http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04354/428660.stm<snip>
The spring of 1863 has some similarities to the winter of 2004. Both found the country mired in a war that was clearly lasting longer than prewar projections (there were also unanticipated problems with occupying captured territory and how to restore democratic institutions, but that is an analogy for another day). There was concern for what would happen when the soldiers' enlistment terms ended if they chose to return home.
In Iraq the unilateral action of the government means that we do not know how the soldiers would have reacted if given the choice to extend or end their tour of duty. The Abraham Lincoln administration had some idea what might happen since 38 of 40 two-year regiments chose to muster out in May 1863. In the next year, over 500 three-year regiments enlistment terms would end and if the re-enlistment rate was as low there would not be enough soldiers to continue offensive campaigning in 1864.
The Lincoln administration did not enact its own "stop loss" program because of a legal precedent that the Bush administration should also consider.
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The Bush administration's Iraq policy resembles how the Confederacy resolved a similar manpower crisis by retroactively making all enlistments last for the duration of the war.
As I would expect from the current U.S. Supreme Court, the Confederacy's Supreme Court upheld the action so that the South legally retained all of its soldiers. Anticipating the double-speak of the current situation, the Confederate Army launched a re-enlistment campaign to motivate soldiers to sign on for an extended term but it was recognized by the soldiers as a sham -- one's tour of duty would be extended regardless.