Both Diebold web sites go down

[BevHarris]

Shortly before midnight Aug. 7, DUer Robbien posted an interesting note on the "Libertarians file records request" thread, noting that the Diebold web site is down. http://www.diebold.com and the voting machine site, http://www.dieboldes.com both yielded "site not found" messages two hours later.

Perhaps a long-overdue security upgrade? Aug 7 Wired News revealed new and embarrassing security problems. http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,59925,00.html

"A hacker has come forward with evidence that he broke the security of a private Web server operated by the embattled e-vote vendor, and made off last spring with Diebold's internal discussion-list archives, a software bug database and more software.

The Diebold discussion-list archives included other warnings of potential security problems. In May 2000, Diebold Election Systems' systems engineer manager Talbot Iredale posted a message to the support list chiding employees for placing software files on the special "customer" section of the FTP site without password-protecting them. That section of the site was created for delivering program updates and other files to election officials and other customers.

"This potentially gives the software away to whom ever (sic) wants it," wrote Iredale.

"On Dec. 2 last year, Diebold Election Systems' webmaster Joshua Gardner announced to the list that the FTP site finally was being eliminated and replaced by the staff site. Gardner explained that the FTP site had been "accessible to the outside world with no restrictions on access, and no provisions for logging user activity. FTP was a security risk, and I have shut it down for this reason."

# # # # #

However, Gardner never shut down the site, and after it was found by Bev Harris on Jan. 23, 2003 and she called Diebold employees to interview them about the site, it was taken offline Jan. 29.

[harperpine]

1. This is a little off the subject,

but I've been reading articles about the voting machines, and wondered if any have talked about the results of the elections where they admitted the voting machines didn't work correctly. In other words, has fraud, in the form of fixed elections, begun to show up in the press? (Please excuse me if it turns out it's all over the place and I've somehow missed it.)

Also, I just wanted to thank you and congratulate you for the incredible work you've been doing.

[BevHarris]

2. The press is still getting their heads around the issue, but

they are getting up to speed. (on edit: yanked some info, some things work best if left as a surprise for Diebold.)

Reporters are getting very interested in the money trail. I spoke with an investigative reporter in Ohio today who is hot on the trail of a guy who is in the middle of purchasing decisions in a few states, and some reporters are finding it very interesting that San Diego went ahead with an order for 10,000 Diebold touch screens (probably a $50 million order, with service contract figured in) -- in the middle of all this.

They are wondering why San Diego, and other places like the city of Norfolk, are in such a hurry, instead of doing the prudent thing and establishing a task force to look into the matter. Especially in view of the fact that Diebold was sending its people flying around the country to keep the deals on track, reporters are starting to ask if that involved writing checks.

I think we're still early on the fraud stories. First the public needs to get introduced to the problem; then reporters tackle tougher investigations, like who is getting paid for what, and then election data starts to get looked at.

I've been asked to come in to another county office that uses Diebold -- don't know if that is going to be friends or foes -- but I will see what can be done in that one to lock down and/or examine past election data files.

We're getting traction.

Bev

[nofurylike]

4. traction! yes!

in awe

[harperpine]

5. It sounds

like they're starting to get the idea.

[asjr]

7. web sites

You deserve a medal Bev. How about the "mainstream" media? I have seen nothing on cable or the other news stations about this. Could have missed it but I don't seem to have seen anything. With the state of our media these days it would surprise me if anything turned up. I have e-mailed them about various things but I am ignored.

[The Night Owl]

9. What you ask is impossible...

How will the media be able to bring us the minutia of the Kobe case if they are off investigating something as unimportant as election fraud?

That was sarcasm.

What I really want to say is that I hope we are not relying on the media to blow the lid off this case. If there is a ball to be dropped, the media will drop it. What this investigation needs is for our leaders in government to wake up and pay attention. A few lawsuits might help too.

[RedEagle]

18. If That Office is in Washington State...

....let me know which one and I'll see if I can get you some back up.

There is a citiznes group there concerned about voting that is growing and they might have some people in that area, or can wrangle up some.

[nofurylike]

3. gratitude

what you have done and are doing is heroic and world altering, BevHarris.

keep on!

[cmd]

6. Diebold is not just voting machines

If they can be manipulated, just how secure are all those Diebold ATM's? Just something to think about on your way to the bank today.

[SoCalDem]

15. The difference is this

When you go to an atm, there is a camera recording your transaction AND a paper trail..

You punch in $100.00 withdrawl, and if you only get 4 twenties, you will scream bloody murder..

There is actually a way to track the transaction because you have a R E C E I P T ... and it has a video recorded backup..


voting is intended to be secret, and any time something relies on secrecy, there is the possibility of cheating..:(

[Robbien]

8. The national conference of computer security specialists

meeting in Washington was picked up by the Pittsburgh Gazette. It is a good article which states the meeting concluded with almost universal agreement that new touch-screen voting technology the federal government is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on since the 2000 election debacle may be readily vulnerable to errors and tampering.

So this is getting some press.

article here

[DrBB]

11. Again, I say

...that Avi Rubin's credibility in the press is at a high point now, and could be leveraged. The article refers to the USENIX security conference where David Dill chaired a session on e-voting. Avi Rubin, who issued the study of the ftp-site files, is a USENIX board member and it is his study IMO that has really given this thing credibility in the press and backed Diebold against the wall. My thought is that if Rubin and the other USENIX security guys were to issue a statement about the impending SAIC evaluation, saying just what criteria that study would need to meet in order to answer the criticisms, I think we could stay out in front of this clear attempt at a whitewash. Such a move could frame the issue so Rubin et al. become, for the media, the ultimate arbiters of the SAIC study, not the Maryland SoS. Dunno if that would work or not, but it seems worth exploring. I have a connection to Rubin through another USENIX board member but it's not something to be used lightly. Considering ways to frame an approach about this....

[angka]

13. love the quote from the populex guy here

"We welcome criticism. If we've got a thin skin, we shouldn't be in this business," he said. He said his company was asked to get into the business by the state of Illinois because of the history of voting "fraud in Chicago."

(more from populex.com)

The Digital Paper Ballot™ system is a new approach to voting designed to accurately capture each voter’s intent, simplify the voting process, safeguard the integrity of elections and restore voter confidence. Combining new technology with common-sense voting needs, it is an easy-to-use computer-based touch screen system. But in contrast to most other touch screen voting systems that collect and store the votes electronically in computers, the Populex™ system prints a tangible paper ballot card. This ballot card is the official ballot. Each ballot contains a bar code that is scanned to reliably record and count the votes on election day. The same ballot card is the permanent paper record that must be available for manual audits and recounts as required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

you know i think i like these guys. so this company was the only one that bothered to show, eh?

[SharonAnn]

21. So the vendors tried to get him fired? WTF?

They didn't like what Rubin had to say so they contacted the president of the university to try to get him fired! Sheeesh!

"He said that at least one vendor of the machines and one high-ranking state election official who has bought the equipment tried in vain to get him fired after his research findings became public, even writing to the president of Johns Hopkins. " have a lot at stake," he said.

"

[DrBB]

10. "embattled e-vote vendor"

"embattled e-vote vendor"

That's the most encouraging phrase I've read in a while. The very fact it is there means that they're starting to lose the PR battle. Marks a critical transition in their brand perception, and not a happy one for them. Now the predominant impression about them is "Having to shore up credibility," "taking serious damage from critics and trying to respond," etc. (This is where we need to get with Shrump, too!)

[ramblin_dave]

12. Did Diebold try to get Aviel Rubin fired?

This article says this about Aviel Rubin:

He (Rubin) said that at least one vendor of the machines and one high-ranking state election official who has bought the equipment tried in vain to get him fired after his research findings became public, even writing to the president of Johns Hopkins. " have a lot at stake," he said.

[ianbruce]

14. Great article!

The research of Aviel Rubin, of Johns Hopkins University's Information Security Institute, has been widely cited as proof that there are major problems because the new law encourages electronic voting. He said yesterday his research found "serious problems" with software for such machines and that the code for one popular machine was even widely available on the Internet.

He said that at least one vendor of the machines and one high-ranking state election official who has bought the equipment tried in vain to get him fired after his research findings became public, even writing to the president of Johns Hopkins. " have a lot at stake," he said.

I'd love to see that letter.

One basic problem widely discussed at the symposium was the difficulty of voter verification and how to get an audit trail. There are many concerns that local officials could skew the machines to record votes falsely.

Sanford Morganstein, a vendor who showed up and was widely cheered for his "courage," represented Populex. "We welcome criticism. If we've got a thin skin, we shouldn't be in this business," he said. He said his company was asked to get into the business by the state of Illinois because of the history of voting "fraud in Chicago."

He said his company's system used touch-screen technology that prints out the voter's selection on a card with a barcode that the voter must drop into a ballot box to have counted. "Can it be fooled? Yes. Can it be better? Yes," he said.

Hey! I like this guy...

[DEMActivist]

16. Can you say "Cathy Cox, SoS of Georgia?"

He said that at least one vendor of the machines and one high-ranking state election official who has bought the equipment tried in vain to get him fired after his research findings became public, even writing to the president of Johns Hopkins

I don't have any proof of this but let's list the circumstantial evidence, shall we?

1. In the original Hopkins report, there was only ONE graphic. It was a picture of Cathy Cox standing next to a Diebold Touchscreen machine.

2. That picture was later replaced with a picture of JUST the Diebold Touchscreen.

3. high-ranking state election official.

Hmmmm....yep, that would be Cathy Cox, Georgia Secretary of State.

[BevHarris]

17. Here's an article with a great analogy for the DISABLED argument

"Election administrators like Lamone will play the "disabled" card, casting opponents of electronic systems as enemies of the physically challenged. The National Federation of the Blind gave Diebold a ringing endorsement - at the same time it's suing Baltimore County to implement a touch-screen system.

"But here's a question: Suppose all buildings were required to have elevators to accommodate the handicapped. And suppose, to save money, the government changed the building code to eliminate stairways because everyone could use the same elevators. What happens in a fire?

"Is it better to establish a voting system with a paper backup and then devise special terminals for the blind? Or a system that works OK for everybody - when it works - at the price of eliminating the best way to solve disputes when it doesn't?"

http://www.sunspot.net/technology/custom/pluggedin/bal-pl.himowitz31jul31,0,4433848.column?coll=bal-pe-pluggedin

####

Now, if you have touch screens, which are friendly for disabled voters, and the touchscreens print a paper ballot (which also eliminates unreadable ballot messups), this is like having a building with both elevators and stairs. The argument used against touch screens having a paper trail is that it does the blind no good. All other disabilities benefit from a paper trail, just as non-disabled do. That argument would say that we should take stairwells out of all buildings because they do the disabled no good.

[RedEagle]

19. Other security conscious vendors and Rubin

Accupoll and Avante weren't there, granted, but may have had other reasons, like being spread too thin and fighting the battle on state fronts. Besides, they know they meet the scientists criteria for a voter-verified paper ballot. So, we can add Populex to that list, except I want to see how the voter verifies the ballot in their system, do they give them a key to match the barcode to their ballot choices? The problem I see with this system, and there may be something I don't know about it, is that it still depends on computer technology to read the ballot. Other voter-verified systems print the choices and use barcode or some form of scanning, too. Are those choices printed on this ballot? You could still have the bar code read one way to the voter and another way to the counting program. However, it's better than the DRE's without any tangible proof.

Let's not get overboard with only using Rubin. I'm still advocating an independent review board in Maryland, but if you want increased whammy power, have another set of scientists review the system. Beware that Diebold may have implemented new software, etc., although it sounded like they couldn't turn it around that fast.

If they DID manage to create a new program that fast, it would have to have been certified. But at the core, did they create it or get if from someone else, if that happened?

I would also prefer a new batch of scientists for review so we don't have the questiion of Rubin and VoteHere popping up. VoteHere and Sequoia jumped on this opportunity real fast and that should be throwing up red flags all over. Let's not get caught with a flanking maneuver here that election officials will grab on to and do a lemming rush to avoid paper.

Any total computer system has to be able to be audited, on a massive scale, provide constant upgrades to insure security, (which these scientists concede is virtually impossible) and be totally open and transparent. A program is a static, sitting duck opportunity for hackers. A voting program has to be certified, hopefully by other institutions than we have now, and can't be easily upgraded and therefore, does not meet the criteria mentioned above. Hackers have a field day with this type of stuff. Then, you have the support structure, and as long as Secretaries of State can OK patches and such at their discretion, such a system as proposed by VoteHere will always be open to fraud.

Watch for the flanking maneuvers. Get ahead of those as well.

:o

[Gordon25]

23. We need to remember voter verified ballots, while essential, are...

...only the beginning. State election law determines what can and can't be done with those ballots. So the second thing we need to do is secure the right to hand count those ballots.

Once we have done that, we must have a law mandating (ala the Holt bill) a hand ballot count in a percentage of precincts sufficient to establish a statistical baseline for the election races against which the machine count can be compared.

Couple that with a law giving candidates the right to request a handcount or recount at their, or their campaign's, expense, and any kind of tampering becomes a very risky proposition.

There simply are no technological solutions to this problem. Technological solutions tend to be complex, and adding complexity to the problem of security in electionic vote recording and counting systems increases the possiblities for fraud rather than diminishes them.

It's my feeling we need to be advocating both now to link them in people's minds: voter-verified paper ballots and partial hand recounts. They are the two critical foundation stones. Without them in place, any attempt to secure the integrity of our voting franchise is doomed to collapse.

I love your posts, RedEagle. They always have meat in them. :think:
Thanks for everything you are doing.

Gordon25

[Pobeka]

27. Even the blind benefit from a paper trail

Because there is a physical ballot that confirms their vote. They are automatically guaranteed a higher level of protection because the potential for fraud is reduced for *all* voters, most who can see and verify their ballots. In paper trail system, the only way blind voters would be a more risk of fraud would be if the machines could determine that the voter was blind. And no offense meant, but the number of blind voters is not high enough to swing an elections, so the blind would benefit in the end by voting in the system with the lowest potential for fraud.

[PurityOfEssence]

20. That says volumes about their computer competence, doesn't it?

Trust us, we know what's goin' on with these computin' machines here, but dang them websites is tricky...

I mean, they can't be GUILTY, can they? It must just be broad-spectrum slobbering incompetence...

[Bushfire]

22. New website that is tracking the issue

http://www.verifiedvoting.org/index.asp

maybe it's been posted before here, but I found it thru another webpage. just like to spread the word. on edit: the founder is David Dill, so I'm sure it's been mentioned already here.

also spoke to an aide of US Rep Rush Holt (D-NJ) who mentioned a professor at the Univ of Maryland who is critical of the Diebold machines, and would be an ally. PM me if you'd like his phone #, or email. I'd rather not say his name yet for privacy reasons.

[Generic Other]

24. Kick

:kick:

[Deja Q]

25. And yet Diebold is content to create a voting box with no paper trail?

Fuck the traitors.

[Lone_Wolf]

26. electioncenter.org seems to be down also

n/t

[BevHarris]

28. The home page is down, but not the site.

Probably just a code error when someone did an update -- all the pages work except the home page.

[ParanoidPat]

29. That's the easy way to make a site appear down.

Eliminate the index (home) page. :evilgrin: