http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16650As I went through the Pentagon to check facts before my Senate testimony on the problem in Iraq in September 2002, I was disappointed to learn that only a few discussions of postwar planning for Iraq had taken place. "Not a popular subject on the third floor
," I was informed. When planning finally began that autumn, it was based on the assumption that a US invasion would be welcomed as a liberation by most Iraqis. The strength of the Baath Party and of intrinsic Iraqi nationalism were underestimated, as was the degree of factionalism among the Shiites; so, too, were the risks of covert engagement by Syria and Iran, among others, along with the fundamental risk that a largely Christian US force would not be accepted by the Iraqi people, especially if it fought its way into their country.
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The campaign in Iraq had indeed succeeded in overthrowing Saddam's regime, but as of late September 2003, no weapons of mass destruction had been found. It was still likely that, before it collapsed, Saddam's regime had at least some programs in place to redevelop or enhance such weapons, especially biological weapons; perhaps there were even some weapons stocks, and we just haven't found them. But it was clear that, as our forces took over the country, new terrorist networks were being created, or imported, in resistance to the American effort. Any democratic transformation of Iraq was therefore going to have to contend with a new terrorist threat, in addition to a multiplicity of cultural, political, regional, and economic challenges.
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I read his book and this sounds like a summary of the first few chapters in it.
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