Where's The Magic In "Paper Trails"?

[MostlyLurks]

I need to get something straight, just for my own understanding of the issue.

When people demand "paper trails", what exactly do they mean? A return to non-electronic voting across the board (i.e. everybody everywhere votes on punchcards) or a printed "receipt" of one's vote on an electronic or computerized machine?

I ask because of this: if the answer to the above is the latter, I don't see how that makes a big difference. Any program that can display a vote for candidate X while recording the same vote for candidate Y could easily be rewritten to display the vote for X, record it for Y and print a receipt showing the vote for X. The "voter fraud" scenario already assumes "they" have the code that switches some X votes to Y votes - adding a routine to print the X vote would probably be pretty easy, if not completely trivial.

So the voter would never know their vote was misrecorded - both the screen and receipt show the correct vote. Only in the bits and electronica that tally it is the conflict present. Granted, having the receipt would be a verifiable item in the event of a retally, but that's pretty much akin to a revote, which never happens and if that's the idea, why not just make a push for non-electronic voting in the first place? I mean, what would we do: ask the voters to bring in their receipts so we could hand tally? I just don't understand how a paper trail for an electronic transaction makes sense and I need some perspective.

It seems to me that, assuming electronic tallying is the future, the only possible safeguard is open source code. Why isn't there more of a push for open source code or, better yet, non-coporate (i.e. governmental) sponsorship of voting machine development and technology? Is this a case where the easy two-word catch phrase has overshadowed the real issue? Or am I missing some provision that makes paper trials immune from the issue I'm outlined? All insight greatly appreciated.

Mostly

[bryant69]

1. Well, I think you right off the recount scenario a little too easily

Obviously without a paper trail, the recount measure is a pretty futile exercise--with a paper trail, one verified by the voter, you can proove that the system screwed up after the voting stage.

That said, I do like the idea of an open source system to voting systems, but how do you keep it free of independent hackers? I mean you couldn't have corporate interference, but what if some conniving Free Republicer hacks in and does bad stuff? Would this make that a more possible scenario?

Bryant
check it out --> http://politicalcomment.blogspot.com

[MostlyLurks]

8. But that scenario necessitates....

I agree that the paper trail makes sense in a recount IF the recount recounts the paper trail. And there's the rub. All recount laws, as far I am aware, recount the same stuff that was counted before. The "paper trail" argument would be a different type of recount - you're counting the machine votes once and paper votes once.

Therein lies another problem: let's say the recount of paper switches the outcome. To my mind, the winner of the first count (and loser of the second) has a legitimate right to question the recount. And then where do we go? A third count (of what)? A revote (and right back to the electronic machines that caused the problem in the first place)? A simple cutoff where we say "nope, sorry, one recount per election - the results of the paper count stands". If that's the case, what's the point of the electronic count in the first place since it is ALWAYS trumped by the paper recount? Why not just skip the electronic count all together right from the start? I just don't understand how the paper trail solves anything where electronic voting is concerned.

Voting experts (universally?) agree that the most accurate vote counting is done by hand. Personally, I think we should return to hand counting of paper (non electronic balloting) but maybe there's an electronic voting scenario that works and I'm just not aware of it.

Mostly

[htuttle]

2. It's all about recounts -- it's not about receipts

Ask any accountant -- except for one from Arthur Anderson. You need two sources for any given piece of information in order to verify it during an audit.

Take-home receipts are a bad idea, and the only people who really talk about take-home receipts are those arguing against a paper trail. It's a red herring.

[MostlyLurks]

9. Could you expand on that?

I'm not sure I follow what you're saying. What would the two sources be in any electronic voting scenario? If paper receipts are a red herring, where does the debate need to be focused?

[Craig3410]

3. I honest;y don't see why electronic voting should even be used.

For 224 years, we used paper ballots and voting machines, and they worked just fine (except for 2000).

Any moron can see from a mile away that the potential for hacking in and changing votes is way too high.

I remember a clip from Jon Stewart's show that an independent computer hacker found that an experienced hacker could completely crash the voting system in just 5 minutes.

Oh well, it won't last when in the 2008 election, a computer glitch winds up electing Thomas Jefferson. :)

[marcologico]

4. Good point. Digitial X-rays are also less accurate than photographic ones.

So guess where Kodak hawks its digital X-ray machines? China.

Electronic voting is a bad, bad, BAD idea, kind of like tearing out electric streetcars and replacing them with diesel buses.

[rman]

5. it's bad, but no because it's digital

it's bad because it is privitised, closed source and therefore not verifiable.

[Cleita]

6. From an accounting POV, if you are counting money

you need a source document to make an entry. Also, the entry should be posted twice in two different ledgers known as a double entry. It was discovered by merchants way back in history that single entry invites fraud so when you collect money you record what you put in the bank in one ledger (usually)from the deposit slip (source document) and where you got it from, like say a credit card. When you total both columns they should match or balance.

Voting shouldn't be any different. If you use a paper ballot, then your entry would be a vote in one column and then distributed to the candidate or issue in another column. If you put it into a voting machine, the paper document you receive should be the same as your votes on screen before you submit your vote. Then the paper vote should be saved as a source document. If there is an election crisis, then the paper ballots can be counted manually to verify the electronic figures.

Personally, I would like to see the votes entered and counted manually, like we did before there were any voting machines. If the paper vote is counted twice by each party's witnesses, it would be preferable than the way we do things now and historically proven to be the most accurate and honest way to do this.

[3 DanO]

7. The term "Paper Trail" means a trail of paper records

left after the voting process that can be used in an audit to uncover fraud. There are several paper trails created during a normal election: The names of voters entered in the poll book, the signed voter affidavit cards, the voters name checked off on the registration list all provide a verification of who voted and how many votes were cast. The poll tapes printed at the precinct and signed by the election judges provide a paper record that can be compared against the official county results to verify the tally machines at the county.

There have been efforts to eliminate the paper trails, restrict access to these records or even destroy the records so they are not available to investigate or prove fraud.

One critical paper trail that has been eliminated in some electronic voting systems is the record of individual votes. Without an audit record the vote could be changed electronically within the voting machine and there will be no way to detect or prove the fraud.

One solution calls for a Voter Verified Paper Ballot. The paper ballot is then the official vote and the machine counts can be audited by re-counting or hand counting the ballots.

Any official that removes the audit trails from the elections is either an idiot that should be removed from office or is actively enabling fraud and should be removed from office and prosecuted.

[Orangepeel]

10. sure, that's what an optical scan machine does

You are exactly right. It wouldn't be difficult to outfit electronic machines with a printout device and then to follow the same procedure used with optical scan machines. With those machines, voters mark their choices, put the ballot into a machine that counts it, and then deposit the ballot into a ballot box. The machine counts the votes, but if a recount is needed, the actual ballots are available (but secure).

A system that has voters mark their choices on the electronic machine which counts it, but then prints out a ballot that the voter deposits into a secure ballot box would work easily.

on edit: but with both types of machines, there needs to be some sort of random audit procedure other than just the closeness of the vote to verify accuracy of counting.

[Billy Ruffian]

11. As I understand it

the important part of the paper trail wrt voting is that there is a voter verifiable paper ballot.

I get to see, before I submit it, the exact ballot that is going to be counted. If there is an electronic selection of what is going to be on that ballot, fine; the machine has to produce a piece of paper that I can review before it gets into the separate ballot box.

This allows for both a machine count of ballots (fast and pretty accurate) and a human count of ballots (slow, pretty accurate, but a good check of the machine count, esp in the event of a close race)

In my county, we have a optical scan ballot. The candidates names are pre-printed, and we are to draw a line connecting two halves of an arrow next to the Candidates name.

Eg.

For President:
Abraham Lincoln >==== ====>

Stephen Douglas >==== ====>

(it won't show up well, but there is a significant break in the middle of the arrow)
what is amazing is that even though we've had this system for years (since 1984, when I arrived here) and even though there are sample ballots posted at every single polling place, and published in the newspaper, every year there are idiots that can't turn this:

>==== ====>

into this:
>============>

There will be ballots where the candidates name is circled. Ballots where the arrow is circled. Ballots where an arrow has been drawn from the candidates name up to the office. Every election, there will be idiots screaming that those ballots should be considered valid.

Using an electroniclly generated paper ballot means that you have a ballot that will be valid (no problems with morons failing to follow instructions) and that same ballot can be reviewed by the voter, and that ballot can be electronically counted, or recounted, and that ballot can be hand counted.

See www.notablesoftware.com/voting for more info.

Other aspects of the paper trail have been noted in this thread. Validation that the voter hasn't already voted, is voting in his precinct, is registered, etc.

Hope this helps.

[MostlyLurks]

12. OK, I think I get it.

So a "paper trail" is different from a "paper receipt".

As you've described it, the computer/electronic portion of the system is little more than an on-demand printer that shows you the ballot, lets you mark it and then prints it for you, so you can take it to a separate ballot counter. The computer that prints maintains no count at all. That makes sense. That even helps me understand that other post upthread that says paper receipts are a red herring. Thanks!