We miscalculated and now history has us by the throat
The west profoundly misunderstood how the Middle East works
By Jonathan Freedland
Nobody now disputes that misunderstanding has paved every step of the way in Iraq. The misunderstanding, or the lie, about Saddam's weapons continues to be central to western arguments about the war. But, important as that issue remains, there was a more profound set of misunderstandings of the social, political and religious processes at work within the Middle East.
They included especially the tense balance between Sunni and Shia, a loss of diversity and tolerance in the Sunni lands, the real impact of Sharon's long reign in Israel, and the effect of demographic changes altering the politics of many countries in the region. It was not that these things were not seen by experts, governments or even journalists, but that they were not added up, or were added up in the wrong way. Some, such as the Shia majority in Iraq, were seen by many only as an asset for an invader. Others, such as the collapsing peace process, were categorised as requiring remedy but not, in spite of much rhetoric, urgency. Above all, the interaction between these processes, still continuing, was only partially foreseen.
For example, Iran's resumption of its nuclear programme this week is the act of a government that, although it has serious internal weaknesses, is in a position of strength in its international dealings. The argument going on next door in Iraq over the constitution is also one in which Shia Muslims are in a strong position. In Lebanon, Syrian withdrawal may ultimately benefit an already strong Shia community. In the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia, suppressed Shia aspirations may not remain so for ever. These are all aspects of a shift in power between Sunnis and Shias that always had some potential for violence. But the way in which the Iraqi intervention triggered a violent Sunni reaction - at least as much among Sunnis outside Iraq as among those inside - to a potential Shia gain may come to be seen as its most important, and its most tragic, effect. To gloss this only as "terrorism", and to see it mainly in terms of a conflict between terrorists and the west, is to miss a large part of its meaning.
The Iranian revolution had given the region a new kind of state, specifically religious and specifically Shia in a way that the Shah's regime had never been. Much of what Saddam did during his years in power was aimed at staving off a Shia succession, but, especially with Iran's weight on the scales, change in Iraq could not be delayed for ever.
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
