''Rebuild or Retreat: America's Strategic Dilemma''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=179&language_id=1T he most severe consequence of America's failed adventure in Iraq is its exposure of American military limitations and vulnerabilities.
The failures of the intervention are manifold. Some of them can be chalked up to poor planning and excessive optimism -- both fueled by utopian neo-conservative ideology -- but others have revealed structural weaknesses.
Just to name a few of the latter: reliance on private contractors to perform key missions at inflated prices, flawed intelligence, overuse of reserve troops, redeployment of troops from South Korea and extensions of the duration of combat duty. All of the foregoing point to the same root problem: the United States military is underforced for any major project of nation building in absolute numbers and, more importantly, in the distribution of specialties.
The occupation has revealed that America lacks the capacity to neutralize insurgent movements, run prisons effectively, procure actionable intelligence and conduct successful public relations. Most importantly, it has proven unable to provide the basic function of government: personal security in the forms of public safety and basic services.
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It is most likely that either a Kerry or a Bush administration will try to restore a multilateral foreign and military policy in which the United States is the dominant partner, making the move to rebuild American military power to meet the demands of future nation building efforts the most probable choice of the security leadership. If so, the military will have to be expanded in size, and investment will have to be made in labor-intensive skilled specialties such as intelligence, policing and civil affairs. The problem is getting the personnel and paying for the expansion.
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