occupied Haiti for 19 years. We do not need to add to that figure.

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And now, the original statement by Richard Haass and Stephen Solarz; presented on the same page, but psychologically placed AFTER Bolton's response. Some mind games there.
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Yes. But it should be done in concert.

Richard Haass was a senior member of the National Security Council staff in the Bush administration. Stephen Solarz is a former Democratic representative from New York. This commentary was written for the Washington Post.

By Richard Haass and Stephen Solarz

Washington: After three years of continuing efforts by two successive administrations to restore democracy to Haiti by limited sanctions and diplomatic means, it is clear that U.S. Policy is not working. As a consequence, both Haitian democracy and American credibility are on the line.

Yet it is extremely doubtful that the comprehensive embargo adopted by the Security Couldil will work, either. The reasons are not hard to fathom. Goods will continue to enter Haiti from the Dominican Republic, and Haiti's military leaders will find ways not only to insulate themselves from the general hardship but to profit from it as well.

Meanwhile, the bulk of Haiti's 6 million people willl be driven deeper into poverty and despair.

Further diplomatic efforts designed to broker a deal by which the current military leaders would step down and President Jean-Bertrand Aristide would return are almost certain to fail as well. As the refusal of the Haitian High Command to fulfill its obligations under the Governor's Island Accord made clear, it has absolutely no intention of permitting Aristide to come back.

Yet without the return of Aristide, who, whatever his flaws, remains the winner of the only free and fair election in the history of Haiti, it is impossible to conceive of a settlement that would result in the re-establishment of a legitimate domocratic government in Port-au-Prince.

Prior to the turnaround of the U.S.S. Harlan County, the naval vessel scared off by a band of hired Haitian hooligans, the mere threat of military intervention might have been enough to do the job.

Now, with American credibility at an all-time low in Haiti, the harsh reality is that nothing short of armed force is likely to succeed.

A military intervention need not and should not be undertaken by the United States alone.

In Haiti, a unilateral intervention would trigger a nationalist reaction. In the hemisphere, it would provoke a resurgence of anti-Americanism. In the United States, it would produce a backlash against another international burden.

Caribbean coalition force envisioned

There is an alternative: multilateral intervention.

a U.S.-led coalition could include forces from Canada, Venezuela, France and the Caribbean. Such an approach might receive U.N. (although probably not OAS) support once it became clear that the strengthened sanctions were not working any better than the more limited restrictions that preceded them.

But even if the United Nations and the Organization of American States balked, the effort would be seen as legitimate by most Haitians, including President Aristide, who previously refused to support intervention but is now reliably reported to favor it.

Defeating the small, lightly armed and poorly trained Haitian military would not be hard. If Desert Storm took six weeks, "Caribbean Hurricane" would take six hours.

The real challenge would come not in winning the war but in securing the peace. In such situations, getting in is always easier than getting out. Yet an exit strategy is entirely feasible. The United States could take the lion's share of the initial operation. But, just as we turned over the task of internal security to the legitimate government of Panama after Operation Just Cause, so too it culd be given to a coalition in Haiti.

Confiscation of arms has appeal

Indeed, one advantage of such an intervention is that it would make it possible to disarm and demobilize the Haitian military. In comparison with a political settlement, in which the top brass would presumable be sent into exile while the rest of the military remained essentially intact, the replacement of this rapacious rabble with a more honest and responsive security force would greatly improve the long-term prospects for decent and democratic government in Haitia - a governmet that Haitians would no longer be desperate to flee.

To be sure, such an operation would result in some casualties. It would cost money. Foreign troops might be required for a few years while adequate security conditions were created. And there is no guarantee it would result in the establishment of an enduring democracy in Haiti.

Yet, the alternatives are worse.

Tougher U.N. sanctions will only destroy Haiti in a vain effort to save it. Lifting sanctions while entering into some cosmetic arrangement with the current regime would constitute a blow to the cause of democracy in the hemisphere. It would further erode the credibility of the United States.

And organizing a legion of Haitian exiles to liberate the country would take too long and result in substantially more bloodshed.

As a rule, military force cannot in itself create, much less sustain, conditions of democracy. But it can provide an opportunity, one that otherwise might not come about.

This is the lesson of Panama and Grenada. It should be applied in Haiti.