David L. Dill, a professor of computer science at Stanford University and founder of the watchdog site VerifiedVoting.org, said he isn't convinced that the Sequoia system is a change for the better.
There are problems with relying on electronic voting machines to record and count votes without the backup of a voter-verifiable audit trail, Dill concluded on his research site.
The Sequoia contract does not include a paper printout available to voters to verify their votes, making the system potentially risky. A paper printout would enable voters to view a printout of their ballot while it is displayed under glass before actually casting their ballot.
Bugs in the software or codes embedded into software could go undetected and impact outcomes, he said.
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County supervisors say they are confident that the machines are secure, but
intend to add a paper backup system as soon as the secretary of state certifies the equipment. The practice is currently being reviewed.
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http://www.losaltosonline.com/articles/2003/09/23/news/news02.txt