Diebold attack on BBV gives us all we need...

[Gordon25]

...to personally file criminal consumer fraud complaints with county attorneys and state attorney generals. You don't need a lawyer. You don't need to wait for some official to initiate an investigation. You can personally file the complaints and in most jurisdiction they are required to investigate. The letter attacking blackboxvoting.org is all you need. As DemActivist points out in other posts, they confirm by their letter that the emails are real, and are Diebold's. By doing so they take ownership of and responsibility for the contents of the emails. The contents of the emails prove Diebold intentionally misrepresented their product in their sales presentation and broke the law numerous times by installing uncertified software on Diebold machines during elections.
So all you activists who care about your vote get a chance to get real active in this fight now and strike your own blow at Diebold. If Diebold systems, either touchscreen of optical scan are used in your jurisdiction, file your own personal complaints at the county and state level and then follow up at regular intervals to be sure your complaints are being investigated. Your loss, which you should highlight in your complaints, is priceless; i.e., the integrity of your vote. This is compounded by the tax money spent to purchase the misrepresented system. Make Diebold defend themselves on a hundred different fronts. The sheer number of the investigations will trigger press coverage.
Anyone familiar with this issue who watched the PBS News Hour segment last night, knows that even when the press investigates and reports it is at least two months and several layers of data behind the curve. Activists who attempt to educate public officials find them in a similar state. Way behind the curve.
Well, it is time to remember these officials work for us and if they aren't doing their job, or paying attention to the right things, it is up to us as their seniors and supervisors to step in and educate them and provide direction as to what they should investigate and why. You can get as thorough as you want with the complaint, from a one paragraph description of why you feel Diebold defrauded you, to a compilation of all the research on this issue done to date by citizen-patriot-activists. The more complaints, the more evidence that arrives with those complaints, the more likely the investigation.
Those emails prove Diebold intentionally defrauded you by selling your agents (sec of state or election director at state or county level) a product they knew to be flawed, they knew to be insecure and subject to tampering and erasure of the evidence of any such tampering, and a product they knew had been used repeatedly to actually tamper with election vote counts.
If you are offended, get off your duff and do somethiing about it, because we either stop them here and now, with the evidence we have, or millions of outraged people in the streets will be necessary to take back our democracy from those the rigged machines install in power.
Gordon25

[E_Zapata]

1. What emails?

Is there another DU thread somewhere that can explain the evidence that we need for the complaint?

Are our complaints filed in a court or with the agencies?

I love your idea - but need much more direction.

[protect freedom impeach bush now]

2. Diebold Demands Removal of Memos - Press copy

Diebold Demands Removal of Memos - Press copy

Meanwhile, many Americans have decided to revisit the Boston Tea Party. Over 500 voting activists are now in possession of the Diebold memos, on three continents, and they are distributing them as fast as they can. "Think of it like a really patriotic chain letter," says one activist.

Honoring democracy: The BlackBoxVoting.org host has so far refused to honor Diebold's demand.

See the Diebold letter: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/diebold-memos-1.htm

Visit forum for BlackBoxVoting.org web host lawyer's reply to Diebold http://www.blackboxvoting.org/blackboxvotingcgi/dcforum/dcboard.cgi?az=list&forum=DCForumID25&conf=DCConfID1

In the memos, dated Oct. 2001, Diebold's own principal engineer Ken Clark concedes that it is a simple matter to do an "end run" around the Diebold "GEMS" voting software, used for both touch screens and the lower tech optical scan machines, and goes on to say that people have used this "back door" in elections.

CLARK: "Right now you can open GEMS' .mdb file with MS-Access, and alter its contents. That includes the audit log. This isn't anything new."

Diebold admits that the memos are authentic, and claims copyright protection.

CLARK: "Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before."

Diebold's own memos authenticate the security flaw I wrote about on July 8, 2003 (http://www.blackboxvoting.org/access-diebold.htm).

In contrast to their rebuttal to the Hopkins/Rice report, Diebold has never denied that I reviewed actual, working, certified versions of its software which are used in real elections, and they have never contended that my analysis is wrong. Clark's memo shows why: The tamperability was well known by senior programmers at Diebold, and had been in place for 10 years.

The memos also show that Metamor (now Ciber), the Independent Testing Authority (ITA) entrusted with testing voting machine software, called attention to the security flaw in Oct. 2001:

NEL FINBERG: "Jennifer Price at Metamor (about to be Ciber) has indicated that she can access the GEMS Access database and alter the Audit log without entering a password. What is the position of our development staff on this issue? Can we justify this?"

Principal engineer Clark acknowledges the security weakness and replies:

CLARK: "if you don't bring this up you might skate through Metamor."

He goes on to say:

CLARK: "Bottom line on Metamor is to find out what it is going to take to make them happy."

Metamor agrees to overlook the flaw.

FINBERG: "For now Metamor accepts the requirement to restrict the server password to authorized staff in the jurisdiction, and that it should be the responsibility of the jurisdiction to restrict knowledge of this password. So no action is necessary in this matter, at this time."

Finberg's response says the software has been approved because the user of the software will have a password. However, I showed in the same July 8 report that the GEMS password can be overwritten in five minutes by any 14-year old.

This leaves only the Windows NT security which is altogether outside the Diebold voting system. Unfortunately, other memos indicate that the less secure Windows XP system is now being installed, moving away from a previous requirement for Windows NT, which had at least some built-in security.

The Diebold memos also demonstrate that the company made fraudulent claims to the state of Georgia when selling its system.

Georgia voting machine R.F.P. March 2002: IV. PHASE I, DIEBOLD TECHNICAL PROPOSAL:] "Generated entries on the audit log cannot be terminated or interfered with by program control or by human intervention."

R.F.P. March 2002: IV. PHASE I, TECHNICAL PROPOSAL: "Beyond the standard array of Windows NT-based layered and encrypted security, GEMS application provides all the security measures necessary for complete system security."

Principal engineer Ken Clark also notes that the security flaw has been in place for at least a decade:

CLARK: "This isn't anything new. In VTS, you can open the database with progress and do the same This is all about Florida, and we have had VTS certified in Florida under the status quo for nearly ten years."

=================================

BlackBoxVoting.org contends that they have the right to publish the memos, which were given to them by a Diebold employee, and that this right supercedes Diebold's right to copyright protection because:

1) The Ken Clark memo demonstrates intent to break the law. The flaw violates both FEC standards and most state statutes. In California, for example, it is against the law to sell a voting system that is not tamper-resistant.

2) The publication of the memos serves an overriding public interest.

3) Other memos provide additional evidence of failure to follow the law, and reveal new security flaws. Specifically:

- At least two sets of memos discuss using cell phones to intercept and transmit vote data

- PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL: The memos document that Diebold has been using changed versions of software in elections, versions that were never submitted for certification at all. What this means is that none of the testing and certification protections apply, and no one, not the ITA, the secretary of state, or any election official (or, according to the memos, even Diebold's own tech support staff) have any idea at all what is contained in the lines of code in those uncertified programs.

What this means is that only three people in the world know what's in the Diebold software code used to run several elections, particularly in California. Two of these individuals are Canadian and one is a Russian living in Canada. Their names: Ken Clark, Talbot Iredale (a stockholder), and Dmitry Papushin.

I have provided a CD containing the memos to my congressman; at least two other members of congress in other states were also given the memos. A "rig-a-vote" CD from California activist Jim March containing step by step instructions with bona fide Diebold software showing how to change the audit log, overwrite the password, and change the votes during the midst of an election.

Over 500 activists in the USA, Canada, Europe and the South Pacific now have the Diebold memos.

- Diebold software is easy to tamper, according to Diebold's own principal engineer

- Diebold has been using untested, uncertified software in elections

- Diebold has been experimenting with insecure and unauthorized remote communications, including use of cell phones to intercept and transfer vote data during real elections.

- Diebold has submitted sales literature that misrepresents its system.

For complete set of memos, contact any voting activist to ask for directions to the next stop on the Diebold "Underground Railroad."

[E_Zapata]

6. oh - thanx much for the update.

I have missed all of this.

I will get on it in my state.

IMO, Diebold can only prosecute whoever the employee was who gave out these memos and only if that employee signed a promise to keep secret such papers.

Beautiful.

[Gordon25]

3. Go to...

...blackboxvoting.org as a starting place. Read as much as you can there about the Diebold emails. The go to your county attorney's website, and your attorney general's website. Look for any kind of link related to consumer fraud. Usually there will be a downloadable complaint form for you to print out and use. In some place you can file via email, but most complaints have to be hard copy.

Do an advanced Google search with all the terms "(name of your state) consumer fraud statutes". That will probably lead you to the laws on consumer fraud in your state so you can read what constitutes it there. Laws differ a bit from state to state. But you should have no trouble finding something in the Diebold emails to fit virtually any definition of consumer fraud.

Just remember, you are the end user and the secretary of state or local election officials purchased the Diebold system on your behalf.

Gordon25

[E_Zapata]

7. Got it. Understood. And I am on it.

thank you!

[Gordon25]

4. Help. Duplicate thread here. How do I fix? n/t

[papau]

5. We need sample filled out complaint including any exhibits such as

the letter, the emails to include, etc. so that the average non-lawyer can file.

Also need to know what the form is we would file and how does one typically get such - from what type office.

And Lastly, do we need a plan by our area to use Diebold - or can we file with no contract in our state with Diebold?

[E_Zapata]

8. 1st - go to your secretary of state site

there will be a link and info re the HAVA act. All states have a program under HAVA to get computer voting in all precincts by the 2004 election.

Even if Diebold didn't get the contract -- or if your state hasn't decided yet, Diebold has definitely submitted a proposal to provide their machines. That is called an application for the state's Request for Proposal (RFP). If Diebold did a RFP, they committed fraud. Bingo. You ask for an investigation on the RFP.

In a lot of states where Diebold was denied the RFP and a contract went to another company, Diebold is challenging the HAVA committees on their decision, saying it wasn't a fair process.

These complaints should be filed in every state.

[Gordon25]

10. See "Go to..." above.

Also, complaint forms vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. AZ's Attorney Genral consumer fraud complaint form is a single page PDF form, easy to fill out. Georgia's I understand from DemActivist is a 7 page form and requires extensive supporting documents, etc. So you will have to do a little digging in your jurisdiction.

Hope this helps.

Gordon25

[gristy]

9. Gordon posted twice by mistake

Go here to continue discussion:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=348894

[xchrom]

11. i suggest a dark ages approach

pitch forks and boiling oil.

[lazarus]

12. dupe

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=348894