I don't get the reluctance to paper trail for votes

[HFishbine]

Arrggh! I don't get it. Why do officials think generating a paper trail from stored voting data is just as good as a paper record of each vote?

Here's an e-mail excahnge I had today. Is there a better way I can make the point?

> Hi all,
> The machines we use are, to my way of thinking, really terrific. They
> provide voters with reminders and opportunities to go back and
> review their
> voting. They notify voters if they have undervoted. They will not
> let a voter
> overvote. So, once this vote has been cast, very deliberately
> with that final red
> button, an audit trail would seem to me to be all that would be neede for
> recount. I suspect the voter would not like to have to review a
> paper ballot after
> voting and reviewing the electronic ballot. This is a good system
> that voters
> like. They really can go backwards and forwards and review and
> change their
> minds.

My reply:
-----------

Nobody is suggesting that electronic voting machines don't have advantages. Adding a paper vote at the polling place takes away nothing from the advantages you cite. There is not a single benefit you mention that would be lost by adding a printed vote to the process. What is does do however, is add an auditable trail that is not dependent on stored electronic data. An audit trail generated from corrupt, manipulated, or hacked data is useless.

Nobody seems to be able to offer a reason why a printed vote at the time the ballot is cast would be a detriment to the voting process. There are however obvious reasons why it would make the voting process even more accountable.

[Fredda Weinberg]

1. The handicapped want to vote privately

and having paper ballots eliminates all the potential savings - it costs a lot to guard those pieces of paper ... remember the convoy up the Florida turnpike for the ultimate recount?

I understood the vice president of the League of Women Voters. Because of my background, I have less faith in the technology, but with nothing more than suspicions, I don't blame her for not changing her mind.

[qb]

3. How does a paper trail take away privacy?

Apparently, electronic devices allow the handicapped to vote privately without assistance. If they are unable to read the printout, what's to keep them from verifying electronically and then pushing the button that feeds the printout into the machine where it is stored anonymously with all the rest?

[gristy]

4. my counterpoints

The handicapped want to vote privately

Solutions that allows the disabled to vote privately and verify their vote privately are not in any way incompatible with paper ballots used as the master record.

and having paper ballots eliminates all the potential savings - it costs a lot to guard those pieces of paper ... remember the convoy up the Florida turnpike for the ultimate recount?

Ah, yes, cost. The alternative, i.e. NOT having any paper ballots to guard would be cheaper, but this certainly could not be an improvement if indeed you wanted/needed to recount. And remember it costs a lot to put a computer in front of every voter. And it costs a lot to design and maintain and upgrade an electronic voting system that has any chance of keeping track of the votes AND not having its vote totals compromised AND being able to identify the situation where indeed vote totals have been compromised.

I understood the vice president of the League of Women Voters. Because of my background, I have less faith in the technology, but with nothing more than suspicions, I don't blame her for not changing her mind.

Trust your suspicions, along with the evidence that Bev has dug up. I do have a background in technology. And I don't trust voting systems that do NOT use the paper ballot as its master record.

[HFishbine]

5. Fredda -- Huh?

"The handicapped want to vote privately"

How does having a printed ballot keep the handicapped from voting privately? I don't see how a blind person can vote privately with an electronic machine. What type of handicapp would keep someone from receiving their printed ballot and dropping it in a box? Clarification please.


"and having paper ballots eliminates all the potential savings"

If that's the argument, then I want to hear it. Let's have a national discussion about just how much accountablity we can afford in our election process. I think that is really a red herring.

"but with nothing more than suspicions..."

So, must we wait until a hack is proven beyond a doubt? Isn't it enough that vulnerabilities have been exposed? Are we to wait until all we can say is, "we should have seen this coming?" I mean, do they lock ballot boxes for paper ballots because they used to leave them unlocked, but someone stole some at some point, or do they lock them because it's prudent?

[DuctapeFatwa]

2. You have answered your own question

A paper trail would indeed make the process more accountable.

Paper trails would allow independent counting verification, facilitate monitoring, and make it more difficult to merely decree that so and so had "won."

Because the voting classes do like the illusion of having a "voice and a choice," the regime is reluctant to simply abolish the process entirely at this time.

[gristy]

6. Your reply is pretty good

Nobody is suggesting that electronic voting machines don't have advantages. Adding a paper vote at the polling place takes away nothing from the advantages you cite. There is not a single benefit you mention that would be lost by adding a printed vote to the process. What is does do however, is add an auditable trail that is not dependent on stored electronic data. An audit trail generated from corrupt, manipulated, or hacked data is useless.

[gulliver]

7. You are right.

Maybe put it this way. Only the voting machine company's software knows for sure how a vote was recorded. The paper trail makes it possible for humans to be sure without relying on a hidden third party, the software. Software is both fallible and, if kept secret, subject to suspicion.

Done properly, the paper output could be human and computer readable. The voter can verify the vote if they want to.

What if the Florida fiasco happened and a recount was requested? What if the challenger sues in court and asks the election officers to prove that people voted the way the Diebold (for example) machine says they did?

Anyone who buys a machine without a paper trail is making a big purchasing mistake.

[gristy]

9. That would be an optically-scannable ballot

Done properly, the paper output could be human and computer readable.

[gulliver]

18. Absolutely.

You can see how you voted and an optical scanner can do a recount.

[HFishbine]

11. Great!

Great points! I keep thinking that I just need to find the right way to put it before local election officials start to get it.

[Salviati]

8. One problem I see

is with the presentation of the problem...

Too often I see the problem explained as "the computers can be hacked!" I for one am not worried about the computers being hacked from the outside, I'm worried about the election being rigged from the inside.

Though it may play on peoples preexisting fears of hackers and computer viruses and whatnot, it offers the voting machine manufacturers an all too easy out: "See, it's impossible for Joe Hacker to break into our machines from the outside, therefore our system is unhackable, therefore the election is legitimate", when in fact it is concievable that Joe Programmer wrote the software for all the machines in the state to display one thing and record another, possibly even modifying the code after the fact to leave absolutely no trace of the deed.

At least with paper ballots or records there is actual physical evidance that would have to be destroyed and forged, making the process much more difficult to tamper with on a large scale, and in order to do it effectively would likely need lots more people in on it.

[gristy]

10. Exactly - you can have outsiders hacking and insiders commiting fraud

This two-part problem has indeed been well-noted (if not well-addressed).

[Salviati]

13. Right, but by emphasizing the hacking

it allows Diebold etc. to ju-jitsu around the issue of fraud, so I think the best thing to do is to empasize the fraud, especially how much fraud can be perpetrated by so few people. That coupled with the absolute stonewalling against a paper record...

[gristy]

14. The pro-paper trail people do emhasize the insider fraud danger.

And Diebold refutes the outsider hacker danger. At least that's what I've noticed.

[BevHarris]

17. First rule of fraud investigation:

Look very carefully at what they tell you not to look at.

Diebold:

These machines do not connect to the Internet.
These machines are not connected to anything.
These machines do not have modems.
That is, the modems are only one way.
That is, the modems are never plugged in.
These machines have wireless capability but we don't ever use it.
That is, we only want the capability to use it.
That is, it replaces the land line modem (new TSx system) but we won't use it.
That is, if someone gets in via wireless they won't get the official results, so don't worry.
They do not have modems.
They do not have modems.
They do not have modems.

I say: Look very carefully at all aspects of the modem communication. This is what can give access without physical access, to both insiders and outsiders. This is what will enable a machine to pass any kind of L&A test and still rig votes. This gives complete flexibility.

[HFishbine]

12. Another good point.

Thank you.

[DEMActivist]

15. In Georgia they couldn't answer this simple question

I asked the following:

In this state, we are required to insure our automobiles and homes. Most of us also insure our health and our lives. Why would you choose NOT to insure an election with a small piece of paper to prove the vote is counted as cast?

[never cry wolf]

16. Check out gristy's take

Post #158