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and their random attacks at democrats (grassroots and candidates) looks like desperation due to shrinking importance. I have never seen/heard their spokes people get quite so shrill.
Those candidates following DLC advice in 2002 - didn't do so well. Why? Because they seemed to be bounded to one issue (privatization of Social Security) and not much else (even advised to go light on criticisms of corporate corruption). The new democrats in the eighties wielded some power (their ideas - as carried at the time by Gary Hart - were seen as 'fresh' and pragmatic policies) - but in an outsider sort of way. They grew to dominance with Clinton - and after the Gingrich takeover - they became a key in a strategy to leverage some corporate campaign dollars.
Imo, when Gore failed, they immediately distanced themselves from Gore (hence the attacks on his candidacy, his "populism", etc.) And somewhere after 911 some of their strategies seemed to emanate less from a position of strength (as they had during the Clinton years) and more from positions of fear (as in - we are afraid of x or y position because we fear that it might make our candidates less electable). I contend that working from fear never allows for the best strategic thinking - as it confines candidates and campaigns so much as to disallow growing themes that develop generically (re: in 1990/1 Sen. Woffard wins a special election on Health Care issues - and in 1992 over the course of the campaign - as the issue resonated more and more it became a center piece of the Clinton campaign).
As the DLC campaigns in 2002 were not seen as 'successful', I believe their power began to wane. No institution that went from relative outside of the power structure to becoming the power structure, cedes power/influence willingly. Fewer candidates were taking cues (hence the rhetoric of spokesman Evan Bayh is no longer the main rhetoric of folks on the Hill, nor of some of the major candidates) from the DLC.
And then the kicker - the main power/influence point - the ability to raise beaucoup dollars - was demonstrated by one grassroots campaign as not an absolutely necessary ingredient for successful campaigns. Note that the attacks on Dean and his supporters grew more intense after Dean demonstrated some impressive fundraising prowess.
I would guess that any candidate doing the same, without the DLC as the key conduit, will face similar attacks. And I believe that at the core it isn't about policy positions as much as desperations to hold on to their influence/peddling position.
At the same token, I believe that there will be some reconciliation and working together with the DLC, the DNC and the primary winner. And I think the reconciliation will come from both directions. The DLC will want to play a role in order to try to maintain a position of influence in other campaigns and future campaigns. The Candidate will want to work with the DLC - because the DLC still can raise a good deal of money.
How folks here respond to that - hopefully in a tempered and pragmatic way.
----- Not sure about the last part - Norquist is far more dangerous than Barr. I really don't mind folks working with Barr and Army on fighting the Patriot Act (and PA2); BUT Norquist is another story altogether. He is one to be exceptionally wary around. His actions are all about exessive power brokering (forcing lobbyists out who have ever - in their nonprofessional life - given money to any democrat, for example).
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