Katrina: Were all these bureaucrats necessary? Did some unintentionally

[AirAmFan]

do or not do things that led to unnecessary deaths for hurricane and flood survivors?

There have been several DU threads about first reponders from elsewhere in the nation who couldn't penetrate tight "Homeland Security" around the Gulf disaster zone, about a physician who was stopped from saving the life of a dying woman, and about officials who repeatedly decided it was not "safe" for busdrivers, helicopter pilots, and boat operators to enter New Orleans. Just who the officials were who seemed to have a nutty bureaucratic agenda of their own has not been determined.

But, if you look at DHS's organizational chart and National Response Plan, "ESF 13" for the Texas or Atlanta "Regional Resource Coordination Centers" VI or IV jumps out as the most likely culprit. Has anyone run across news stories about specific "Public Safety and Security" bureaucrats preventing rescue operations during Katrina? The job description for "ESF 13" officials sounds like almost pure bureacratic interference with useful rescue efforts: "badging and credentialing", "access control", "site security", and "force protection".

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DETAILS

The following is a functional breakdown of Homeland Security organization for catastrophes, drawn from a glossary of DHS jargon at http://www.fema.gov/txt/preparedness/faatlist03_05.txt :

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMA Acronyms Abbreviations and Terms

The FAAT List is not designed to be an authoritative source, merely a handy reference. ...

ESF Emergency Support Function(s)
ESF 01 Transportation
ESF 02 Communications
ESF 03 Public Works and Engineering
ESF 04 Firefighting
ESF 05 Emergency Management
ESF 06 Mass Care, Housing and Human Services
ESF 07 Resource Support
ESF 08 Public Health and Medical Services
ESF 09 Urban Search and Rescue
ESF 10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF 11 Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF 12 Energy
ESF 13 Public Safety and Security
ESF 14 Long-term Community Recovery and Mitigation
ESF 15 External Affairs

According to the multi-megabyte National Response Plan (online at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf ), Regional Resource Coordination Centers (RRCCs) are responsible for deploying teams to carry out these functions during the early days of non-terror catastrophes.

The "FEMA National Situation Report" early on Labor Day (online at http://www.hazus.org/KATRINA/2005Sep05_FEMA_Natl_sitrep.pdf ) reported that four RRCCs were active:

€ Region IV RRCC at Level I (full activation)
€ Region VI RRCC at Level I (full activation)
€ Region III RRCC at Level III
€ Region V RRCC at Level III.

And the National Response Plan lists these duties for "ESF #13" teams:

"ESF #13-4 ESF #13 … Public Safety and Security Annex December 2004

Incident Management Activities: While State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities have primary responsibility for public safety and security, ESF #13 provides Federal public safety and security assistance to support prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery priorities in circumstances where locally available resources are overwhelmed or are inadequate, or where a unique Federal capability is required. This may include but is not limited to the following activities, when appropriate: ...

Badging and Credentialing: Assisting in the establishment of consistent processes for issuing identification badges to emergency responders and other personnel needing access to places within a controlled area, and verifying emergency responder credentials.

Access Control: Providing security forces to support State and local efforts (or to secure sites under Federal jurisdiction) to control access to the incident site and critical facilities.

Site Security: Providing security forces and establishing protective measures around the incident site, critical infrastructure, and/or critical facilities. ...

Force Protection: Providing for the protection of emergency responders and other workers operating in a high-threat environment...."

Don't these activities sound EXACTLY like those described as having slowed down the Federal response by several days? Were there unnecessary bureaucrats onscene whose only reason for being was to interfere with vital rescue efforts?

If so, the Katrina experience is a great argument for REMOVING FEMA from the Department of Homeland Security and making it a separate cabinet-level agency again. Maybe tasks like these are necessary for terrorist events, but IMO they may not be necessary -- and could be fatal to survivors -- during natural disasters.

[Retired AF Dem]

1. Not a new problem

Rarely had the failure of the federal government been so apparent and so acute. On August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew leveled a 50-mile swath across southern Florida, leaving nearly 200,000 residents homeless and 1.3 million without electricity. Food, clean water, shelter, and medical assistance were scarce. Yet, for the first three days, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is responsible for coordinating federal disaster relief, was nowhere to be found. And when FEMA did finally arrive, its incompetence further delayed relief efforts. Food and water distribution centers couldn't meet the overwhelming need; lines literally stretched for miles. Mobile hospitals arrived late. In everything it did, FEMA appeared to live up to the description once given to it by South Carolina Sen. Ernest Hollings: "the sorriest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses I've ever known."

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0509.franklin.html

[AirAmFan]

2. Great article! Note the second paragraph and beyond explain how Clinton

and Witt quickly cleaned FEMA up, only for Dubya and Ridge to destroy it again with incompetents and a highly unlikely primary mission.

From http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0509.franklin.html :

'Fast forward one year to the summer of 1993: Weeks of unrelenting rainfall had driven the level of the Mississippi River and its tributaries far beyond the previous records. Every county in the state of Iowa was declared a federal disaster area, as were portions of eight other states in the river basin. But this time, FEMA's response earned nothing but praise. The agency met the needs of the flood victims quickly and with few of its trademark bureaucratic tangles. Said Congressman Norman Mineta, then chair of the committee that oversees the agency, "FEMA has delivered finally on its promise to stand with the American people when floods or hurricanes or earthquakes devastate their communities."...

The high number of political appointees allowed the new administration to free itself of the incompetents and replace them with talented new people. Clinton agreed to let Witt interview all potential appointees to ensure that they were qualified for the jobs. As a result, the resumes of the team they assembled are formidable. Elaine McReynolds, head of the Federal Insurance Administration served as the insurance commissioner of Tennessee for over seven years. Richard Moore, a former state legislator from Massachusetts, was appointed to help make state and local governments better prepared for disasters. Carrye Brown, head of the Fire Administration, had worked on Capitol Hill for 18 years where she was a specialist in disaster and fire legislation.

With a new mandate and the staff to go with it, Witt conducted a top-to-bottom review of FEMA's mission, its personnel, and its resources. The review brought swift changes. In its first two years, the agency shut down several unneeded field offices. It reduced internal regulations by 12 percent and drafted a plan to reduce them by 50 percent by the end of 1995. It strengthened programs that prepared states for natural disasters. And, so it could better inform state directors what aid was available, FEMA conducted the first comprehensive inventory in the agency's history.

Recognizing the unlikelihood of a massive nuclear attack, Witt also moved the agency out of the nuclear war business, making available to natural disaster responses many of the resources the agency had accumulated in preparation for a Soviet attack. One hundred FEMA disaster specialists were freed up to deal with natural catastrophes."

[Retired AF Dem]

3. Kick

Since this was posted in the evening hours believe it needs more exposure.