Did want to take action in Rwanda. He was probably the only one....at the time a three star General. But the Clinton Admin was too scared that they might suffer U.S. casualties in the process and were not interested nor were they all that interested in the plight of those who were losing their lives. The Admin and the Pentagon didn't respond to Clark's requests and queries, and so he went to some lower level state officials attempting to get them to bring the matter up in congress......Nothing happened.
That's why when he saw a repeat happening in Kosovo (Clark, by then a four star)he was determined that there would be no repeat.
Clark was actually retired because of his zeal to stop the genocide. The Pentagon knives inserted themselves deeply into his back and were turned just so.
Waiting for the GeneralBy Elizabeth Drew
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16795 Clark displeased the defense secretary, Bill Cohen, and General Hugh Shelton, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by arguing strenuously that—contrary to Clinton's decision— the option of using ground troops in Kosovo should remain open. But the problem seems to have gone further back. Some top military leaders objected to the idea of the US military fighting a war for humanitarian reasons. Clark had also favored military action against the genocide in Rwanda. http://www.crookedtimber.org/archives/001104.html Clark was almost alone in pushing for a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda.Pulitzer award winning Samantha Power for her book "A Problem from Hell" : America and the Age of Genocidehttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/006054164... http://www.kiddingonthesquare.com/2003/12/redeeming_wes... The following excerpts from Power's book give the details. The narrative surrounding the quotes was written by another person commenting on the book. Note especially Power's last comment below on Clark's pariah status in Washington:
General Clark is one of the heroes of Samantha Power's book.
She introduces him on the second page of her chapter on Rwanda and describes his distress on learning about the genocide there and not being able to contact anyone in the Pentagon who really knew anything about it and/or about the Hutu and Tutsi. She writes, "He frantically telephoned around the Pentagon for insight into the ethnic dimension of events in Rwanda. Unfortunately, Rwanda had never been of more than marginal concern to Washington's most influential planners" (p. 330) .
He advocated multinational action of some kind to stop the genocide. "Lieutenant General Wesley Clark looked to the White House for leadership. 'The Pentagon is always going to be the last to want to intervene,' he says. 'It is up to the civilians to tell us they want to do something and we'll figure out how to do it.' But with no powerful personalities or high-ranking officials arguing forcefully for meaningful action, midlevel Pentagon officials held sway, vetoing or stalling on hesitant proposals put forward by midlevel State Department and NSC officials" (p. 373).
According to Power,
General Clark was already passionate about humanitarian concerns, especially genocide, before his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe. She details his efforts in behalf of the Dayton Peace Accords and his brilliant command of NATO forces in Kosovo. Her chapter on Kosovo ends, "The man who probably contributed more than any other individual to Milosvevic's battlefield defeat was General Wesley Clark. The NATO bombing campaign succeeded in removing brutal Serb police units from Kosovo, in ensuring the return on 1.3 million Kosovo Albanians, and in securing for Albanians the right of self-governance."
"Yet in Washington Clark was a pariah. In July 1999 he was curtly informed that he would be replaced as supreme allied commander for Europe. This forced his retirement and ended thirty-four years of distinguished service. Favoring humanitarian intervention had never been a great career move."