Zugzwang

[bemildred]

Mods: my original work.

ZUGZWANG(*)

While taking my walk these last few days, I have been trying to figure out what will happen next in Iraq, or more precisely, what the current administration is trying to do. There are only a few basic interpretations of the situation, so let's see if we can think our way through them.

First, one might say we have enough troops in Iraq. This seems to be an untenable conclusion.1,2

So then, admitting we need more troops, one might claim the current recruiting arrangements are working fine and they will produce the necessary troops as needed. This does not seem to coincide with the facts either.3,4

And in fact, it seems that efforts are being made to scavenge troops from elsewhere in the world to supply needs in Iraq. 5,6

Well then, how might we resolve this troop shortage? We could try to get other countries to send more troops, and this is being done, but without much success. In fact there seems to be a decline in support from other countries over time; in any case we are not getting more support as time goes on. 8,9

We could try to "Iraqify" the war, developing and training an Iraqi force to help us with the fighting. An effort of this sort has been under way for some time now, but with limited success 10.

The elections, currently scheduled for the end of January appear to be intended to shore this effort up, among other things. If the elections are carried off with some credibility, leading to a government that a substantial number of Iraqis are willing to fight for, the current occupation can be transformed into an Iraqi civil war in which we support one side, and we can let them do most of the fighting. In the most optimistic version of this scenario, once our side has won the ensuing civil war, we could withdraw from public view in Iraq and reduce our troops strength to something more sustainable. One can see from this why the administration is so reluctant to postpone the elections, as that would also postpone this happy scenario, and at some point such a delay will force other strategies to be employed; that is the troops shortages will have to be addressed with non-Iraqi forces.

We seem to have had some success in getting this scenario off the ground, and I would wager that the main thrust of the administration effort now it to make this work. 11

Despite it's drawbacks, this provides a semblance of "peace with honor", i.e. we have an orderly exit from the quagmire with some shreds of credibility left. I consider this, extraction from the quagmire with miltary and political credibility sufficient to permit the pursuit of an interventionist foreign policy in the future, to be the probable most important strategic goal of the administraion at this point. This is not unlike the goal of Nixon's policies when he inherited VietNam from Johnson.

If it proves out that Iran supports the elections, they may succeed. Although getting into bed with Iran, SCIRI, and al Sistani to elect a Shi'ia-Kurd government, that will then fight our war for us against the Sunni, may produce a far from ideal result in Iraq, it offers the hope of extraction from the quagmire. I have a feeling that al Sadr may be heard from again in this regard 12,13, and the magnitude of the support that al Sistani can command is uncertain, but one can only await events in these regards.

Now, if the Iraqi resistance succeeds in postponing or preventing entirely the elections, either the occupation must be ended, or more troops must be found, and they must be trained and equipped and so on. There seem to be two main approaches to getting more troops: incentives and the draft. Incentivized methods would include mercenaries, service-to-citizenship programs, and improvements in the pay and benefits of servicepeople. These incentivized approaches are already in use, and are apparently not sufficient even to maintain current troops levels 14,15.

That leaves the draft. That is the last choice, and I believe we will only see it considered when it becomes clear that the alternative is a "dishonorable" withdrawal. And that is because a reinstitution of the draft has enormous political risks and consequences domestically. The risks are that the draft will fail, that as in VietNam, the level of refusal will be so high as to call into question the legitimacy of the government, and also that it will mobilize a political reaction sufficient to challenge the current rulers of the State. Given the existing "polarized" political situation these risks must be taken seriously. The consequences are several, most essentially that a draftee is not merely an employee, he is a citizen-soldier, and the state incurs a debt when it demands his services, and it activates a citizen. A new GI bill will be required, and all those returning veterans will be politically active and vocal long after the war is done, ahd they will not sit quietly while their benefits are cut.

So, now, what can we conclude? The Iraqi elections are central. If they can be held, and if they then result in a government with the legitimacy to fight and win a civil war for control of Iraq, then the US may escape from it's quagmire. If not, we may see a draft, and if not a draft, then some sort of constructed fig-leaf and a withdrawal with whatever dignity can be mustered. And all of this depends on the actions of al Sistani and al Sadr and the Kurds and the Sunni, the people of Iraq, and on Iran. The administration meanwhile stalls for time and hopes for a bit of luck.

[necso]

1. One can argue that a civil war

is already taking place in Iraq, with the US attacking the Sunni Arabs, as a "player" in that civil war. And there have been reports of Shia militias (at least one, anyway) forming to attack the Sunnis -- but of coordination with US attacks I have heard nothing.

With a civil war being one of the likely outcomes to emerge from our invasion of Iraq, perhaps it has become deliberate policy to align ourselves against the Sunni Arabs in this "war", thereby hoping to avoid (or minimize) difficulties with the Shia (perhaps even to achieve some "cooperation"). (The Kurds were predisposed to side with us in the first place -- and I have heard nothing much to the contrary to date.) And with "their own government" in place, the Shia might be willing to commit themselves more fully to this "civil war", whether or not they do so openly in conjunction with US forces.

However, I am not clear that this will work long term. The Shia might not be content with the "defeat" of the Sunni Arabs and may turn on either the Kurds and/or US forces when (and if) this "defeat" is accomplished. Nor can we necessarily rely on Shia (and Kurdish) forces to (largely) accomplish this objective on their own. Shia-Sunni warfare might also inflame a wider conflict (with unknown results, and these not necessarily in our interest) and perhaps cause a stream of Sunni jihadis to come to Iraq. And should we invade other Islamic countries, all bets may well be off. Moreover, all this says nothing about whether or not the state that emerges in Iraq will be a greater danger to our interests than the one under Saddam was.

If our goal is to divide Iraqis as a means to "subdue" them (with some number in "our camp" -- more or less), then we might have better looked (or look) to using tribal rivalries, rather than ethnic or religious ones, as our "wedge".

Generally, however, I find your analysis into the "thinking" of our "leadership" a good one (any omissions being theirs, not yours)... regardless of why they might be looking to reduce the troop levels committed to Iraq.

[bemildred]

2. Agreed.

It's a real can of worms, the outcome is wildly unpredictable.

I started thinking about this because it was getting well past the
election and there were still no dramatic steps to address the manpower
problem, and I wanted to understand why? It would seem an urgent issue
with a long lead time.

I have also had a general feeling since Summer, after the "Najaf offensive",
that efforts were being made to divide the Shi'ia and the Sunni, and
I wanted to understand where that was supposed to go and why.

One could argue that after the Fallujah offensive in the Spring and
the Najaf offensive in the Summer, in each case of which the Sunni and
the Mahdi Army supported each other, a new approach was adopted, it
being realized that we could not prevail against a unified Shi'ia-Sunni
resistance. The sudden intervention of Sistani in the Najaf offensive
was the turning point, and I would guess that that was when the deal
was made with Sistani.

I liked this analysis because it made sense of those things. It's all
very Negroponte-like too, very much in keeping with past performance in
these little colonial ventures.

From the Iraqi side then, the question becomes whether the nationalists
who want to unify and expel the invaders or the sectarians that want to
pursue the advantage of tribe and sect prevail in the sentiments of
the Iraqi public at large.

Edit: your comment about the virtues of tribal allegiances as opposed
to sectarian ones is a good one, but I expect it would require a better
understanding of Iraqi tribal politics than we possess or have the
patience for.

[necso]

3. The problem, for me at least,

is that I have nothing but "open" sources of information. There is a great deal of complexity in Iraqi society, and I have less good information available to me than the average Soviet citizen did (or so it seems to me sometimes).

I find myself reading "the press" like one used to read the Soviet press, looking for the odd fact -- or what is mentioned and what is not.

As I read the situation (and I rely on small things like that while Al Sadr spoke of supporting the "insurgents" in Fallujah, as I remember, nothing seemed to be done), the Shia are more or less waiting to see how the whole election thing turns out -- and settling some old scores. The Kurds are more or less supporting us, but this seems to be being done carefully -- maybe more out of lack of faith in their abilities (I have heard of units comprised entirely of Kurdish officers, which may be true or not), than any concern for the implications of using units of specific ethnic or sectarian nature against other such groups (you could call this practise various unflattering names).

But I have could have sworn that I have read both that Al Sadr's people were in and out of the "election list" (the Al Sistani list -- or whatever). And whatever the truth is, I don't think that Al Sadr will tolerate getting a raw deal. So we may be whittling down that Shia (non-Kurdish) majority (or plurality) to a point where is not enough for "critical mass". But, again, the situation is complex and whatever we do, we should be considering the tribal and clan components of Iraqi society, in addition to ethic and sectarian components -- and who is "following" whatever leader at the moment.

In any event, I don't see anything good coming out of the war... with or without much useful information on the current situation. Iraq was always a tough nut to crack -- and we have "nuts" instead of "nutcrackers" at the helm.

And your post may have been too thoughtful and rational to accurately reflect the thinking of these "nuts". But it is a good analysis that more rational minds should appreciate. (...For what that's worth coming from me.)

[bemildred]

4. WRT the press: yes, exactly, we are mushrooms.

Kept in the dark and fed a diet of bullshit.

And otherwise, also, yes. I am waiting to see what al Sadr does,
if anything, and there is very little information to be had at
present, other than that he does not seem to be a happy camper.
Still, a breach with Sistani is a big step.

Same to you.

[MichiganVote]

5. Only Americans would suppose that a retreat from a premtive war against

a country that had not attacked us can or must be dignified. There is nothing that will convince the rest of the world that the US is dignified anymore. We've proven ourselves dirty. All the flag waving in the world won't change that.

Dignity only figures in the equation in one central area, propaganda amidst the duped American public.

The US wants to open up the Middle East to uncomplicated trade/commerce/oil. The Iraqi elections alone a government will not make.

[teryang]

6. excellent post and analysis on this thread

The only thing that I would add is that interminable civil conflict is a satisfactory outcome from the point of view of our so called leadership. This would follow the school of thought that says whatever you may think about the ignominius American withdrawal from Vietnam, the "enemy" can't be said to have won, because we destroyed their country in such a profound way. Lebanon is a similar example vis a vis the Israelis.

From a neo-con point of view, building a stable Iraq was always a ruse. A broken down divided Iraq immersed in interminable civil conflict will be a desirable outcome (from the point of view of American imperialists) if as you say, we can more or less extricate ourselves. Like a ship righting itself, a truly sovereign independent Iraq would inevitably seek to regain political control of its energy and financial resources and expel American influence. No one in our government really wants to "reconstruct" Iraq. An irretrievably crippled state is more than acceptable. So in this regard, Sunni subjugation is less desirable than continued conflict with a rebel shadow government in continuous conflict with a "legitimate" regime.

Fletcher Prouty once made the observation that a canon of American foriegn policy is to make energy, more, not less expensive for others. Interference with oil supplies is profitable for the Anglo ruling classes' shareholders.

As you stated so eloquently, the major point about manpower does involve domestic political risks. A large group of veterans has to be rewarded generously. This is something the elites do not want to do, it results in distribution rather than accumulation. It also results in social mobility and the germ of new middle class. The long period without any major wars after Vietnam indirectly contributed to political passivity and social inequity (corruption) in our society. This will be disturbed by a prolonged conflict requiring manpower levees in whatever form they take. This is claimed by one Indian historian (whose name I forget) to be a consistent historical phenomenon although many American historians have noted it anecdotally. One could say that the American ruling class wants war, and the social rot of corruption and a hollowed out society, simultaneously at home.

Your post is so well done, you are definitely ready for prime time.

[bemildred]

7. Aw shucks. Now I'll get a swelled head and become insufferable.

It seems clear enough that balkanization and chaos are preferred
to a unified and autonomous (and presumably hostile) result. That's
straight out of Machievelli, or most any advocate of zero-sum politics,
and observable in our other colonial ventures. One rarely sees the
US promoting in practice (as opposed to rhetorically) unity and autonomy
in the imperial domains.

I do think in the beginning at least some of our "leaders" did have
fantasies of an amiable potemkin "democracy" in Iraq. I would say that
on the whole they are somewhat taken aback by the course of events.

The role of social cyles in these things is fascinating, but ambiguous.
I think we fit in rather well as a declining, decadent empire with the
usual delusions of grandeur. The cognitive disconnect between the
pretensions of virtue and morality embodied in the "values" meme - the
religious evangelical babble we are now being fed - and the "facts
on the ground" of modern American culture are striking. We are awash
in porn, drugs, and corruption, and the ruling elites sit fat, dumb,
and happy atop the dungheap, while it threatens to slough away
underneath them.

[bemildred]

8. Iran, US divide stands in Iraq's way

More on the role of Iran.

---

With less than two months to the general elections in Iraq, all eyes are focussed on the thorny question of Shi'ite-Sunni relations and, in the light of the recent request by some 17 Sunni and Kurdish groups from the Iraqi interim government of Iyad Allawi, a postponement of the elections. Although the Kurds have backtracked somewhat, it is hardly surprising to see that the Sunni Arab governments have officially or semi-officially backed this request, hoping that time will somehow turn the tides back in favor of the Sunni minority that ruled Iraq for so long.

---

Of course, this is not to say that everything is fine and dandy between Iran and Iraqi Shi'ites, many of whom fought against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, notwithstanding the fact that even Saddam Hussein's government included many Shi'ites in the civil and military bureaucracy. In fact, the Iraqi defense minister, Hamza Shaalan, has quite unnerved the Iranians with his recent blistering criticisms and even threats against Iran's "meddlings" inside Iraq. Hence, it is really not the question of Shi'ites, per se, in the Iraqi government, but which kind of Shi'ites, pro or anti-Iran, that matters most from Iran's point of view.

Presently, Iran has vested its hopes on a gradual process whereby the specifically Shi'ite identity of Iraq's ruling politicians will thicken as time goes on, with the current prime minister and his Shi'ite deputies representing only the beginning points of departure for a more substantive process. Whether or not this is wishful thinking or a tissue of future reality is unclear, but it is important to keep in mind that the leading Iraqi Shi'ite figure, namely, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has his own agenda not always commensurate with Iran.

Concerning Sistani, he has appointed a small council that is busy nowadays apportioning seats in the upcoming assembly among the several dozen Shi'ite groups and parties, some of whom have protested their small share of the pie. A case in point, the ayatollah's committee has designated fewer than 30 seats for the group(s) supporting the rebel Shi'ite, Muqtada al-Sadr, and this may not satisfy him.

a good deal more

[Jack Rabbit]

9. You think they would understand 'I resign'

Rather than face the humiliation of "checkmate".

However, there will be an election in Iraq on January 30. It may be as free and fair as we have come to expect elections in Florida to be, which will mean that it is an election only in the same sense that last summer's "power transfer" conferred "sovereignty" on Iraq. And then Allawi will be an "elected leader", who will still require foreign troops to keep him in power and protect him from "anti-Iraqi" Iraqis.

[bemildred]

10. In chess you cannot bullshit your way out of things.

In politics bullshit walks, talks, and makes big money. All of their
knowledge and experience tells them that one can bullshit one's way
through in foreign affairs because of our subservient media. Merely
consider the situation now and how we got here, and this is clear.
The fecklessness of insulated elites is evidenced throughout history,
and we are not different.

I consider everything in Iraq up for grabs at this point, I don't
see the election - if it is held - ending the fighting, it will
only begin the battle over the legitimacy of the results. It will
be interesting to see how many suckers they find.

[Jack Rabbit]

11. In the words of my hero . . .

EDITED to add photo



On the chessboard lies and hypocrisies do not survive long. The creative combination lays bare the presumption of a lie; the merciless fact, culminating in a checkmate, contradicts the hypocrite. Our little chess is one of the sanctuaries where the principle of justice has occasionally had to hide gain sustenance and respite, after the army of mediocrity has driven it from the market place.

-- Dr. Emanuel Lasker (1868-1941), World Chess Champion (1894-1921) and a true twentieth-century Renaissance man

Photo of Dr. Lasker from a German website.

[bemildred]

12. Said better than I ever could.

Chess is "reality based".