British Briefing Papers Revealed (nice summary).

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From Americanprogress.org email to me this morning

British Briefing Papers Revealed

The Washington Post reported this weekend on more secret British memos, including an eight page paper written in July 2002, approximately around the time of the Downing Street Minutes, that warned the Bush administration had given "little thought" to "the aftermath and how to shape it." The American Progress Action Fund obtained the series of memos written by high-level British officials and has revealed their full text this morning. Although the Post's coverage of the memos focused on the British warnings that Bush lacked a post-war plan for Iraq, the Briefing Papers also shed further light on the key allegation in the Downing Street Minutes – that the intelligence on Iraq was being "fixed." The newly released documents show that the Bush administration was indeed selling the Iraq war based on evidence it knew was weak.

PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE WAS KNOWN TO BE WEAK: The Downing Street Minutes alleged that the intelligence on Iraq was being "fixed" around Bush's policy of attacking Iraq. Recent media spin surrounding the Minutes has sought to argue that when the British wrote "fixed," they actually meant something other than "manipulated." The new Briefing Papers reveal that the British knew the Iraq intelligence was weak, further suggesting that the definition of "fixed" is what most have read it to mean all along. The Iraq: Options Paper noted, "There is no greater threat now that will use WMD than there has been in recent years, so continuing containment is an option." British Foreign Office Political Director Peter Ricketts wrote, "US is scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al is so far frankly unconvincing." British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said, "There has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL and Al Qaida."

BRIEFING PAPERS REPEATEDLY WARNED THAT BUSH WAS FAILING TO PLAN FOR IRAQ: The Post writes of a July 2002 memo that warned the Bush administration had given "little thought" to "the aftermath and how to shape it." The claims in the newly uncovered Briefing Papers demonstrate that the Bush administration, to the detriment of our troops and national security, simply chose to ignore the recommendations of its key ally. Bush similarly chose to ignore the State Department, which also foresaw the problems the U.S. has encountered in Iraq. In August 2003, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a secret report that confirmed what the British and the State Department had predicted. The report entitled, "Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lessons Learned," blamed "setbacks in Iraq on a flawed and rushed war-planning process that 'limited the focus' for preparing for post-Saddam Hussein operations."

WHITE HOUSE SPIN CONTRADICTS BUSH: The White House has gone into full spin mode on the revelations of the British papers. "There was significant post war planning," said spokesman David Almacy. "More importantly, the memo in question was written eight months before the war began; there was significant post war planning in the time that elapsed." President Bush, however, in an interview he gave to the New York Times last August, admitted he made "a miscalculation of what the conditions would be" in post-war Iraq.

BLAIR'S ADVISER WARNED THAT BUSH WAS NOT PREPARED FOR WAR: In a paper written to Prime Minister Blair on 3/14/02, David Manning – Blair's former foreign policy adviser and current British ambassador to the U.S. – wrote about a meeting he had with Condi Rice. He reported, "Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions: how to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and justified; what value to put on the exiled Iraqi opposition; how to coordinate a US/allied military campaign with internal opposition (assuming there is any); what happens on the morning after?" In a dire prediction of what came about, Manning wrote: "I think there is a real risk that the Administration underestimates the difficulties."

BRITISH COULD NOT UNDERSTAND BUSH'S RUSH TO ATTACK IRAQ: Underlying the Briefing Papers is a sense that the British did not know the true motivations driving the Bush administration's Iraq policy. "Military operations need clear and compelling military objectives," wrote the British Foreign Office Political Director Peter Ricketts. "For Iraq, 'regime change' does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge match between Bush and Saddam." A British paper entitled "Iraq: Options Paper" sought to further understand Bush's motivations. "The US has lost confidence in containment. Some in government want Saddam removed. The success of Operation Enduring Freedom, distrust of UN sanctions and inspection regimes, and unfinished business from 1991 are all factors."

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1. i got is as an email to me--but they usually post it on their net site

also. AmericanProgress.org.