Beginning to Bloom
The British learned in the 1920s that growing democracy in Iraq takes time. But the U.S. effort there is already showing signs of success.
By Joel Rayburn, Joel Rayburn, an Army major, teaches history at the U.S. Military Academy.
WEST POINT, N.Y. — A year ago, troops of the U.S.-led coalition moved into Iraq on their way to swiftly defeating Saddam Hussein's armies. Since then, Iraq's journey toward stability and democracy under U.S. tutelage has been painfully slow and difficult. So says a chorus of observers who reflexively transform not-unexpected obstacles to the establishment of an Iraqi government into major roadblocks. Typical was the New York Times' judgment, after reports of a delay in the signing of the interim Iraqi constitution, that the U.S. occupation had failed both to deliver Iraq from "pervasive insecurity" and to devise a "satisfactory formula … for creating the interim government due to assume power July 1." But although the problems confronting the United States and its coalition partners in Iraq are complex, they are not new. The good news is that when measured against the only previous attempt at Iraqi democracy-building — in the 1920s under the British — the current effort compares favorably in virtually every way.
Britain's experience in Iraq after World War I was strikingly similar to that of the U.S.-led coalition. From their capture of Baghdad in 1917 to their withdrawal from the League of Nations mandate in Iraq in 1932, the British struggled to build a stable state around the country's ethnic, tribal and religious divisions. One of the most important events was the adoption of Iraq's first constitution and the holding of its first elections.
Although promising elections in 1918, the British governors of Iraq didn't begin drafting election laws until they assumed the League of Nations mandate in summer 1920. Not until a year later did the British install a constitutional monarchy under the non-Iraqi Prince Faisal, friend of T.E. Lawrence and leader of the Arabs' so-called Revolt in the Desert. Another year passed before election regulations were published (May 1922). Meanwhile, the British army and air force had to suppress a nine-month insurgency involving as many as 100,000 Iraqis.
The British-sponsored elections rules were convoluted and often unfair. They called for two phases of voting in 14 separate districts; candidates were nominated in various ways. The regulations were stacked against the Shiites, who, though constituting perhaps 60% of Iraq's population, were guaranteed no better than a plurality in the Iraqi constituent assembly. Jews and Christians, though small minorities, were allocated a certain number of seats. Iraqi tribes, which generally sought to undermine the central government, were effectively allowed to vote twice — once when sheiks nominated candidates and once when tribesmen voted as individuals. When the leading Kurdish figure briefly declared himself king of an independent Kurdistan, the British enticed the Kurds back into the elections by decreeing that no Arab could be elected in a Kurdish area.
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