BBV: Research on Senator Ensign's electronic verified voting legislation

[demobabe]

I'm doing research regarding the various proposed legislation, and was specifically looking at the bills in the Senate. There are two bills by Democrats and one by Republican Senator John Ensign (NV) - S.2437. This bill looks like the simplest bill of the three and the most likely to pass.

Verifiedvoting.org has a comparison chart of the three bills along with the text of each bill:
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/legislation/federal/senate/senatebillcomparison.asp

My question to you guys is, how do you think these three bills measure up? More specifically, what do you think of Sen. Ensign's bill? What concerns/questions would you address to him?

[MallRat]

1. Dear Senator Ensign,

If you feel that a voter-verified paper record is important to ensure the security of the election process, then why does your bill:

Not require manual mandatory surprise recounts of voter-verified paper ballots?

Not require public disclosure of voting system software?

Not require any audit trail compliance for the 2004 elections?

Not require use of paper ballots in 2004 if voting systems are not ready to print paper ballots themselves? THIS IS HUGE.

Not require hardware and software to be accredited?

Not require recertification of software if it is edited or altered?


It sounds to me like the Ensign bill has loopholes so big, you could drive the 2004 Presidential Election right through it.

Both Democrat-sponsored bills require paper ballot alternatives if the electronic systems are not in compliance for this year's election. Ensign's bill essentially allows election officials to throw up their arms and say, "Sorry, but we won't be ready this year. We'll use BBV just this once, OK?"

-MR

[shraby]

3. Dear Senator Ensign

Your bill leaves a lot of verification methods out. It should

Require manual mandatory surprise recounts of voter-verified paper ballots.

Require public disclosure of voting system software.

Require any audit trail compliance for the 2004 elections.

Require use of paper ballots in 2004 if voting systems are not ready to print paper ballots themselves. THIS IS HUGE.

Require hardware and software to be accredited.

Require recertification of software if it is edited or altered.

These requirements are mandatory in order to have an honest, verifiable election for November 2004.

[Eric J in MN]

4. The RECORD Act has a huge loophole, allowing a state to

The RECORD Act has a huge loophole, allowing a state to postpone forever voter-verified paper ballots by claiming it's "technologically impossible.'

That is why "The Voter Confidence Act" is the best.

[Eric J in MN]

2. There is no mandatory auditing.

It seems ok, but without mandatory auditing, it's unclear how a rigged election would be discovered.

Theoretically, exit polls showing a different result than the paper ballots could lead to a lawsuit and a counting of the paper ballots, but in 2002, there were no exit polls in Georgia.