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Introduction
On July 24, 2003, Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin and Dan S. Wallach released a report on their analysis of the security of the Diebold AccuVote direct recording electronic voting system <1>; This story was covered on the same day by the New York Times <2>.
In response, I immediately called for the decertification of the Diebold AccuVote direct recording electronic voting system. The long version of the story leading up to my call for decertification is available on-line and will be updated as this story develops. <3>. What I present here is a short summary of this story.
Background
In 1996, I-Mark Systems submitted its Electronic Ballot Station, Model 100, to Wyle Laboratories of Huntsville Alabama for testing against the Federal Election Commission's 1990 Voting System Standards <4>. The Wyle Labs report on this system described it as the best voting system software they had ever examined; the embedded software for this system was written in C++ and ran under Windows 95, using a clever seeming smartcard-based system for voter authentication <5>.
In mid 1997, Global Election Systems acquired I-Mark Systems; Global had acquired the AccuVote optical mark-sense system from Unisys in 1991, and one of their first steps after acquiring the Electronic Ballot Station was to rename it the Global AccoTouch EBS voting system. Global submitted this system to the Iowa Board of Examiners for Voting Machines and Electronic Voting Systems on Nov. 6, 1997; this is when I first saw it.
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