http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/books/review/26FRANKET.html?8hpibMax Frankel's cynical, slightly scathing, and definitely skeptical view of the book, but mostly of Clark's candidacy. Well, it's certainly not the first time the General has been accused of being "coy." ;-)
Excerpts:
That jacket speaks louder than the coy words with which Clark denies any partisan purpose. He allows that while writing he heard ''continuing speculation about whether I might engage in some manner'' -- sic! -- ''in the 2004 election.'' But that ''looming decision had no bearing on my analysis.'' His only aim, he insists, is to give voice to the soldiers ''far from home, in an uncertain mission,'' because they ''cannot and should not speak for themselves.''
Well, those soldiers and their fellow citizens can vote. And the general cannot camouflage the partisan thrust of his polemic. His deft review of the battlefield tactics that won Baghdad in less than a month is merely the preface to a bitter, global indictment of George W. Bush. The president and his administration are condemned for recklessly squandering a brilliant military performance on the wrong war at the worst possible time, diverting resources and talent from the pursuit of Al Qaeda, neglecting urgent domestic needs and dissipating the post-9/11 sympathy and support of most of the world.
<snip>
Clark glibly lists these objectives, and many more, without suggesting any priorities of effort. And he makes no attempt to explain how any American leader could effectively reconcile so many conflicting ambitions and sovereignties. His self-confidence seems rooted in his experience as commander of the NATO forces that bombed and pacified Kosovo in 1999, a headstrong performance that enlarged his faith in international collaborations while it poisoned his relations with peers and superiors at the Pentagon.
As Clark recounted in a previous book, ''Waging Modern War,'' his enemies in Washington managed to trick the Clinton White House into firing him from the post of supreme allied commander in Europe. And so he was left to watch from a CNN studio as a new administration employed the battle doctrines he had long championed in what he bitterly concluded was a misguided cause in Iraq. It was enough to drive a man to print, and to think he could do better, as commander in chief.