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Edited on Tue Jul-26-05 12:20 PM by kodi
To prove that a crime was committed, Fitzgerald must show that a government official revealed Plame's name or likeness while knowing that the administration was working to keep it concealed. Attorneys for the Times and Time magazine argued that reporters have a First Amendment right to resist disclosing confidential sources. In a separate brief before the Appelate Court, several dozen news organizations argued that journalists should not be questioned because there was "doubt that a crime has been committed" in the disclosure of Plame's name.a brief authored by a right wing lawyer who threw in everything she could troll up from the right wing media as an amicus brief in the case of miller refusing to tell what she knew to the grand jury. (I read the Brief) linked below. Several media organizations paid the lawyers to file the brief. Their description runs about a dozen pages. http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/tbl_s10News/FileUpload44/10159/Amici%20Brief%20032305%20(Final).PDF http://washingtontimes.com/national/20040722-115439-4033r.htm"officials said the disclosure that Mrs. Plame's cover was blown before the news column undermines the prosecution of the government official who might have revealed the name, officials said. "The law says that to be covered by the act the intelligence community has to take steps to affirmatively protect someone's cover," one official said. "In this case, the CIA failed to do that. "A second official, however, said the compromises before the news column were not publicized and thus should not affect the investigation of the Plame matter." The trial record accompanying the appeals by Miller and Cooper carried information -- a sealed record -- that has not been made public. It is an affidavit that was submitted by Special Counsel Fitzpatrick to Judge Hogan when Miller, Cooper, and other reporters (who have since cooperated with the investigation) sought to first block the subpoenas calling for them to appear before the grand jury. In a November 10, 2004 ruling, Judge Hogan addressed this information: "In his ex parte affidavit, Special Counsel outlines in great detail the developments in this case and the investigation as a whole," he explained. "The ex parte affidavit establishes that the government's focus has shifted as it has acquired additional information during the course of the investigation. Special Counsel now needs to pursue different avenues in order to complete its investigation." Judge Hogan then found, based on Fitzpatrick's information, that " the subpoenas were not issued in an attempt to harass the , but rather stem from legitimate needs due to an unanticipated shift in the grand jury's investigation." Judge Hogan concluded that because the "subpoenas bear directly on the grand jury investigation and are of a limited time and scope," Fitzpatrick was entitled to this information.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, relied on Branzburg, stressing that the leak at issue seems to have also been a crime:
"On the record before us,there is at least sufficient allegation to warrant grand jury inquiry that one or both journalists received information concerning the identity of a covert operative of the United States from government employees acting in violation of the law by making the disclosure."
The argument is being made that the Federal courts have not spoken on the claim that Plame was covert. However, in the amicus brief before Hogan and the Apppellate Court review of Judge Hogan’s decision, a claim was made that she was not covert at the time she was outed.
the amicus brief was written by that GOP intellectual whore Toensling.
In it it claims that Plame was not covert.
The Appellate Court, in reference to the claims outlined in the amicus brief, ruled
“We further conclude that other assignments of error raised by appellants are without merit. We therefore affirm the decision of the District Court."
Those “assignments of errors” included that Plame was not covert.
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200502/04-3138a.pdf
"United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued December 8, 2004 Decided February 15, 2005 Reissued April 4, 2005 No. 04-3138 IN RE: GRAND JURY SUBPOENA, JUDITH MILLER Consolidated with 04-3139, 04-3140
Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges. SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: An investigative reporter for the New York Times; the White House correspondent for the weekly news magazine Time; and Time, Inc., the publisher of Time, appeal from orders of the District Court for the District of Columbia finding all three appellants in civil contempt for refusing to give evidence in response to grand jury subpoenas served by Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald. Appellants assert that the information concealed by them, specifically the identity of confidential sources, is protected by a reporter’s privilege arising from the First Amendment, or failing that, by federal common law privilege. The District Court held that neither the First Amendment nor the federal common law provides protection for journalists’ confidential sources in the context of a grand jury investigation. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the District Court that there is no First Amendment privilege protecting the evidence sought. We further conclude that if any such common law privilege exists, it is not absolute, and in this case has been overcome by the filings of the Special Counsel with the District Court. We further conclude that other assignments of error raised by appellants are without merit. We therefore affirm the decision of the District Court.
pages 6 - 7
"The appellants have proceeded with common counsel and common briefing in a consolidated proceeding before this court. They assert four theories for reversal. Their first claim is that the First Amendment affords journalists a constitutional right to conceal their confidential sources even against the subpoenas of grand juries. Secondly, they claim that reporters enjoy an evidentiary privilege under the common law to conceal confidential sources. Adjunct to this claim, while denying that the privilege is less than absolute, they argue that if the privilege is in fact qualified, the United States has not overcome the privilege. Thirdly, appellants argue that their due process rights were violated by the Special Counsel’s ex parte and in camera submission of evidence to the court to establish that the United States had overcome any qualified privilege. Finally, they argue that the Special Counsel failed to comply with Department of Justice guidelines for the issuance of subpoenas to journalists, and that the failure to comply is an independent ground for reversal of their contempt conviction. Finding no grounds for relief under the First Amendment, due process clause, or Department of Justice guidelines, and persuaded that any common law privilege that exists would be overcome in this case, we affirm the judgment of the District Court for the reasons set out more fully below."
Pages 20-21
"Special Counsel’s compliance. The guidelines in question are set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 and the United States Attorney’s Manual, § 9-2.161. Those guidelines provide that subpoenas for testimony by news media must be approved by the Attorney General, a requirement not pertinent in the present case as the Special Counsel had received delegation of all the Attorney General’s authority, and should meet the following standards:
(a) “In criminal cases, there should be reasonable grounds to believe, based on information obtained from nonmedia sources, that a crime has occurred, and that the information sought is essential to a successful investigation–particularly with reference to establishing guilt or innocence. The subpoena should not be used to obtain peripheral, nonessential, or speculative information.” 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(f)(1)."
page 10
"As can be seen from the account of the underlying facts in Branzburg, there is no material factual distinction between the petitions before the Supreme Court in Branzburg and the appeals before us today. Each of the reporters in Branzburg claimed to have received communications from sources in confidence, just as the journalists before us claimed to have done. At least one of the petitioners in Branzburg had witnessed the commission of crimes. On the record before us, there is at least sufficient allegation to warrant grand jury inquiry that one or both journalists received information concerning the identity of a covert operative of the United States from government employees acting in violation of the law by making the disclosure. Each petitioner in Branzburg and each journalist before us claimed or claims the protection of a First Amendment reporter’s privilege. The Supreme Court in no uncertain terms rejected the existence of such a privilege. As we said at the outset of this discussion, the Supreme Court has already decided the First Amendment issue before us today.
In rejecting the claim of privilege, the Supreme Court made its reasoning transparent and forceful. The High Court recognized that “the grand jury’s authority to subpoena witnesses is not only historic . . . but essential to its task.” 408 U.S. at 688 (citation omitted). The grand juries and the courts operate under the “longstanding principle that ‘the public has a right to every man’s evidence,’ except for those persons protected by constitutional, common law, or statutory privilege.” Id. (citations and internal punctuation omitted). The Court then noted that “the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.” Id. at 689-90. The Court then expressly declined “to create another by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.” Id. at 690. In language as relevant to the alleged illegal disclosure of the identity of covert agents as it was to the alleged illegal processing of hashish, the Court stated that it could not “seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about a crime than to do something about it.” Id. at 692.
Lest there be any mistake as to the breadth of the rejection of the claimed First Amendment privilege, the High Court went on to recognize that “there remain those situations where a source is not engaged in criminal conduct but has information suggesting illegal conduct by others.” Id. at 693. As to this category of informants, the Court was equally adamant in rejecting the claim of First Amendment privilege:
e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news about crimes from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.
The Branzburg Court further supported the rejection of this claimed privilege by the commonsense observation that “it is obvious that agreements to conceal information relevant to the commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy.” Id. at 696. While the Court recognized the right of the press to abide by its agreements not to publish information that it has, the Court stated unequivocally that “the right to withhold news is not equivalent to a First Amendment exemption from an ordinary duty of all other citizens to furnish relevant information to a grand jury performing an important public function.” Id. at 697.
We have pressed appellants for some distinction between the facts before the Supreme Court in Branzburg and those before us today. They have offered none, nor have we independently found any. Unquestionably, the Supreme Court decided in Branzburg that there is no First Amendment privilege protecting journalists from appearing before a grand jury or from testifying before a grand jury or otherwise providing evidence to a grand jury regardless of any confidence promised by the reporter to any source. The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question. Without doubt, that is the end of the matter."
THE SYLLOGISM IS WRITTEN THUSLY:
1. (A) IS NOT = TO (NOT A)
COVERT IS NOT = TO NOT COVERT
2. (X) IS = TO (A), OR = TO (NOT A), BUT CAN NOT, BY THE FIRST STATEMENT ABOVE, BE EQUAL TO BOTH. HER STATUS WAS EQUAL TO COVERT OR EQUAL TO NOT COVERT.
3. THE COURT REJECTED (“AS WITHOUT MERIT”) THE CLAIM OF THE AMICUS BRIEF THAT PLAME’S STATUS (X) IS EQUAL TO (NOT A), 4. IPSO FACTO, PLAME’S STATUS (X) IS EQUAL TO (A), viz.., Plame was a covert agent
If the amicus brief claims that Plame was not covert, and the Court concludes that such a claim is without merit, what else is the court saying but that Plame was covert? It rejects the thesis that Plame was not covert. What remains, by analog logic can only be the affirmation of the antithesis, viz., the conclusion by the Court that she was covert.
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