Looks like Gen. Byrnes was replaced by three star Lieutenant General Anthony Jones:
http://www.kwtx.com/home/headlines/1666606.html So then I Google the replacement and find this:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/200... Special Defense Department Briefing on Results of Investigation of Military Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib Prison FacilityMajor General Fay was initially appointed by Lieutenant General Sanchez, who later recused himself so that the report could account for all of his chain of command to include himself. I was named as the appointing official, as a result of that, in June, and Lieutenant General Jones was named as the senior investigating officer.
Q And just one question -- I'm sorry -- for General Jones. Do any failings by the general in charge at the time in Iraq, do they rise to the possible level of criminal negligence?
GEN. KERN: We did not find that, but I'll let General Jones, who did that, answer your question.
GEN. JONES: As you know, I was charged with looking at the chain of command above the 205th Brigade. And as General Kern has said, putting things in context, what they were faced with as they transitioned from 5th Corps -- and the commander -- faced with a counterinsurgency -- fighting that while transitioning numerous people.
In my 34 years -- I started a little bit later in life in the military than General Kern, so I only have 34-plus years -- I can sympathize with what they were going through, the complexity of the environment, what it's like to fight a war.
As I look at it, I had to determine three things. In the chain of command of the 205th, were they directly or indirectly involved in the execution of the mission they had given their subordinate units? Did they provide clear and consistent guidance to those units and to those leaders? And did they resource them appropriately?
Given the responsibilities in our profession of the commanders at all levels being responsible for the leadership below them and the units below them, my conclusion was two things: one, that the leadership above the 205th MI Brigade were not directly responsible for the violent abuses that happened as we've depicted. However, I will tell you they bear responsibility for those things that happened in the units and the soldiers underneath them happened. But neither did their policies, procedures, nor doctrine, nor training also cause or condone the actions that were taken, specifically the violent abuses and the sexual misconduct.Q So you're saying -- I'm sorry -- (inaudible) -- neither General Sanchez nor General Karpinski should be brought up on charges. (Off mike) -- this because --
GEN. KERN: Let me clarify. Remember General Karpinski is the commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade.
Q But she was in the chain of command.
GEN. KERN: She was -- we would like to say that, but not explicitly. And that was one of the confusion factors that we did find and report on. What we found was that -- and General Jones reports on it very clearly, and I'll let him add to that -- is there should have been clear direction given from General Sanchez and his deputy to ensure that General Karpinski knew what her role was.
Q But as far as any charges are concerned, potential charges?
GEN. KERN: Again, we are not referring charges that are outside the boundaries of that, and some of those already are in the report that General Taguba has submitted on the 800th MP Brigade, which did include General Karpinski. I'm not trying to duck your answer, but it could be referred to outside of our report.
Q General Jones has made pretty clear that he doesn't think that your top general should in any way face charges, given the circumstances.GEN. JONES: We've provided our report and all the things in our report to include the mitigating circumstances of what this unit -- what the headquarters, with General Sanchez, and what they were going through, to include: continue to prosecute the war; the counterinsurgency; support the Coalition Provisional Authority; support the Iraqi people in the reconstruction efforts of their country and the establishment of the directorates which they needed to establish, working with different agencies and entities to do that; and what that caused them somewhat, based on their under-resourcing and movement to that transition to a combined joint task force; all that was going on at the same time.
They completely changed the leadership in their staff, moving from tactical level to operational and strategic level. They had to change the mind-set at the same time they had to fight for intelligence, establish an intelligence operational structure which enabled them to fight that counterinsurgency, determining who this faceless enemy was, what the support base was, and so forth. And that morphed over a period of four to five months in which they worked 24/7 just to get that accomplished.
GEN. KERN: I think to very specifically answer, we did not find General Sanchez culpable but we found him responsible for the things that did or did not happen.