before the Democratic Policy Cmte. Hearing on Intelligence Leaks last weekend on CSPAN. One of the things they repeated several times was how Cheney and co. went to the CIA to meet with junior agents and insinuate that they weren't finding WMD because they weren't looking in the right places, etc. etc. The 30 year CIA veteran, Cannistraro, said in all of his years he had never seen anything like it. That Cheney/Bush Co. would not take no for an answer and that they consistently use intimidation etc., to try to manipulate the CIA.
Here's the transcript.
<clips>
...CANNISTRARO: Yes. I've had some experience in that, Senator.
And it's clear that when the analysts are being interviewed, there is
always some senior person there with us, congressional affairs person,
someone from the General Counsel's Office. And that could be
construed by the person who's doing the testifying as subtle pressure
not to be too candid, not to be too frank.
I've read the newspaper reports, but I've also talked to former
colleagues of mine who are still active and who lived through some of
this period of what I would call intimidation and pressure. Yes, they
say it's intimidation, they say it's pressure.
The fact that it's manifested by a very senior official, vice
president of the United States -- the first time in my 27 years in
intelligence, the first time I have ever heard of a vice president of
the United States going out to CIA and sitting down with desk-level
analysts. President and vice president coming out, making a speech,
cutting a ribbon? Absolutely. A commemoration ceremony.
But sitting down and debating with junior-level analysts, and
pushing them to find support for something he personally believes,
that Saddam was trying to acquire uranium, that, to me, is pressure and that's intimidation....CANNISTRARO: Well, I think that underlies the purpose of the
visits is that the vice president, as well as other senior officials
in the administration, were convinced of this because they were
getting separate information. They were getting information from an
intelligence operation that has been described in various ways.
There are euphemisms being used to describe it, but there was an
intelligence collection operation at the Department of Defense in the
undersecretary of policy's office and they were getting intelligence
information from other people outside the intelligence community;
information which was not vetted with the community, which was not
coordinated with the intelligence community, not even with DIA.
And much of this information we now know, in retrospect, was
fraudulent. Some of it was fabricated, some of it was just so
speculative it should not have ever risen to the level of being
reported. But a lot of this information made its way into
policymakers' public statements.
Yes I think look there was an underground war going on within the
administration, certainly between the Pentagon and the CIA. I'm a
private citizen now and so I think I can comment on it as an observer
outside government, but it was very clear to me that was going on.
Part of it was the underlying contempt for the CIA by
professional ideologues who believed that the agency was a squishy
place that came up with soft judgments and didn't look hard enough for
the information. Their mantra was: ``You're not going to find
anything unless you know what you're looking for.'' Well, if you know
what you're looking for, you are going to find it because you're
predisposed to find it. And that's against the intelligence effort. But I think that's the fundamental problem here is that
policymakers at the NSC, at the Defense Department and the White
House itself already believed in something and they were looking for the
supporting intelligence data. Sometimes they got it. Many times they did not get
it. And when they didn't get it it was again subjected to criticism and contempt.
There's no question that, you know, intelligence agencies and
policy-makers should have a dynamic relationship; it's not that their
assumptions should not be queried or second-guessed. That's fine.
Policy-makers should be keeping the intelligence community on its toes.
``Are you looking for this? Are you looking for that?'' You know,
``Put more resources here. Put more resources there. Reexamine your
assumptions.'' That's fine. I've seen it that happen. I saw it happen
in the Reagan administration. Saw it happen with Bill Casey, who was
originally accused of distorting intelligence for policy-makers.
Never, never did Casey ever drop to the level that we've seen
today. He fought with analysts about the subject of whether the Soviet Union was involved with supporting terrorism. The analysts challenged him and challenged him quite effectively, and Casey backed off. That doesn't seem to happen today.
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http://democrats.senate.gov/news/transcript-cia.html>