BBV: position of People for the American Way makes no sense

[Eric J in MN]

From http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=14581

"Such a voter verifiable audit trail does not necessitate the use of paper. Future technologies could include encrypted ballots, votemeters or modular voting architecture. For example, an electronic voting system called Automark, which creates a voter verified audit trail with an audible capacity for voters with visual impairments, is being considered for certification. Because it uses a touch screen interface that prints onto an optical scan ballot, it also accommodates voters with limited English proficiency. Although this system is not yet certified, it appears to have enormous potential."
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Summary: paper isn't needed. For example,there is a great system which prints on paper.


Based on visiting the webpage below, the Automark machines seem good, but I'm saying that because they print onto paper optical-scan ballots.

http://www.vogueelection.com/products_automark.html

[On the Road]

1. I Agree That Paper is Not Needed

but only if an electronic system can track individual votes back to individual voters. For me, THAT is the only way to truly verify the accuracy of a recount. If you can do that, the need for paper drops significantly.

(Some people say this would violate voter privacy. I think that's ridiculous -- your medical records are private, but it doesn't mean they're anonymous.)

[Eric J in MN]

2. How would you do a recount without paper?

uld you do a recount without paper?

Would you call every single person listed in a machine and ask them who they voted for? Some people wouldn't want to answer, or would answer incorrectly. It's much more practical to print paper ballots, with a machine like Automark, and count the paper-ballots.

[Kelvin Mace]

3. No system

which stores your vote on an ephemeral medium is safe.


1) Safety - If the software fails, your vote is gone. There is no tangible record of your vote to fall back on.

2) Security - I can build a system that records the vote one way, while still reporting the vote to you correctly.

David Allen
Publisher, CEO, Janitor
Plan Nine Publishing
http://www.plan9.org

[RC]

4. Paper is the only sure proof way in case of a recount

Paper has survived intact for thousands of years. Newspapers have survived intact and readable for over a hundred hears in US land fills.
There is nothing wrong with paper.

The paper trail must also be in human readable form. No bar-codes, no electronical gimmickry.
The voting device must leave a human readable paper that the voter deposits into a separate locked ballot box as the voter leaves the polling place.

Anything short of that is an open invitation to voter fraud.

[Andy_Stephenson]

8. You have learned well!

:toast:

[RC]

9. Learned hell...

I was one of the first here at DU advocating a mandatory paper trail.

[Andy_Stephenson]

12. Paper Ballot

not paper trail.

[RedEagle]

5. This position paper is not really on target

Still acting like paper disenfranchises.

We must not conduct vote counting in the dark and vote counting must be able to be done by ordinary citizens.

[BOHICA06]

6. The optical scan ...

fill in the bubble ballot where the ballot is both the ballot and the scan sheet is the most fail-proof way to conduct an election. The number of sheets must equal the number of voters that signed in - mistakes (double voting) are rejected at least the first time.

[Eric J in MN]

7. and Automark lets people with disabilities use optical scan ballots (nt)

nt

[RedEagle]

11. Optical Scan Better, but no Panacea

IF you can cast and have your optical scan vote counted AT THE POLLS, you may get a chance to revote. Palast proved that the machines just happened to behave differently in different counties in Florida in 2000, allowing some voters to correct any mistakes in one county, and in the next, predominately black county, the machines gave no indication the votes were invalidated.

Keep in mind that not all optical scan ballots are counted at the polls. A lot of the systems employ central counting. Ballots are taken to a location, probably the auditors office, for counting. This denies a large number of voters any chance at all for what they are calling "second chance" voting. If there is a problem with the ballot, there is no recourse whatsoever for them to be alerted to it by the machine rejecting it.

There is also the fact that the systems count by computer. Unless any recount is done, at the very least, on a different system, not just a different machine, the recount is in serious question. That is why we must not only push for voter verified paper ballots, but robust, random, manual audits, of every voting system.

In Washington State, the Secretary of State finally mandated a voter verifiable paper audit trail, but only of poll site based machines, (leaving the option for Internet voting wide open) and included some random audits in his last bill, but it was written to ONLY be audits of touch screens- which in Washington State would not be the predominate system due to the popularity of absentee voting. So you have to really, really read the rules or proposed legislation carefully. The Secretary of State made a big proclomation but in the final analysis, essentially gave nothing.

Also with Optical Scan, you have to make very sure the machines can read the ink/pencil used. Some of the older ones, especially, will not read anything that does not have carbon in it. Some inks have carbon, some don't. And if extra ballots need to be made, and are copied, the shrinkage due to the copier can cause the machines to misread the ballots.

Optical scan is way, way better than a system with no paper at all, by far. But we must push auditing along with the voter verified paper ballots. Florida wasn't skewed just because of punch cards. Punch cards took the rap. That was a case of, "look over here," "don't look over there."

Sorry for the rant. We have to hammer home auditing along with voter verified paper ballots, and that auditing cannot just be recounting the ballots on the same system that counted them the first time.

[sendero]

10. as a software jockey and...

... general technology geek for 40+ years, I have to say that I'm skeptical of any system that does not print a paper confirmation that can be later used for a recount.

I'm not saying it is impossible, just damn near and why bother when printing something is cheap, easy, and almost completely secure compared to any other scheme.

IMHO.