http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18967769/site/newsweek/Jonathan Alter: Phony Analogies
snip//
U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea at the explicit request of the South Korean government and people. When President Carter raised the possibility of pulling them out in 1977, American Gen. John K. Singlaub was not the only one to object. South Koreans know that American forces are the only thing standing between them and being overrun by a million North Korean troops stationed just over the border. Only now, more than 50 years after the end of hostilities, is the formal state of war being brought to a close. Aside from some demonstrators once in a while, no one in South Korea seriously wants our troops to go, at least until the threat from the North recedes and unification begins. Then we’ll be gone.
In Iraq, by contrast, many polls show that about three quarters of the Iraqi people favor us leaving. Even those Iraqis who want us to help them fight Al Qaeda think we can do so with strike forces from bases outside the country. The idea of us spending hundreds of millions of dollars establishing permanent bases inside Iraq (something that has received amazingly little publicity) is repugnant to them. This is where a bit of residual nationalism kicks in. Iraqis don’t like the idea of foreigners permanently on their soil. No people—or tribes—do.
Moreover, all of that White House chatter about staying in Iraq for decades means that Bush has essentially given up on democracy there. The Iraqi democracy of his dreams would not stand for permanent bases, unless Iran or some other neighbor were poised to attack. Despite warnings from Sen. Joe Lieberman and a few others, there is no sign of that. Iranian mischief-making, yes. Invasion, no. At least not at present.
So why the move to permanent bases in Iraq? For years, I have been reluctant to embrace the oil theory of American policymaking in the Middle East. I’ve subscribed to the notion that oil is only part of a complex set of strategic, political and moral issues animating American interests. I still believe that in the short term. Bush and the few remaining supporters of his policy are motivated by more than oil. They want to avoid a failed state in the middle of a volatile region.
But what does that aim have to do with permanent bases? The only two reasons to station troops in the Middle East for half a century are protecting oil supplies (reflecting a pessimistic view of energy independence) outside the normal channels of trade and diplomacy, and projecting raw military power. These are the imperial aims of an empire. During the cold war, charges of U.S. imperialism in Korea and Vietnam were false. Those wars were about superpower struggles. This time, the “I word" is not a left-wing epithet but a straightforward description of policy aims—yet another difference from those two older wars in Asia.
© 2007 Newsweek, Inc. | Subscribe to Newsweek