Bird Flu: "This Thing Just Continues to March"

[PVK]

http://www.citypages.com/databank/27/1320/article14219.asp

Scare headlines about the possibility of a deadly flu pandemic have been with us for a few years now, ever since the H5N1 bird-flu virus that first appeared in Hong Kong in 1997 resurfaced in the region in 2003. But in the past month the drumbeat of such stories has grown faster and louder: Avian Flu Arrives in Poland. Turkey. Azerbajian. Germany. Denmark. And, just last Friday, Israel. The good news, according to Dr. Michael Osterholm, the director of the University of Minnesota's Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, is that the arrival of infected birds in North America—sometime this year, in the estimation of most experts—is not likely to result in large numbers of human infections with the virus, because most domestic poultry in this part of the world is raised in factory-farm isolation units that prevent contact with wild birds.

The bad news is that that's pretty much the only good news. What matters in judging the prospects for a human pandemic version of H5N1 (the name is shorthand for the chemical structure of two of the virus's key components, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase) is not so much the global reach of the bird version, but the question of if or when the virus mutates to a form that's easily passed from human to human. If that happens anywhere in the world, says Osterholm, the virus would likely start hitching rides with travelers and seed itself around the globe in a matter of days or weeks.

{SNIP}

Will it cross over? If it does, can it possibly remain as deadly? Though Osterholm notes that viruses usually do lose strength as they spread—it's not really in their own evolutionary interest to kill the majority of their hosts—he believes the only responsible answer on both counts is we don't know. But it's not just the characteristics of the virus that worry him.

One of the things that sets the former Minnesota state epidemiologist apart from other public health officials is his attention to the fate of the medical and social infrastructure in any serious contagious outbreak. With respect to bird flu, his outlook recapitulates in many ways what he had to say in his 2001 book about bioterrorism preparedness, Living Terrors—much of the human toll in death, hysteria, and anarchy would be exacted not by infection but by the wide-scale breakdown of global supply chains and just-in-time delivery systems for vital goods and services. "I think Secretary Leavitt has been brutally honest in telling American communities, you're going to be on your own," says Osterholm. "And I think he's right."

{SNIP}

[Viva_La_Revolution]

1. it has to cross over AND

modify itself to infect the cells in the nose and throat. So far it can only hook to cells in the lungs.


This means, if you don't sleep with sick chickens, so far you are ok.

[mike_c]

3. damn....

What if you don't you don't stay all night?

[Viva_La_Revolution]

5. I'm thinkin'...

no french-kissin the chickens.

:rofl:

[pinto]

2. Though the paper's headline is a little over the top, it's a

good article, and probably a good assessment of the level of response if a human transmitted strain ever occurs. Local Public Health is, and has always been, the front line. Osterholm's to be credited for his official, clear eyed account.

(aside) There's a current study being discussed about the variability in human transmission of "typical" influenza with avian influenza - The annual flu outbreaks are primarily an upper respiratory infection - more easily survived and more easily spread *cough, cough* in human transmission - while researchers have data that suggest the avian flu is a lower respiratory infection - less easily survived, but less easily transmitted in a theoretical human-to-human scenario. I'll look for the reference, think it was a Dutch study.

(ed for clarity)

[Fridays Child]

4. Factory farming may be the primary vector for H5N1. Please read this...

http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=194

[Kailassa]

6. Change is the only constant in this world.

If H5N1 mutates to an easily contageous form, that will not be the last of it's mutations. It will constantly be changing, adapting to whatever environment it finds itself in.

When it is in an environment where incapacitated people are not in contact with other unprotected people, any form that quickly incapacitates people will die out. This is why it's important to have supplies at home. The easiest way to stop a virus in its tracks is to find any new outbreak while it is small, institute house arrest for everyone who may have been exposed, and only have immunised people in contact with them.

The way to make the virus more lethal is to keep large numbers of people closely confined. An example would be the living conditions of hurricane Katrina survivers in the superdomes. Seeing the disregard authorities showed for saving lives in that situation, I was afraid they would go one step further at that time, and actually release infections in the refugee sites.

I'm not trying to panic anyone or suggest the government is likely to do something stupid, but anything is possible, and it's best to know the facts first. If any authority tries to herd people into confined spaces in response to a viral epidemic, that needs to be actively resisted. That's a time when safety is in solitude, not in numbers. Unfortunately, this means that the stinking rich are much more likely to survive than the slum dwellers, as it's easier to avoid crowds when you have a big house and plentiful supplies.

The other places to avoid in such a time would be crowded doctors' clinics and casualty wards.

[PVK]

7. As Osterholm points out the biggest risk is in the breakdown of supplies.

As you say, those who have will likely live.