January 28, 2011
Mubarak and the Generals
Posted by Steve Coll
... What will the Army do? The United States provides about $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt’s armed forces annually. Its military-to-military strategic partnership is more than two decades old. An Egyptian military delegation led by Lieutenant General Sami Anan, chief of the armed-forces staff, happened to be visiting the Pentagon this week for talks ...
Some American intelligence types I’ve run into this week suggest that the Egyptian Army is more closely tied to and controlled by the presidential palace than the Tunisian Army was ... A cynical way to explain their position would be to observe that the uprising has provided an unplanned opportunity to stage a coup d’état, if the generals wish to carry one out. They may not even carry out the coup out of cynical motives. They may conclude that patriotism and justice require them now to switch sides, to stand with the population, which they are, after all, sworn to defend.
There have been reports that protesters are relieved to see the Army in the streets; no doubt, as in many other like countries, the Army has more credibility than the corrupt and often torture-prone police. The sense among generals and line officers that they have popular standing may influence the choices they now make. They could deliver an ultimatum to Mubarak, but fashion it to allow Mubarak to remain in office in exchange for an announcement of reforms and free elections. That is unlikely to quiet the streets, but it might. Or the generals could decide, as in Tunisia, that only Mubarak’s departure from office will create the necessary space for a transition.
Or the generals could decide, as other Arab generals in their position have before, to level their guns in defense of the status quo ...
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/01/mubarak-and-the-generals.html