We've Got Saddam; Now, Let's Nab Osama
http://www.newsday.com/news/opinion/ny-vpuno213592035dec21,0,5345139.story?coll=ny-editorials-headlinesDecember 21, 2003
Hunting down bin Laden and continuing to pursue an aggressive strategy to root out al-Qaida's cells worldwide must be at the top of Bush's foreign-policy agenda. But those are independent missions, geographically and tactically. They cannot be confused. Success in one does not automatically translate to the other. And the hunt for bin Laden along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border must not divert attention and resources from the plots al-Qaida is hatching in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Bin Laden has intentionally divorced himself from al-Qaida's terror operations and delegated them to loyal subordinates. He remains the iconic figurehead of his radical Islamist movement and the object of cult-like veneration by tens of thousands of disaffected Muslims. But capturing him would not halt al- Qaida's operations. The network no longer depends on his direct leadership; it's designed to operate without central control. And if bin Laden were killed, he would be transformed into a martyr to his movement.
Unlike Hussein, who was feared and despised by a good portion of his subjects and would ultimately be betrayed by one of his cohorts, bin Laden has a fiercely loyal following among the Pakistani tribes among whom he hides. They are devoted to him and believe in his cause. Since bin Laden fled Afghanistan for the safety of Pakistan's rugged northwest frontier, the $25 million price Washington put on his head has had no effect in generating information on his whereabouts.
Complicating all this are indications that al-Qaida is busy shifting funds and operatives away from Afghanistan and into Iraq and its surrounding region - Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The intent is either to turn Iraq into the focus of Islamists' fight against the West or, more ominously, to set a trap by diverting attention to Iraq's insurgency and terror attacks in neighboring nations while al-Qaida is preparing another catastrophic attack against the United States. Either of these moves would dilute resources otherwise devoted to the hunt for bin Laden.
In Iraq, the search for Hussein was integrated into the counterinsurgency operations. Both took place in the Sunni triangle and used the same intelligence and military resources. Capturing bin Laden and defeating al-Qaida pose entirely different and far more daunting challenges. Meeting them will be more essential to the nation's security than defeating Hussein's regime. And success is not an option but a necessity.