HEADS UP - (Black Box) Scoop scoops again

[BevHarris]

http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00106.htm

Diebold Internal Mail Confirms U.S. Vote Count
Vulnerabilities

Scoop has obtained internal mail messages from Diebold Election
Systems which clearly and explicitly confirm security problems in the GEMS vote counting software highlighted in Scoop in July.

In the internal mail Diebold Election Systems principal engineer Ken Clark responded to an internal query over a security problem. The official certification laboratory responsible for assessing the voting technology company software's robustness had noticed a problem, and a staff member was seeking Clark's advice.

Nel Finberg wrote to the "support" list on 16th October 2001: "Jennifer Price at Metamor (about to be Ciber) has indicated that she can access the GEMS Access database and alter the Audit log without entering a password. What is the position of our development staff on this issue? Can we justify this? Or should this be anathema?"

...

Wait until you see Ken's reply ...

Bev

[Paulie]

1. Response before link

Oh Boy!!! :D :D :D

Drip Drip Drip GUSH!

[never cry wolf]

2. Here too

can't wait :bounce:

[hang a left]

3. bring it on

[BevHarris]

4. Okay. It's up now -- and it contains the memos themselves

http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00106.htm

My personal favorite quote, from the Ken Clark memo:

Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before.

[AP]

8. What happened in Gaston and King County?

I'm not sure I understand the implication of this reply.

[althecat]

17. According to clark in these places they "end-run the database"

Anyone's guess as to what that means.. but from the context it sounds like it means they hacked their own election. Presumably for good reason.. i.e. they figured some absentee ballots had been counted twice or some such screwup and instead of using the official methods of fixing the result they just fudged it...

[hang a left]

16. bev, just a question here

I read somewhere(?) yesterday that HAVA has verbage in it that requires a paper trail auditable system and that the Act has been misinterpreted. Have you heard about this? Just wondering? Might be an area to pursue.

[Vadem]

22. That's it! CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT!

"By the way, all of this is why Texas gets its sh*t in a knot over the log printer. Log printers are not read-write, so you don't have the problem. Of course if I were Texas I would be more worried about modifications to our electronic ballots than to our electron logs, but that is another story I guess.

Bottom line on Metamor is to find out what it is going to take to make them happy. You can try the old standard of the NT password gains access to the operating system, and that after that point all bets are off. You have to trust the person with the NT password at least. This is all about Florida, and we have had VTS certified in Florida under the status quo for nearly ten years.

I sense a loosing battle here though. The changes to put a password on the .mdb file are not trivial and probably not even backward compatible, but we'll do it if that is what it is going to take.

Ken"

As I posted in another thread, we are setting up Paypal accounts for the various investigations we are planning. It's time to set up an account for a class action suit for all the voters in this country (all of us who have been disenfranchised by the touch screen voting machines), to pay for lawyers to represent us to file suit against EVERY state in the Union who have purchased these damnable machines and who refuse to listen to us about the corruptibility of our votes from these machines and the lack of a voter verified paper ballot for hand counting.

Now, I ask you, would this class action suit not be in every newspaper in the country, bar none, and really open up some eyes in Congress and the courts?

We have pleaded, cajoled, and begged them to look into this, and only Rush Holt's bill, H.R. 2239, which still doesn't have enough sponsors to bring it to floor and is stagnant in the House, is the only response we have gotten from our fervor. (Thank G_d for Rush!)

Dammit, I'm sick of them all! I say, let's sue the bastards!

I guarantee you this will bring some attention, and perhaps, some results!

[althecat]

32. Think Qui Tam... then find a greedy kick ass lawyer...

All the ingredients for a Qui Tam are here...

Technically it should be the SoS's that are suing Diebold. For their money back.. But just because they are lazy there is no reason to despair. Under the wonderful US legal system it is possible to sue Diebold on behalf of the SoS's without their permission... and if you get the states their money back then you get to keep 20%... 20% of $4 billion being....

[Vadem]

36. Hell, I know a Qui Tam lawyer; I used to work for her, but she

is in semi-retirement. She is teaching in Maryland now. Don't know if she would even be up for the magnitude of this case.

There must be some young, vigorous attorneys out there, willing to take on a case that could make their reputation for all time!

Any young attorneys out there willing to take on this case???? We're calling you forth!

[althecat]

37. It wouldn't just make a reputation.. it would make a fortune...

[Vadem]

39. Truer words were never spoken, Al! C'mon all you patriotic

and vigorous attorneys, looking to make your reputation and fortune!

[Andy_Stephenson]

38. I know one!

Here in Seattle.

[4dog]

30. BBVers: Anyone have the quote from a thread earlier this week

to the effect "Do you really feel comfortable with an unknown corporation using unknown software to count your votes?"

It was better than that.

[Zhade]

99. That was me :)

The question I use is, "Do you think it's a good idea for private corporations to count our votes using a process we're not allowed to see?"

[BevHarris]

100. Zhade: The latest in a growing string of heroes on this issue

Each of us take on what we can -- and note that Zhade's latest activism on the electronic voting issue made Buzzflash yesterday!

Bev

[John_H]

58. "you have to trust the holder of the NT password"

Yup you sure do. Mayor Daley used to trust his election officials totally since he picked them himself, of course. You always gotta trust the soldiers in your machine. Especially when it comes to election day!

[BevHarris]

80. 2000 people hold the passwords?

Do a Google search "GEMS election results"

2,020 results.

This leads you to just a PORTION of the people who use GEMS and therefore, have the password.

Of course, I can show you how to end run the GEMS password. That leaves only the security on NT. And did I mention that many of these systems run on Windows 2000, and even Windows 98?

[Vadem]

5. Bev and Althecat! How do you do it? Yayyyyyyyyyyyy

I posted awhile back that Jennifer Price (in doing research on Shawn Southworth and his sidekick Jennifer) had taken a position with Madison Company (I believe, was the name); now I can't find the post. Do you think she left Southworth after the discovery she found, noted above???

[Vadem]

6. Found the Madison info on Jennifer Price:

http://www.madisonresearch.com/news/press/020202.asp

MADISON RESEARCH CORPORATION ANNOUNCES PROMOTIONS, NEW HIRE

Huntsville, AL (February 2, 2002): Madison Research Corporation recently announced the promotions of Larry Lewis and Regina Spradling, and the addition of Jennifer Price to MRC’s corporate office.

Larry Lewis, previously Manager of Corporate Development, has been promoted to Director of Corporate Development. Lewis will continue to be responsible for all of the company’s facilities, internal information technology infrastructure and MIS development, strategic planning, and mergers and acquisitions support. Lewis received his bachelor’s degree in technical industrial management from the New College at the University of Alabama and a master’s degree in business administration from the University of Alabama.

Regina Spradling has been promoted to Systems Analyst in Madison Research Corporation’s software engineering department. She will be responsible for configuration management and technical writing for the company’s Software Engineering Institute Capability Maturity Model, Level III activities. Spradling received a bachelor’s degree in general studies with a minor in business management from Columbia College of Missouri. She has been employed with MRC since January 2000.

Jennifer Price has joined Madison Research Corporation as Director of Information Software. She will lead the information software business practice, which is focused on migrating and supporting legacy systems, developing new application software and providing software consulting. Price received a master’s degree in computer science and engineering management form the University of Alabama in Huntsville. She has more than 18 years of experience in software development, including client/server and Web technologies.

Madison Research Corporation specializes in providing high quality Engineering and Information Technology Services to

[BevHarris]

51. So 3 1/2 months later she's working elsewhere. Interesting.

Price was working with Shawn Southworth for several years before that.

Bev

[John_H]

55. I hope you're thinking what i'm thinking

nt

[Bush_has_Parvo]

7. Oh-My-God. They admit it. Oh-My-God.

Fancy Footwork, indeed. If this doesn't call for a full-blown investigation, I don't know what does.

[frank frankly]

9. fantastic!

kick

[DEMActivist]

10. My favorite parts...

Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before.

There it is...in their own words. Admissions that:
1) the certifiers KNOW it's insecure and certify it anyway
2) the elections officials use Access to do "fancy footwork"
3) King County is FAMOUS for it

Isn't this a/k/a RICO? Colluding to defraud the consumer..

OK, so now....do you think we can find a lawyer to shut these machines down? Can we pull the plug now?

[HootieMcBoob]

11. wow - wow

that this company is still in business and still getting contracts...hello OHIO!!!! is criminal.

I keep hoping that this will eventually turn into the big watergate - media story that it deserves to be.

[punpirate]

12. Sunlight is a great disinfectant...

... isn't it? All the while that Diebold is pooh-poohing the possibility of hacks, their own people two years prior were trying to snow the ITA over precisely the same issues, apparently with some success.

There's got to be a formula for what happens when gall is exceeded by stupidity....

[Cocoa]

13. Clark must be a DUer

I sense a loosing battle here though. That's the official spelling error of DU. :-)


Doesn't seeing this breach as serious contradict a separate BBV argument, that is that it's unacceptable to use Access at all, due to its poor security? In other words, it's been argued previously that Access security is so inferior that it's like not having security at all. If that's the case, then why does it matter if the password can be bypassed.

Also, Clark's argument is very similar to mine before, that the Access security is not the only one. In my experience at my own company, we don't even bother with Access security, we rely solely on NT security, just as Clark said.

[althecat]

15. The point is cocoa...

That once the security is breached there is nothing to stop the files being altered and the evidence of the alteration being deleted. If this system was properly designed none of this would be possible...

One of my favourite bits... which is not in the actual memo is the bit where Clark says that he thinks all the other companies are as bad or worse than him on these security issues.

As for the physical security argument. That was kinda blown away in SLO county.

al

[Cocoa]

18. they can use the same argument...

the same argument they can use to justify the use of Access can be used to say this is not a serious breach. I've made the argument myself, and Clark is saying something similar: this is not the only security. There's others, NT, and non-electronic security such as locking the door or whatever.

There was a story here about poll workers "forgetting" to pull the memory cards in a recent election. There's no machine security that's going to prevent someone switching those cards. You have to trust the poll workers, or search them, or whatever.

I guess what's not convincing to me about this is that the level of security involved is very significant. And the previous argument about the inadequacy of Access suggests that it's not significant at all. If Access provides zero security, then what can it mean that that non-security can be breached?

[John_H]

60. The problem is who has the password and

how easy it is for them to tamper and cover their tracks. In texas in 1948 they had to have a gun toting sheriff "loose" a ballot box. Now you just need a crooked machine appointed election official who's memorized a string of numbers.

[DEMActivist]

62. Well, seeing as how the password is printed in the manual

I'd say quite a few people probably have it, huh?

Yes, the default ADMIN password is printed in the User Manual.

[BevHarris]

81. The GEMS password is nothing. NADA. A 10-year old can bypass

The only thing keeping anyone out of the system is whatever security they set up on the county machine itself.

It took me 10 minutes to figure out how to end run the password in GEMS, and while I was at it I added 50 of my friends, and gave them all the same password, which was "password." Then, just for ho-ho's, I changed the supervisor's password. I then gave me and 50 people "administrator" priveleges.

All this and I am not even a computer person. I did it with a simple cut and paste -- they make the password plainly visible in an Access database, and you simply copy and paste your own password in.

To be fair, it is possible to have good security set up on the computer itself that it independent of the GEMS system -- but now let's review, class:

Isn't security supposed to be part of the VOTING system? The entire Diebold voting system has only psuedo-security. According to these memos, they are relying on the county computer to provide ALL of the security for our voting system.

Bev

[Eloriel]

86. Bev -- that, or a link to your article on that

should be added to the newest Scoop scoop.

Eloriel

[John_H]

95. it is possible to have good security set up on the computer itself

My point is even that's not enough--ultimately whoever has access to that computer can change vote tallies and cover their tracks. I hope I'm not misleading ewhen I tell the pople I talk to that this is the main reason for paper reciepts--even if the software was perfectly secure. When the Diebold guy says "you have to trust someone" he's wrong. When it comes to elections, you trust no one.

[DEMActivist]

96. Not to mention

When, in the source code, the programmers NULL the security measures the operating system MAY offer.

All in the interest of "backward compability" BTW.

[John_H]

94. Even if the password is known by only one election official

the issue is that that election official can change votes and alter the log file to cover it up, right? As the son of a chicago precinct captain, I can tell you you might as well just ask any politician who controls his or her election officials how much he or she would like to win by.

[Eloriel]

23. Am I DREAMING?

Here we have a smoking gun, Cocoa. It reveals that they KNEW that there was NO Password protection preventing changing the all-important audit logs, and you now only can't acknowledge it, you actually have the chutzpah to DISMISS IT?

Un-freaking-believable. I'm shaking my head in utter disbelief.

You have been naysaying BBV for months now. When confronted with EVIDENCE that Diebold knowingly sold defect-laden software (and in fact, could have even touted these flaws as "features" to certain clients who themselves were prone to break the law), YOUR response is to DISMISS, DIVERT, DISTRACT, and NAYSAY some more with your ridiculous argument that it contradicts another BBV argument?

You are just amazing. No one could have described this for me and have me believe it. Nope, not even Bev or DA.

Un-freaking-believable.


But to answer your question, NO. It does not contradict ANYthing. It shows one reason why the other argument (that Access shouldn't be used at all) is valid.

Eloriel

[Cocoa]

25. but how important is the Access password?

what standard says that there even need to be a password?

Regarding your last statement, it IS a contradiction. If the original anti-Access argument is true, then Access does not provide security, and so a breach of that security would mean nothing.

To respond to the anti-Access argument, they could say "we have other levels of security than Access security" and that answer addresses this current problem also. In a way, Clark is saying this when he mentions NT security.

[shance]

34. Cocoa you are working my LAST nerve.....

along with everyone elses.

In short you are a PILL....

And you are divisive, monotonous to the ENTH degree, you bring nothing to the discussion but whining negativity, you ultimately have some sort of agenda and whatever it is, it just aint good.

So unless you have something constructive to provide you are not welcomed here.

To top it all off, You could care less about fair voting.

And you probably work for someone to continue these divisive threads.

JUST STOP IT.

[DEMActivist]

35. Folks, folks, please.....

understand that this very damaging to Diebold thread has to be locked and removed from the DU front page.

You are being goaded into personal attacks and fights to achieve that goal.

Don't forget....DEBATE THE ISSUE, NOT THE PERSON.

They WANT to make it personal to get this thread locked.

[Cronus Protagonist]

61. As usual, DA, you are spot on the money.

We really must be more aware of COINTELPRO tactics.



Click Here To See Fair & Balanced Buttons, Stickers & Magnets!>

[ibegurpard]

91. That's the tactic all right

I've seen it happen in previous BBV threads. Ignore the people that continue to try to explain it away in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary.

[Cronus Protagonist]

59. You must be aware that Diebold will have hired PR people

And some of the posters on these threads will be paid to do PR spin for Diebold. Knowing that might help your perspective a little. Don't even think that it's not already happening.



Click Here To See Fair & Balanced Buttons, Stickers & Magnets!>

[Vadem]

33. LOL, Cocoa!

I sense a loosing battle here though. That's the official spelling error of DU. :-)

It is true--we have bisected "loosing" as opposed to "losing".

Very clever of you to have caught this "DU error". LOL

[never cry wolf]

14. Great stuff Bev

I hope this blows the lid off the whole thing. I want to write now to my county clerk in Lake Co., Il. and include the link to the scoop article. We use the optical scan machines and I am not fully up on the whole thing. This article does apply to optical scan as well, right? It is the counting software rather than if it is touch screen vs. optical scan. Here is a pic from the county web site on the machine, I don't know what type it is, can anyone help me here?



on edit:spelun

[BevHarris]

21. Yes. It applies to optical scan machines and absentee votes too

This is the central count, folks, the one that does the master tabulation.

[never cry wolf]

24. OK, thanks!!

Time for me to write to the Co. Clerk!

[Eloriel]

19. Champagne all around

:toast:

Bev, Al, DA -- Salud!

Onward and upward! (and DOWNWARD for Diebold)

Eloriel

[BevHarris]

20. I am meeting with a congressman tomorrow

I will ask for a congressional investigation. I contacted Alan Dershowitz today and requested help filing a lawsuit to get an injunction and pull the plug on these machines. (You should see what else is in the memos -- its the shit that keeps on shitting.)

I hear that the Jim March rig-a-vote CD will be in the hands of dozens of members of congress by Monday.

Bev

[4dog]

26. Great, but keep on truckin everyone.

That is, pray for the guys with the big guns, but keep on informing your neighbors, writing to your elected reps, bugging the election office or the Secy of State, copying Bev's primer to hand out, etc.

[Vadem]

27. Way to go, Bev! Which Congressman, if you can divulge

at this time? If not, I'm sure you will give us a full report later!

[DEMActivist]

28. We should wait for the report

The last time I publicly said I was meeting with important folks over this issue, very bad things happened to keep me from arriving at the meeting.

Just suffice it to say it's best Bev keep the details secret until AFTER the meeting.

[Vadem]

31. You're absolutely correct, DemA! Sorry I asked!

eom

[John_H]

53. Can we justify this? Or should this be anathema?"

Jeezus what a dumbshit this guy is! Why not just say "what's our lie gonna be?" "Hey Ma the police want to know why you ran that guy over. Can you justify this? Or should this be an accident?"

[BevHarris]

85. heh. Yeah. And another set of memos has the same guy asking

what to do when an uncertified version number pops up on the screen. And they discuss just having the program pop a message up that it is the certified version, regardless of what it is.

Again, they apparently aren't concerned about doing things to comply with state or FEC requirements. The objection raised to naming one version with an earlier version's number is that it will be hard for THEM to keep track of which is which. No mention of "this would be wrong!!!!"

[frank frankly]

40. Bev, thanks again!

kick

[0007]

89. Thank you kindly Bev

Your work is above the call of dury.

[cosmicdot]

29. ...sweet land of liberty ...

:kick:
:dem:

[Gordon25]

41. Intent to deceive

Kudos, Bev. This is very valuable and timely. Note this statement from the email:

"Back to perception though, if you don't bring this up you might skate through Metamor."

This comes awfully close to making a prima facia case for intent to deceive which is pretty widely accepted in law as the threshold for consumer fraud. Here in Arizona, it is sufficient grounds to bring such charges. And this is the kicker, you don't need an attorney to file a consumer fraud complaint. At least in Arizona, any citizen can file such a complaint with the Attorney General. We are currently trying to flood our AG with such complaints, and this is great ammunition.

In light of this email, I don't see why this wouldn't work in any state using Diebold systems. The consumers of the voting systems are not the elected officials buying and using the systems. The consumers are the voters, for whom the elected officials are acting as agents in purchasing the systems. If Diebold knowing sells a defective system without disclosure of what is known, they are liable for consumer fraud. This email pretty well establishes that they have done just that for at least ten years.

It is not difficult to do. Go to your Attorney Genral's website and they will probably have a downloadable consumer fraud complaint form. If they receive enough complaints about the same company (Diebold) they will be hard pressed to ignore them. Here, because the Secretary of State just awarded a $53 million single source contract to Diebold for voting systems, we are billing it as a $53 million dollar consumer fraud case, and listing our loss on the complaint form as the integrity of our vote and $53 million taxpayer dollars.

Waiting with less than perfect patience to see what's coming next.

Gordon25

[Eloriel]

42. GA Atty General's website

http://www.state.ga.us/ago/consumer_info.html

Click on Governor's Office of Consumer Fraud. Look at the FAQ, and click on Forms too.

Can I quote you, Gordon???? :evilgrin:

Here's the link for the Fair Bus. Practices Act
http://www2.state.ga.us/GaOCA/FBPA.html

I didn't off-hand see something all that applicable in it. BUt I haven't read it yet -- just going by titles. Ooops , here's something. Maybe (a) applies, and how 'bout CERTIFICATION?

10-1-393. Unfair or deceptive practices in consumer transactions unlawful; examples.

(a) Unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of consumer transactions and consumer acts or practices in trade or commerce are declared unlawful.

(b) By way of illustration only and without limiting the scope of subsection (a) of this Code section, the following practices are declared unlawful:

(1) Passing off goods or services as those of another;

(2) Causing actual confusion or actual misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;

----
Ahh, more:

(5) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he or she does not have;

----

7) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;

---

Something to check (has hotlinks):
(15) Any violation of 49 U.S.C. Sections 32702 through 32704 and any violation of regulations prescribed under 49 U.S.C. Section 32705. Notwithstanding anything in this part to the contrary, all such actions in violation of such federal statutes or regulations shall be consumer transactions and consumer acts or practices in trade or commerce;

---





Eloriel

[Gordon25]

44. Feel free

Eloriel -- You always have permission to quote me. You're one of the good guys. Even the bad guys can quote me if they want to, but none of them seems too keen on the idea.

Also, take a look at this if you haven't already:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=324114

Gordon25

[Eloriel]

45. Thanks, Gordon - and check your PM (in a minute)

And I'm glad you provided that link. I missed that thread all together.

Eloriel

[DEMActivist]

43. Georgia's Consumer Complaint info

If you feel that you have been the victim of fraud, please contact the Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs at [phone] or link to their website at http://www2.state.ga.us/GaOCA/

How do I file a complaint with your Office?
The Forms section of this web site contains a Consumer Complaint form developed for your use. Although you are not required to use our form, consumer complaints must be submitted in writing to the Office of Consumer Affairs. The complaint must set forth the problem in a chronological manner and must be accompanied with copies of relevant documents, such as invoices, contracts, or previous correspondence with the business.
http://www2.state.ga.us/GaOCA/pdfs/complaint.pdf (Complaint form in PDF format - 7 pages)

[Gordon25]

46. Not very friendly to complaing consumers...

...in Georgia, are they? Seven pages and accompanying documents, etc. Here's is a link to Arizona's form:
http://www.attorneygeneral.state.az.us/consumer/compformintro.html
It is a one page pdf.

I think these Diebold folks are in big trouble. Funny thing about emails...Let's see how many actions we can force them to defend simultaneously.

Gordon25

[DEMActivist]

47. You caught that, huh?

Somehow I get the impression that Georgia officials don't care to hear from the voters.

How dare we question how the business of government is run, huh?

Sorry to say it, but this is exactly what happens when you have one party in control of the Governor's mansion for 130+ years. That would be the Democratic party in Georgia.

[Eloriel]

50. Yeah, I was steaming over that very thing yesterday

or was it today -- remembering my phone conversation with Miz Rodgers (or Rogers, as the case may be), and the brush off I basically got.

The Elections Division and our SoS have been adamant about NOT hearing from real voters, at least not real voters with really serious concerns. They are absolutely rigid about it.

So this 7-pager fits right in.

Eloriel

[Vadem]

64. But DemActivist, aren't the Republicans in charge of GA now?

eom

[DEMActivist]

66. Well, that depends on how you define 'control'

If you define it this way:

Sonny Perdue=control, it would be laughable.

About all Sonny can do is fly the traffic helicopter for a quest spot on the morning news show doing rush hour traffic reports. (I kid you not, that's what he did last week.)

[Vadem]

70. Well, (and I hate to say it), but he did call for Cathy Cox to

pursue an investigation into the voting machines. Probably just to cover his a** as to how he and Saxby Chambliss won the election, but we all heard him on Washington Journal on C-Span, so we can hold him to it. Of course, as you have said, we're still waiting for her to allow you to "hack" the blackbox. I think they are really sweating bullets now and are obviously hoping we will all just fagettaboutit!

[seemslikeadream]

87. Yes Sonny did assure me and all the C-SPAN

audiance that the Diebold machines that got him and Saxby elected would be investigated to make sure they were secure. Just because he had been taken by suprise by a caller from Illinois who knew a bit about those machines doesn't mean we shouldn't hold him accountable for his promise. Sonny when I asked, you told me the security of the vote in Georgia was important to you, well?? What's up?

[Devils Advocate NZ]

48. I HOPE you are working on the far more damaging statement in that email!

From the Ken Clark email:

By the way, all of this is why Texas gets its sh*t in a knot over the log printer. Log printers are not read-write, so you don't have the problem. Of course if I were Texas I would be more worried about modifications to our electronic ballots than to our electron logs, but that is another story I guess.

Am I mistaken in the belief that the bolded line says that Ken Clark thinks there is an even MORE dangerous fault that allows the ballots themselves to be tampered with, even if there was no problem with the logs?

I think so.

I have no direct knowledge of the internal coding going on, but if Access is being used to stor the ballots as well as the logs, and the log can be changed without there being any record of the change, can not the same thing be said for the ballots?

After all, it is a piece of code that has to monitors usage that updates the log to show that a change has been made. If you can circumvent that code (in other words open the access db as raw data without any code running) then it doesn't matter if the log itself can be changed, because the ballots can be changed without the log being updated anyway.

As for how difficult it would be to secure these databases, I can tell you it would NOT be difficult at all. There are cryptographic functions built into Windows that can be used to encrypt ALL data entered into the database inside the application. This would mean that even if you opened the file without using their custom built application you would only see gibberish. Access itself could NEVER decrypt these encrypted entries.

Just check out the CryptoAPI 2.0 (or greater) information in the Windows SDK.

Here are a couple of excerpts from that API:

Introduction
The Microsoft® Cryptographic Application Programming Interface (CryptoAPI) provides services that enable application developers to add authentication, encoding, and encryption to their Microsoft Win32®-based applications. Application developers can use the functions in the CryptoAPI without knowing anything about the underlying implementation, in much the same way as they can use a graphics library without knowing anything about the particular graphics hardware configuration.

Or this:

Introduction to Encryption Techniques
The Microsoft® CryptoAPI can be used by applications to easily encrypt and decrypt messages and files. This section discusses the various options available for encrypting data. For a hands-on description of how to encrypt data by using the CryptoAPI, see Encrypting Files and Messages.

The encryption algorithms available to an application depend on the cryptographic service provider (CSP) being used. However, most CSPs share most of the attributes discussed here. A symmetric algorithm is used for all data encryption performed by using the CryptoAPI, regardless of which CSP is installed

This stuff is so simple to use, I have coded it in VB and in VBA. It is STANDARD encryption built into Windows 95 OSR2 or later.

If Diebold WANTED this stuff to be unhackable, they could do it as easily as having a simple cryptography function that encrypted each write to the db, and decrypted each read from the db.

I have done it! This is simple stuff. So why don't Diebold use it?

You see, as far as I can tell, at the moment you don't need the GEMS application to read and write the db. All data is stored in clear text in the db and thus any access compatible db application (which are very simple to write with VB) can do the job.

With the kind of encrypting I am talking about, the ONLY way the data would be readable is with the GEMS application, and that could be secured well enough to make election tampering impossible - if only because it would take too long to succeed before the election closed, and the results announced.

[BevHarris]

49. Yes, I caught that paragraph. Been puzzling over it

And yes, the ballot info is stored in MS Access too.

Here's a quote I have returned to several times:

By the way, all of this is why Texas gets its sh*t in a knot over the log printer. Log printers are not read-write, so you don't have the problem.

Does this mean Texas has its sh*t in a knot because they CAN'T rig the log printer? (The log printer keeps a running tally of the vote data uploads as they come in from the polling places -- it is different and the MS Access "audit log" which logs actions like opening the database, running the report, setting up the ballot.)

At first, I took this to mean that Texas was worried about security in the log printer. Now I'm not so sure -- maybe certain folks there get their sh*t in a knot because it is NOT read-write, and therefore they can't mess with it.

And yes, the ballot info is a red flag.

There are other memos that are equally or more damning, by the way. Taken as a whole they cook the goose.

Bev

[Devils Advocate NZ]

52. So let me get this straight...

there is a printer that prints out the incoming totals from each polling place? If that is the case, the sentence you quoted DOES seem strange.

However, I originally read it as Texas were asking FOR a log printer BECAUSE the database was NOT secure, and thus they wanted to be able to check the totals coming in against the totals recorded in the db.

If that is NOT the case, then these logs are the place to look for any manipulation of the totals at the central server, which as you point out makes you wonder what Texas has it's shit in a knot over?

[BevHarris]

82. The log is a file which automatically records incoming uploads

Thus, one of the most appealing attack points, if I were a hacker, would be during upload. I'd jump in there and masquerade as the precinct, substituting data and ideally, sending my new data back down the pipeline into the touch screen so that both sides match.

But listen (and DemActivist and I sometimes debate this point) -- I have no problem visualizing a hack which changes the numbers only on GEMS, even for optical scans where a paper trail can prove the GEMS numbers are wrong. This would be much harder in California, which requires a printout of the polling place votes to be posted on the door, and it must match. But in states like Washington and Georgia, I think you'd get away with it quite often.

As for how dumb people are when they steal: I had an accountant once who did the cleverest possible manipulations, like setting up dummy bank accounts, but as time went on he became careless. Eventually, he started wiring money directly from my business checking account into his personal account! This was absurdly findable. After years writing about financial fraud, I can tell you they often "just do it" even when it can be found.

I would urge anyone involved with a campaign to scrutinize everything carefully and don't accept nonsensical answers. In the recent SLO County situation, I reported that votes were called in from the polling places, and the elections official said no, they were absentee votes. However, in the database itself they are called "polling place votes" (and other votes are called "absentee.") She then explained that some but not all mail in votes are called polling place votes but the mail ins she likes to call polling place are not in the file I have. ??????? This is what I call a nonsensical answer. Unacceptable.

[Devils Advocate NZ]

97. Hang on... I'm confused :-)

Is the log you're refering to a printout? You called it a file, which to me as a computer weenie means a file on the hard drive, and thus can be manipulated.

To me, a log printer means a printer that makes a physical printout as the vote comes in. So as the total is received a line of text is printed out saying for example "Precinct 801 - Bush 320, Gore 425", thus, as you say, meaning you have to hack the upload BEFORE it reaches the central server in order not to leave any trace. However, if it is a file on disk, then the log file on disk that records the uploads can also be hacked.

Assuming it is a printout, you are right about how it could be ignored, especially if the people doing the hacking are the ones who would be responsible for checking the log printout. When the people who are supposed to be running the election and ensuring it is fair are not trustworthy this is not impossible.

Like I said, real cyrptograpy is so easy under windows that not using it is a red flag to me. These people did not want to secure these systems, and it makes you wonder whether they did it on purpose so that should any fraud be found they can say "it must have been a hacker" rather than "the software itself is designed to cheat."

You see, that is my big problem with computerised voting even when the code is open to scrutiny, it is NOT impossible for the application to make the vote totals reverse without this being easily seen during examination of the code.

Hell, how many MASSIVE bugs go undetected at Microsoft? This is the kind of thing I am talking about. With enough obscure code doing obscure things, just about ANYTHING could be slipped in and be VERY hard to find, especially, as you have shown, when the certifying organisations - the only outsiders allowed to see the code - seem willing to just take the company's word for it.

[uhhuh]

54. Bev, Please!!!!

I am very excited about the recent developments here. This info is great and totally nails Diebold, but I hope you are still against the idea of Qui Tam, like you were a month or so ago in that big blow up with the folks from Bartcop.

This has to be about protecting democracy and have absolutlely nothing to do with making a buck. The fact that several of the posters brought up a Qui Tam suit and you didn't object to it, makes me uncomfortable.

I appreciate all the work you and others have done on this. I trust that you are acting on good faith and have never doubted your sincerity on this issue. I think, however, that you could give those who want to discredit the work you and others are doing some ammunition to use against you if you don't consider denouncing the use of a Qui Tam suit.

I hope you take this as a vote of continued support in this matter, and not an attempt to open you and others up to attack.

[DEMActivist]

56. Rest assured...we have NO desire to take that route

NONE.

Giving Ashcroft control of what gets printed, written, discussed is completely against our goals here.

We will NOT sit down and we will NOT shut up.

Qui Tam is not in our frame of reference.

[uhhuh]

57. Thanks DA!!!

All better now!:)

[DEMActivist]

63. You're welcome!

This is about democracy - not $$$$$.

If it ever becomes about $$$$, we will have become THEM.

[althecat]

77. In defence of Qui Tam...

The law is there for a purpose. Not purely for money making.... and as the news out of Miami Dade (see link below) indicates a bit of a financial incentive might be helpful for some of the players in this debacle...

[BevHarris]

83. The problem with Qui Tam is the gag order

For 90 days, you are not allowed to divulge that you have filed a suit, nor discuss an iota of information about it.

It goes to John Ashcroft's D.O.J. for review, and he assigns the judge, who can also order a gag order.

If not for that I'd be right there, paperwork in hand, but this issue cannot afford a gag order. Also, imagine this: gag order and John Ashcroft and his personally appointed judge get to decide the merits. Make no assumption that the Diebold files or any of the memos would be allowed in as evidence -- here in the USA our judges are famous for excluding evidence.

Bev

[punpirate]

65. The other very interesting implication of these emails...

... is that there is the appearance of an ongoing dialogue between the ITA and the manufacturer. In effect, this means that the ITA is acting as the manufacturer's quality control contractor.

I was under the impression that the equipment and/or software was delivered to the ITAs, the ITAs ran them through their tests (and their line-by-line examination of the code, yeah, right), and then delivered a report to the manufacturer. Compliance or non-compliance, and the reasons why.

It certainly doesn't sound as if that's the way it's working, and it's certainly not the way the law intends.

Oh, what I would give for a chance to get a few of these people stinking drunk and talkative....

[DEMActivist]

67. Not to worry, punpirate

We've got the equivalent of stone cold sober and talkative.

And, yes, that's what struck me about this memo as well.....

The certifier finds a failable flaw and what does she do? Well, hell, she calls the VENDOR, of course.

Not only does she call, she begs for a reason to IGNORE the flaw.

They give it to her and she says "Oh, OK. Pass."

Don't you have to wonder how big the deposit was in the Swiss bank account for that one?

[punpirate]

69. Since I haven't seen all the equipment required...

... but, if this is a system-based program used to strip precinct machine IDs from the COM port data and write that directly to a log file, there's probably a way around that in NT.

If this means, however, that some part of Diebold's software is taking that ID info and writing it _directly_ to a physical printer, then the implication of the above statement is pretty clear--they can't jigger with a printed report and they're unhappy about it.

What is more likely, though, is that it is doing both of those things--writing a log file concurrently with parallel output to the printer. That's means it's hackable, if someone had access to the hard copy streamed to the printer, in order to destroy it and reprint the contents of an altered log file.

[ConsAreLiars]

68. So I sent some emails to County Council members

The King County reference in the Diebold email was just the hook I needed to get off my lazy ass and hunt-n-peck out a message to a couple of good guys on the county council. One I know (sort of) and the other is my rep and is also a progressive activist. I copy the text below in the hope that it gives a few more people an idea of how (or how not) to approach this task:

-----------------------------------------------------------------
(Intro hello comments)

Anyway, I'm a bit of a computer geek as well as a blue-collar progressive, so I've been interested in learning how computers are impacting the voting process. There are some good things -- Touchscreen systems can create a paper ballot in Lao as easily as English. And ballot scanners can do the numbers quickly.

But there are some bad things also -- instead of the votes being cast in secret the counting gets done in secret. Even if the vote tabulation is done honestly by the GEMS programs running the system (unfortunately the process used is a proprietary secret so it's hard to know), insiders or outside hackers can make changes to the results during or after the tabulation process.

You can get a lot of the relevant information at a site hosted by a local King County citizen, Bev Harris, at: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/
A forthcoming book on the subject and additional information can be found at: http://www.blackboxvoting.com/

There are lots of other sources, and lots more info -- the deeper you dig the dirtier it gets -- and I can get more to you if you are interested, but the main reason I write is because the internal emails from a Diebold employee strongly hints at some "irregularities." (Diebold is a supplier of vote tabulating and counting software for King County.)

I'd really like to see you use your office to dig further into these questions. It seems to me that if the vote counting is secret all sorts of things can happen that are incompatible with democracy.

The email documents are at:
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00106.htm

From the Scoop article: "In the internal mail Diebold Election Systems
principal engineer R&D Ken Clark - then working for Global Election Systems before Diebold took the company over - responded to an internal query over a security problem. The official certification laboratory responsible for assessing the voting technology company software's robustness had noticed a problem, and a staff member was seeking Clark's advice."

From Clark's email:
"Right now you can open GEMS' .mdb file with MS-Access, and alter its contents. That includes the audit log. This isn't anything new. In VTS, you can open the database with progress and do the same. The same would go for anyone else's system using whatever database they are using. Hard drives are read-write entities. You can change their
contents.

"Now, where the perception comes in is that its right now very *easy* to change the contents. Double click the .mdb file. Even technical wizards at Metamor (or Ciber, or whatever) can figure that one out.

"It is possible to put a secret password on the .mdb file to prevent Metamor from opening it with Access. I've threatened to put a password on the .mdb before when dealers/customers/support have done stupid things with the GEMS database structure using Access. Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in
Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before."

Thanks for thinking about these questions. Democracy matters, and I'd hate to see voting turn into an irrelevant ritual.

Oh, and this is not just a partisan issue. One of the strongest defenders of democracy in this area is Jim March, a guy noted for vigorous gun rights advocacy, someone who describes himself as a libertarian, and someone who I would characterize simply as a patriot. See:
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/aptech_story.asp?category=1700&slug
=Electronic%20Voting
Or just do a Google search on "Electronic Voting":

(Signed with Personal Info)

[Vadem]

71. Excellent letter, Bumbler! Let's hope they read and respond

to your (and our) concerns. Keep us posted!

[punpirate]

72. Good letter....

I also missed in my first read-through of the emails a couple of things you caught: "Even technical wizards at Metamor (or Ciber, or whatever) can figure that one out."

That's not praise--that's dissing the ITA. This guy Clark doesn't think much of the ITA's people or their skills (Shawn Southworth, maybe?), because he starts the sentence with "Even...."

Second, there's this: "It is possible to put a secret password on the .mdb file to prevent Metamor from opening it with Access."

Clark does not say that this would be a good thing in terms of system security in elections; rather, he says that it would be a way of keeping the _ITA_ from finding the back door through Access. Notice that he says "Metamor," not "some hacker." He's clearly interested in hiding something built into the system from the ITA, rather than improving the security of the system.

And, even he's not aware of some of the ways in Access to get around the very password hurdle he proposes.

Cheers.

[althecat]

73. At last... the brits wake up.... Bev Harris in the financial times

http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1059479771397

Security fears grow over electronic voting systems
By Henry Hamman
Published: September 12 2003 5:00 | Last Updated: September 12 2003 5:00

Bev Harris, a freelance writer and public relations consultant in Washington state, made a startling discovery while conducting research for a book about elections. Without trying, she stumbled upon one of Diebold Election Systems' most proprietary company secrets - the entire computer code to its electronic voting machines.


Ms Harris is no cryptographer. She found the machine code for Diebold - one of the leading vendors of computerised voting equipment - using the popular Google internet search engine.

She and her publisher then downloaded the entire site and had the files posted for public access on a New Zealand news site. From that site, Avi Rubin, a computer security expert at Johns Hopkins University, teamed up with two graduate students and pored through the code line by line. Their results leaked to the US media in July.

Professor Rubin's report called the Diebold system "far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts", and said that reliance on electronic voting systems such as Diebold's "places our very democracy at risk".

[althecat]

74. Heads up .. the SAIC report is out... release day may be today

From the FT report...

"Maryland officials are studying the 200-page report from SAIC. A spokesman for Mr Ehrlich said the state might announce its decision on whether to continue with the Diebold contract as soon as today. Tom Swidarski, president of Diebold Election Systems, said criticism of the product was "misguided", and that the company supported the SAIC review. He also complained that the code on the Diebold site was copyrighted and had been stolen."

So it looks like our timing couldn't have been better.... :)

[punpirate]

75. Ah, the copyright complaint again...

... and that it was "stolen." From an anonymous ftp site, eh? More "look over here, not over there" routine.

Yep, the software's crap, but, by gum, it's our crap, and you can't see it, and we're going to make you think it smells like roses because we're going to harp on everything else but the real issue.

"... criticism of the product was 'misguided'...." Yeah, right. Why does it occur to me suddenly that the acronym for Diebold Election Systems is the same as for diethylstilbestrol?

Cheers, Al.

[BevHarris]

84. Don't assume the SAIC report will ever be released

The article said the state of Maryland has had the 200-page report and is studying it. It says nothing about releasing the report.

Bev

[althecat]

76. Miami-Dade commissioners decide against refitting county's voting machines

http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/local/miami/sfl-dmachines12sep12,0,2413613.story?coll=sfla-news-miami

(edited to add link)

Miami-Dade commissioners decide against refitting county's voting machines

By Jean-Paul Renaud
Miami Bureau
Posted September 12 2003

Miami-Dade County voters will have to trust the electronic voting machines county officials invested millions of dollars in, at least for the foreseeable future.

County commissioners on Thursday decided against backing a resolution that would have required election officials to equip Miami-Dade's 7,200 iVotronic machines -- which cost taxpayers $24.5 million -- with equipment that would record a paper printout of all votes.

...

Most commissioners said they were wary of passing the resolution without fully understanding the costs involved. County Manager George Burgess said Thursday that retrofitting all of the county's voting machines could cost from $3 million to $18 million.

"Somewhere, somehow, the word has spread that we have trees that grow money," County Commissioner Natacha Seijas said. "We cannot do it now."

The resolution's sponsor, Commissioner Jimmy Morales, said the study would give the county a more accurate assessment of the feasibility of establishing a paper trail for elections results.


...

PATHETIC... TRULY PATHETIC... if the petitioners are correct and the machines fail to meet HAVA standards then Diebold should pay for the retrofit.... And if the above can be relied upon (and it can) then they should also give back the money paid for in the initial machine purchase. Someone should contact these people in Miami Dade and clue them in.

[shirlden]

78. I see a glimmer of hope.

:kick:

[leftchick]

79. kick

:kick:

[artr2]

88. Could anyone write a generic letter to send to our sup.of elections?

I know what this is about but I cannot frame words to use. Could anyone write a letter we can cut & paste and then modify to fit our circumstance. I want to send a letter but unsure what to put in it
HELP !!

[DEMActivist]

92. I'll ask some of our BBV writers to do this

Will post it here when we get it done.

[hedda_foil]

90. kick

This belongs on the front page.

[Eloriel]

93. Definitely

:kick:

Eloriel

[DEMActivist]

98. Kick to the top for the evening crowd