Were We Wrong?
by the Editors
Resources are finite. To defeat and occupy Iraq, the United States has transferred special operations units from the hunt for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Because our military is stretched so thin in Iraq, we cannot threaten military action in Iran or North Korea, which has reduced our diplomatic leverage. The tradeoffs even extend to the nonmilitary sphere. The Bush administration's refusal to adequately fund security for U.S. chemical and nuclear plants, for inspections at our ports, and for the police officers and firemen who would be the first to respond to a terrorist attack is well-documented. Absent its enormous expenditures in Iraq, the administration could have far better addressed these threats--threats more urgent than a tyrant in Baghdad with nuclear dreams, but no nuclear plans.
Should we have known that the key assumption underlying our strategic rationale for war would prove false? By early 2003, it was becoming clear that at least two pieces of evidence the administration cited as proof of Saddam's nuclear program--his supposed purchase of uranium from Niger and his acquisition of aluminum tubes for a supposed nuclear centrifuge--were highly dubious. By mid-February, Mohammed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), announced that his agency's inspectors had "found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq."
In retrospect, we should have paid more attention to these warning signs. But, at the time, there seemed good reason not to. After all, Saddam had tried desperately to build a bomb before the first Gulf war. While there was no proof he had revived this nuclear program in the '90s, he acted like a guilty man--relentlessly impeding inspections, even though such behavior perpetuated the sanctions that ravaged his people and made him an international pariah. Even after he allowed IAEA inspectors to return in late 2002, he denied them unfettered access to Iraqi nuclear scientists--although, by then, the cost of noncompliance was more than just continued sanctions; it was war. And, beyond Saddam's past history and current behavior, there were the claims of American --and foreign--intelligence. In October 2002, the National Intelligence Estimate, the combined assessment of America's various intelligence agencies, stated that "all intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons." We know now that some experts didn't agree, but few outside the administration thought so at the time. Indeed, even most opponents of the war assumed Iraq was trying to build a bomb. We feel regret--but no shame.
more at link:
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040628&s=editorial062804
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