<snip>To the war-hungry neocons, the CIA was seen as weak, underestimating the threat and thus undermining the imperative for preemption. It’s no wonder the CIA lost favor, as its higher standards had made it unable to appease the administration’s demand for friendly intelligence. Intelligence that failed to make a “slam-dunk” case for war with Iraq simply wasn’t acceptable. More rational voices were drowned by the shrill calls of the chickenhawks for war.
The enabling strategies came from a national security apparatus masterminded by Dick Cheney. After 9/11, the military and executive were closer than ever before; tentacles of the executive burrowed deep within the military decision-making apparatus and command structure, constricting the flow of information.
Under Bush, the chain of command underpinning the intelligence gathering process has been politicized and shifted from the CIA and State to the Pentagon. Dissent from subordinate intelligence gathering organs was suppressed alongside any nonconforming intelligence from rival agencies.
Still, the neocons were not content to rely on the Pentagon for its intelligence to promote the Iraq War. Neocons assigned two primary objectives for the Office of Special Plans (OSP), a shadowy, pro-war contingent of mostly Republican consultants operating within the Pentagon. The OSP was tasked with gathering news and information that referred to WMD in Iraq, or implicated the country in terrorism. It’s been accused of cherry-picking intelligence that supported the war. <3>...
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