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Edited on Mon Jul-11-05 10:15 PM by kenny blankenship
something that had been ruled unthinkable from the beginning because of the risk of drawing the People's Republic Of China directly into the war, as happened ten years before in Korea.
The PRC lost an insane number of soldiers in Korea, something like half a million. But the fear in official Washington was that Mao would be ready to do it again. China had become an atomic power between Korea and the early years of Vietnam. And maybe the USSR also would want to go to war over it as well, after all they had advisors and technical people in N. Vietnam and in an invasion Americans would meet Russians face to face. I think the odds are that none of those doomsday scenarios would have happened had we invaded N. Vietnam. Vietnam wasn't important to either China nor the USSR. In 1954, both Russia and China were tired of Korea and hung Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Viet Minh out to dry. The Viet Minh had controlled 3/4 of the country directly but thanks to lack of interest on their behalf from allies in Moscow and Beijing they had to settle for a temporary partitition along the 17th parallel. But no one in Washington could know for sure the shallowness of "international Communism" and the lack of coordination among the eastern bloc around a longrange plan for "subversion in S.E. Asia", and in the calculations of sane Americans at least, it had to admitted that Vietnam wasn't that important to us either. It was not worth risking a wider conflict over. At the same time, everybody but everybody in official Washington erroneously believed the existence and direction of the Viet Cong was determined in the Kremlin, right down to unit level actions. It was a result of our own paranoia and brainwashing. Of course some of that can be excused because the Soviet Union and China were hardly what you could call transparent societies. Knowing what they were up to and what their intentions were was totally impossible, and in an absence of reliable evidence the mind of America's foreign policy elite reeled towards the darkest assumptions. They were sure Communism had a plan, and it had to be countered. But they also were sure Vietnam wasn't worth even the risk of WWIII, so the war had to be contained to S. Vietnam. It had to be a "police action", in which an internal rebellion would be put down instead of an all-or-nothing fight to the finish between the south and the north. They could look at the experience of Korea and conclude that the "fight to finish" was probably going to reach a similar impasse as it had there and nobody would say the slight fluctuation of a border was worth 50,000 dead Americans. Had they broken with those assumptions and pursued unconditional victory over Hanoi, the resultant numbers of dead would have been doubled surely for the Vietnamese people. American dead, I wouldn't predict because it would depend on the tactics used. It would get worse and worse for us the later in the conflict we decided to go north of the 17th parallel. By the time the North crushed the South, they had a large army indeed. The NVA had of course carried the brunt of the fighting since Tet, and had tried another conventional invasion of the south in 1972, but when they finally succeeded in 1975, they invaded with 17 full divisions. In terms of raw manpower that's larger than our entire Army at present. And I wouldn't doubt the committment of the NVA to the defense of the Hanoi government in the face of any odds. They wouldn't run off like the Iraqi Army did or surrender easily even when facing defeat. American planners had to be remembering the way the Japanese fought on, though militarily defeated, in places like Okinawa. From all we could see, the North also had that level of ideological committment to its government and nationhood. Instead of 58,000 dead Americans we could easily be talking about 250,000 or 300,000 dead Americans. Would that be victory?
Victory, as the RW defines it, would have been insanely costly. Of course they never give a shit about how many Vietnamese died or would die following a different course of action in the conflict. (Then they have the gall to talk about how we shouldn't have pulled out because the Vietnamese would be so much better off under us rather than Communist rule. Funny how we never allowed that to come to a vote in S. Vietnam. Ike didn't allow it, and Kennedy was informed in no uncertain terms by the CIA that the Communists would win in an election, followed by Buddhists, not our French collaborator friends.) 58,000 Americans weren't enough for the RW either. They'd still be there today saying the 58,000 dead demand to be avenged, even if it meant all S. Vietnamese dead and Cambodia and Laos in flames. If the hypothetical gamble to invade the North had failed or hit a snag, the Wingnutters would insist that our stalemated invasion of the North be restarted with a nuclear assault on Hanoi, Haiphong and any center of resistance in the field, lest it fail and require a humiliating retreat and abandonment of our war aims. And the use of nukes would be the last straw with the PRC and the USSR, and then very likely none of us would be here to chat so pleasantly about what might have been.
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